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By 
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Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a chronic disorder characterized by pervasive 
difficulties in the emotion regulation system.  While it is clear that individuals with BPD 
frequently exhibit intense emotional reactions, lack bilities to effectively manage such 
emotions, and often engage in serious maladaptive behaviors as a consequence of intense 
emotions, many aspects of the process by which this sequence occurs are not well understood. 
One crucial aspect of emotion regulation is the processing and perception of cues from the 
environment.  To date, processing of emotional cues in individuals with BPD has been 
understudied.  Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold.   First, a thorough overview of the 
literature on the development of both emotion regulation and emotion processing will be 
presented.  Next, theories linking emotion processing, emotion regulation and the development 
of BPD will be critically analyzed. Finally, a study esigned to investigate perception and 
processing in individuals with BPD versus a healthy control group will be presented, and the 
results will be discussed.   This study presented is the first identified study to examine emotion 
perception in BPD using a unitary measure of facial and auditory emotion perception, and to then 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a prevalent, chronic, and often debilitating 
disorder (APA, 2000; Linehan, 1993).  Diagnostic criteria of BPD include a pervasive pattern of 
at least five of the following: frantic efforts to avoid abandonment, a pattern of instability in 
relationships, unstable self-image, impulsivity, recurrent suicidal behavior, labile mood, chronic 
feelings of emptiness, difficulty controlling anger, and dissociative symptoms when under stress 
(APA, 2000, 2013).  As the characteristics imply, those with BPD are typically living chaotic, 
crisis-ridden lives that are often described as unbearable.  The symptom picture can vary widely 
(Digre, Reece, Johnson & Thomas, 2009), such that some researchers have suggested that there 
are BPD sub-types with varying degrees of psychopathology such as: internalizing - 
dysregulated, externalizing - dysregulated, and histrionic - impulsive (Zittel Conklin, Westen, & 
Bradley, 2006).   
 The conceptualization of BPD has been fraught withcontroversy. For instance, different 
theoretical conceptualizations postulate quite varied hypotheses about the core 
psychopathological constructs that are believed to underlie the disorder.  Some have attributed 
behavioral patterns observed in borderline patients to faulty internal object representations 
(Kernberg, 1967, 1975, 1976), or to faulty  (Fonagy, Target, & Gergely, 2000) or disorganized 
attachment (Judd & McGlashan, 2003), and more recently as a disorder of emotion dysregulation 
(Linehan, 1993).  
One theory that has received a lot of attention and resonates well with the diagnostic 
picture of BPD is Linehan’s biosocial theory (1993).  According to Linehan (1993), BPD is 
primarily a disorder of emotion dysregulation and emerges from interactions between individuals 
with biological vulnerabilities and specific environmental influences.  This theory is based on 
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biosocial underpinnings, and identifies emotion regulation difficulties as being at the core of the 
disorder. The dysfunction proposed by Linehan (1993) is one of broad dysregulation across all 
aspects of emotional responding. Consequences of this dysregulation are a heightened emotional 
sensitivity, an inability to regulate intense emotional responses, and a slow return to emotional 
baseline.  When emotion dysregulation regularly occurs, it can lead to dysfunctional response 
patterns during emotionally difficult events (Crowell, Beauchaine, & Linehan, 2009; Linehan, 
1993). Over time, the result is that many individuals with BPD experience either extreme 
emotional responses or a blunting of emotional respon es (in emotionally charged situations; 
Wagner & Linehan, 1999).   
In addition, Linehan (1993) proposed that a precursor to the development of BPD and 
emotion dysregulation occurs within an invalidating environment.  An invalidating environment 
can be characterized by an intolerance of the expression of emotions, which is often coupled with 
intermittent reinforcement of extreme expressions of emotion (Crowell, Beauchaine, & Linehan, 
2009).  When a child is raised in this type of environment, according to Linehan (1993), it is 
communicated to the child that such emotional displays are unwarranted and that emotions 
should be coped with internally and without parental support. Consequently, the child does not 
learn how to understand, label, regulate, or tolerate emotional responses and instead learns to 
oscillate between emotional inhibition and extreme emotional lability (Crowell, Beauchaine, & 
Linehan, 2009; Linehan, 1993).  
In Linehan’s model, many of the problem behaviors ob erved in individuals diagnosed 
with BPD such as impulsive behaviors, interpersonal problems, dissociative behaviors, and self-
injurious behaviors are understood as attempts to modulate extreme emotions; additionally they 
can also be a means of inducing emotional experience when none exists (e.g. wanting to feel 
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‘real’; Wagner & Linehan, 1999; Westen, 1991).  Furthe more, inaccurate appraisal of 
interpersonal interactions may fuel interpersonal istability (e.g. assumption of abandonment; 
alternating extreme views of others or love/hate) thus leading to emotional reactivity and 
continuing the emotion dysregulation cycle. Consequently, emotion identification and regulation 
are key targets of intervention in psychotherapeutic treatment for BPD (Linehan, 1993). 
As stated above, emotion regulation is understood t be core pathology in BPD, yet much 
remains to be learned about how and why individuals with BPD have difficulty managing 
emotions effectively.  Therefore, this paper will first review the literature on the childhood 
development of emotion regulation.  Next, one of the first steps in emotion regulation, social 
information processing, will be reviewed, with a particular focus on the interpretation, or 
perception of emotional cues.  The paper will then return to BPD, and a link between the 
development of emotion regulation, emotion processing, and the disorder will be offered.  
Finally, a research study will be presented with the aim of examining differences in emotion 
processing between individuals with BPD and healthy controls. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Emotion Regulation 
This section reviews the existing literature on emotion regulation. According to 
Thompson (1994) “Emotion regulation consists of the extrinsic and intrinsic processes 
responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions; especially their 
intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one's goals” ( p. 27).   The term “emotion 
regulation” does not necessarily refer to one’s ability to change their emotion (e.g. anger to 
happiness), but rather one’s ability to alter the dynamic of a given emotion (Thompson & Meyer, 
2007).  In other words, individuals use emotion regulation to maintain or modify the intensity, 
escalation, or extent of an emotional response.  Emotion regulation can be contrasted with the 
term “emotion dysregulation” which has been defined by Linehan and colleagues (2007) as “the 
inability, even when one’s best efforts are applied, to change or regulate emotional cues, 
experiences, actions, verbal responses, and/or non-verbal expressions under normative 
conditions” (Linehan, Bohus, & Lynch, 2007, p. 583). Thompson (1991) notes that the degree to 
which individuals use emotion regulation strategies d pends on their goals for the situation, 
despite whether their goals are shared by others. Therefore, people in seemingly similar 
situations may react very differently. Thompson andMeyer (2007) caution against viewing 
differential use of emotion regulation strategies as either inherently optimal or maladaptive, and 
instead suggested considering emotion regulation strategies as means to an end. This can be 
contrasted with Linehan’s (1993) position that problematic behavior (including suicidality) can 
be attributed, at least in part, to emotion regulation deficits in individuals. Thus, individuals may 
not employ emotion regulation strategies either because they do not have such strategies in their 
behavioral repertoires, or because using them is not required or desirable, given their goals for 
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any given social situation. Before proceeding furthe , it will be useful to examine the basic 
processes understood by researchers to constitute emotion regulation. 
Emotion regulation can be either a conscious or an automatic process; it can be 
conceptualized to exist on a continuum from conscious and effortful to unconscious and 
effortless.  According to Gross and Thompson (2007), one learns from both internal responses 
and from their environment both how and when to regulate their emotions. Therefore, those in an 
individual’s early environment are believed to be very influential in the development of emotion 
regulation skills.  Researchers have identified several contributing factors, both internal and 
environmental, that lead to the development of emotion regulation.  Because these contributing 
factors are ongoing moderators of differences in emotion management, individuals reach 
adulthood with a wide array of abilities in emotion regulation.  Unfortunately, as will be 
discussed below, some internal and environmental factors can put children at risk for under-
developed emotion regulation abilities, or in some cases affect-dysregulated psychopathology 
(Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  
Development.  The development of emotion regulation is heavily re iant on outside 
influences, but the influence of neurobiological development cannot be ignored (Thompson & 
Meyer, 2007).  Researchers have generally identified th  overall temperament of the child, the 
prefrontal cortex (including the excretion of cortisol), and the growth of cognitive processes 
(including the ability to understand emotion), as internal factors related to the development of 
emotion regulation (Thompson, 1994).  As Gunnar and Vazquez (2006) have noted, all of these 
factors interact with the external environment, including parental and peer influences, creating a 
tightly intertwined relationship that leads to the development of emotion regulation.  For 
instance, if children are not protected from overwhelming stress in their environment, 
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neurohormonal stress systems can become sensitive in ways that can make the child biologically 
vulnerable to ongoing problems in stress, or emotion regulation (Gunnar & Vazquez, 2006).  
However, the temperament of the child, which is thought to be determined even prior to 
exposure to stress, can play a role in the child’s reaction to stress (Halberstadt, Denham & 
Dunsmore, 2001).  Therefore, researchers have some difficulty pinpointing the neurological 
influences verses the environmental influences on emotional development.  Both will be 
discussed extensively here. 
Internal influences. Neurobiology. Gunnar and Quevedo (2007) explain how, from a 
purely biological perspective, people can differ in their vulnerabilities or resilience to stressful 
events, and how vulnerabilities to stress can make one prone to developing problems with 
emotion regulation.  They first explain the role of the sympathetic-adrenomedullary (SAM) 
system and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adremocortical (HPA) system.  In general, the SAM 
releases adrenaline and activates the fight/flight response.  The role of HPA is much more 
complex, but includes the production of cortisol, the primary hormone that is produced in 
response to psychological stress (Flinn & England, 1995).  Gunnar and Quevedo (2007) have 
identified that HPA supports acute fight/flight responses, but suppresses the impact of the 
reactions to such situations, which in simpler terms can be referred to as emotion regulation.  The 
researchers state that the SAM and HPA systems are centrally connected by limbic brain circuits 
and involve the amygdala, hippocampus, and orbital/medial prefrontal cortex.  Together, these 
brain circuits are all involved in responding to psychosocial stressors (Gunnar & Quevedo, 
2007).  In the short term, rises in cortisol levels for the activation of the fight or flight response, 
supports healthy functioning.  When the system is activ ted repetitively or when cortisol levels 
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are consistently elevated, the body is more vulnerabl  to both physical and mental problems 
(Flinn & England, 1995; Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007).    
Certain environmental factors play a role in either the healthy development of this 
intricate system or how much the system gets taxed or worn down.  As mentioned, cortisol is 
produced by the HPA circuit and plays an essential role in the regulation and support of human 
functioning (Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007).   Researchers ave monitored cortisol levels over time, 
typically through saliva samples, and compared the lev ls to the environmental stressors of 
children (Flinn & England, 1995; Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007).   Numerous longitudinal studies 
(Dettling, Gunnar & Donzella, 1999; Dettling & Parke , 2000; Flinn & England, 1995; Gunnar, 
Sebanc, Tout, Donzella, & van Dulmen, 2003; McBurnett, Lahey, Rathouz & Loeber, 2000) 
demonstrate that abnormal cortisol levels can cause wear and tear on the ‘stress regulation’ 
system, making one more vulnerable to stress regulation difficulties during childhood and into 
adolescence and adulthood.   
As has been mentioned by several researchers before them, Gunnar and Quevedo (2007) 
also affirm that the primary source of stress and also the most powerful buffers against harmful 
stressors are the primary caregivers in a child’s life.  For instance, in a longitudinal study 
conducted over two years by Gunnar and colleagues (1996), differences in cortisol levels were 
found between 73 children who had formed secure attachments to their caregivers, and those 
who had not.  In this study, attachment to caregivers (mainly mothers) was determined by the 
Strange Situation, developed by Ainsworth and Wittig (1969). Cortisol levels were measured 
through saliva samples.   
Briefly, the Strange Situation includes the observation of a parent (instructed to be 
passive) with their child who is allowed to explore th  room.  A stranger enters the room and 
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speaks with the mother and then approaches the child for a brief interaction and leaves.  The 
parent leaves the child alone in the room shortly thereafter, and then returns after a few moments 
to comfort the child.  The response of the child upon reuniting is reportedly an indication of the 
level of attachment between the mother and child (Ainsworth, 1969). For the experimental 
portion of the Gunnar and Quevedo (2007) study, infants and toddlers, who were with their 
caregivers, were presented with a distressing situation (standard care inoculations at 2, 4, 6 and 
15 months), and their cortisol levels were measured before and after. Those with secure 
attachments did not have a rise in cortisol levels, whereas those with insecure attachments did.  
Furthermore, those with secure attachments did not have rises in cortisol levels, even when they 
were crying to elicit soothing from their caregivers (a signal of being in distress).  Therefore, the 
authors suggest that a secure attachment has a direct relation to the manner in which children 
respond to distressing situations and the levels of cortisol they produce to handle such situations 
(Gunnar et al., 1996).   
Studies such as this suggest that children who haveinsecure attachments have ongoing 
elevations in cortisol, possibly due to an increased nsitivity to their unstable environment, 
which causes wear and tear to the HPA system.  As mentioned, HPA is thought to be directly 
involved in the emotion regulation process, as mediat  by cortisol levels, and ongoing stress to 
this system may cause one to become more vulnerable to stress (Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007).    
Beyond the role of primary caregivers, family dynamics are also putative factors in 
cortisol reactivity.  Upon longitudinal observation f 247 children, Flinn and England (1995) 
found that children exposed to traumatic family events and severe caretaking problems had 
chronic changes in cortisol levels over time. The researchers collected cortisol levels through 
twice daily saliva samples for 6 days a month over a four month period, for seven years (i.e. 24 
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days a year over 7 years).  Flinn and England (1995) found that children who were raised in 
stressful environments (e.g. fighting, arguments, belittling) exhibited high levels of cortisol 
throughout their childhood.  The researchers also documented an interesting finding in infants 
specifically.  Those children who were poorly taken care of as infants (e.g. neglected, abandoned 
by their mother, exposed to parental alcoholism) exhibited either extremely low cortisol levels 
with occasional high spikes, or chronically high levels.  Flinn and England (1995) explained that 
in their sample, chronically low cortisol levels were associated with antisocial and delinquent 
tendencies in the children, and chronically high leve s were associated with anxiety and 
withdrawal, as the children got older.   
In support of the aggression/delinquency finding, a study conducted by McBurnett and 
colleagues (2000) also found a relationship between cortisol levels and aggression in boys.  
Twice over four years, saliva samples were collected from 38 boys who had been referred to 
clinics for “aggression and disruptive behavior.”  The authors found that low cortisol levels were 
associated with persistent early onset aggression. Those boys who had low cortisol 
concentrations at both collections reportedly exhibited triple the number of aggressive symptoms 
in comparison to those boys who had higher concentrations of cortisol at either collection time 
(McBurnett et al., 2000).   
As children move into more social environments such as day-care and/or school, new 
stressors emerge and can affect a still developing stress regulation system.  Peer interactions can 
be a significant stressor, especially when social skills have not yet been solidified (Gunnar & 
Quevedo, 2007).  In child care settings, researchers ave reported that children with high cortisol 
levels are also those who are observed to be less socially competent and less able to regulate 
negative emotions and aggression (Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007).  For instance, Dettling and 
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colleagues (2000) found that both quality of care and child temperament can affect cortisol 
levels.  Using observational rating scales in the environment, a d parental and preschool teacher 
reports as a measure of child temperament, three groups of 20 children (in-home childcare; no 
outside childcare; and center childcare) were monitored for both the attention the child received 
and the stimulation the environment provided.  The researchers determined that children’s 
cortisol patterns over the day correlated significantly with the amount of attention and 
stimulation provided by the childcare provider or setting.  Children in out-of- home settings that 
were determined by the raters to provide relatively more focused attention and stimulation, did 
not have changes in cortisol between home and childcare, while those in settings with relatively 
less attention and stimulation exhibited higher leve s of cortisol production while at the childcare 
facility. Children whose child care was provided in home did exhibit normal fluctuations in 
cortisol levels; higher in the morning with decreass in the afternoon (Dettling et al., 2000).   
Patterns of cortisol production at childcare were also correlated with child temperament.  
Dettling and colleagues (2000) found inverse cortisl production (i.e. larger increases in cortisol 
from morning to afternoon) for children who had been d scribed as having a more emotionally 
negative temperament, and for those children with less self-control.  These cortisol patterns were 
not the same as those found when the same group of children were at home, suggesting that the 
influence of the childcare setting caused a stress to the emotional and self-regulation system of 
the children (Dettling et al., 2000) 
Other studies have examined cortisol and peer status of children.  In comparison to “liked 
children,” those who are rejected by their peers as early as the preschool years have been 
observed to have elevations in cortisol levels (Gunnar et al., 2003).  The interaction between peer 
rejection, temperament, and cortisol levels was examined by Gunnar and colleagues (2003).  
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Preschool teachers completed questionnaires regardin  the temperament and aggressiveness of 
82 of their students.  The researchers collected saliva samples during two five-week periods in 
the fall and spring.  To measure peer rejection, the researchers interviewed each student and had 
them select three classmates from class photos whom t ey “especially like” and “really don’t like 
very much.” The researchers found that children with poor behavioral control had more 
aggressive temperaments, and that aggressive children were more likely to be rejected by their 
peers.  Rejected children in turn, exhibited higher cortisol levels.  Thus, according to the authors, 
peer rejection and aggressive temperament are indirectly related to higher cortisol levels (Gunnar 
et al., 2003).   
The findings discussed here illuminate the interaction between biology and environment, 
whereby peer rejection is associated with aggression and poor emotion regulation, and high 
cortisol levels are thought to influence the vulnerability to emotional stress (Gunnar & Quevedo, 
2007; Gunnar et al., 2003).  As has been mentioned here, another internal influence on the ability 
to emotionally regulate is temperament.  While it has proven to be difficult to decipher, 
researchers have attempted to determine which typesof t mperament, if any, play a role in 
whether children become effective at self regulating heir emotions.   
Temperament.  A study conducted by Calkins and Johnson (1998) examined the role of 
temperament and maternal reactions in toddler’s ability to regulate their emotions during 
unstructured ‘free play’, teaching tasks with their mother (showing the child how to use a shape 
sorter), and frustration tasks.  The frustration tasks included taking away a toy and putting it in a 
closed plastic container, showing the child a snack but denying them the food for two minutes, 
sitting the child in a highchair to wait for a toy for five minutes, and taking a toy from the toddler 
and putting it behind a glass barrier.   
12 
 
In seventy-three eighteen- month-old toddlers, the authors assessed individual differences 
in emotion regulation in relation to physiological arousal, temperamental frustration distress, and 
maternal reaction to the distress and emotion regulation of their child.  They also attempted to 
determine whether a relationship between all three could predict adaptive or non-adaptive 
emotion regulation behaviors (Calkins & Johnson, 1998).   
Physiological arousal was monitored through heart rate; frustration distress was 
monitored in 10-second intervals and included monitoring of fussing or crying (latency, 
frequency, duration, and intensity level 1-5); regulatory behaviors were also monitored at 10-
second intervals and included self-comforting, mother-orientation (retreating), distraction, 
aggression/venting, and constructive coping.  Three typ s of maternal interaction were scored, 
including frequency of positive guidance (positive expressions, physical affection, and 
support/guidance), negative control (e.g. negative verbal expressions, physical control, and 
verbal control), and preemptive interference (not all wing the child to decipher the task on their 
own; Calkins & Johnson, 1998).   
Calkins and Johnson (1998) did not find a direct relation between the physiological 
arousal (as measured by heart rate) of the toddler and distress.  In other words, in this study, 
heart rate alone was not a predictor of distress in toddlers.   The authors did find a relationship 
between distress and emotion regulation behaviors, whereby the toddlers who exhibited distress 
tended to also act aggressively during the frustration tasks.  The authors postulate that those 
toddlers who became distressed may not have yet devloped effective coping mechanisms 
because they had not yet been exposed to situations at home that caused distress, or they may 
have been prone to becoming more easily frustrated.  On the contrary, those children who were 
not distressed may not have found the tasks frustrating, or may have had opportunities to develop 
13 
 
emotion regulation strategies prior to the experiment.  In addition, the authors determined that 
once distressed, toddlers’ abilities to implement emotion regulation were reduced (Calkins & 
Johnson, 1998).  In other words, when distress was not targeted early on, the ability to regulate 
emotions became inhibited and less likely to occur for the toddler.   
Distress of the toddler was also related to the mother’s interaction style.  The toddlers 
whose mothers intervened early to assist them in free-play tasks were found to be more easily 
distressed in the frustration tasks.  Those mothers who provided positive feedback and guidance 
during unstructured play tasks (i.e. no behavioral intervention) had toddlers who implemented 
constructive coping behaviors during frustration tasks.  Interestingly, the authors also found that 
the more negative and controlling the mother was during play, the less distressed the child was 
during frustration tasks (Calkins & Johnson, 1998).   
Considering these results, Calkins and Johnson (1998) theorized that mothers who do too 
much for their children may be doing so to avoid emotional outbursts, which may be a 
characteristic of the child’s personality.  Furthermo e, they suggest that early intervention during 
tasks not only inhibits the child learning new tasks, but also inhibits the learning of emotion 
regulation.  This inhibiting in turn, fuels a low tolerance for frustration when the child becomes 
more independent and no longer has their mother to rely on (Calkins & Johnson, 1998).  Both 
positive and negative verbal expressions, according to Calkins and Johnson (1998), may serve to 
encourage the child to develop self-control.   
Eisenberg and colleagues (1996) explain that individual differences in emotional 
reactivity (including ego resiliency and ego control), are often referred to as temperament in the 
literature, and are thought to influence the degree and type of emotional responding.  These 
researchers assessed several types of regulation and ego resiliency in a study of 199 children 
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(102 boys) in grades from kindergarten through third.  A secondary goal of the research study 
was to examine baseline facial and physiological rectivity to a distressful stimulus.   
For this research, Eisenberg and colleagues (1996) operationalized resiliency as “the 
dynamic capacity of individuals to modify their modal level of ego control (regulation) as a 
function of the demands of the environment” (p. 143).  According to this definition, there are two 
ends of the continuum, high ego resiliency, and ego brittleness.  Ego control as mentioned within 
this definition, is itself defined as “the threshold f operating characteristic of an individual with 
regard to the expression of containment of impulses, feelings, and desires” (Eisenberg et al., 
1996, p.143).  According to the authors, ego control is also on a continuum, and includes over-
control and under-control (Eisenberg et al., 1996).  Neither over- nor under-control is optimal 
however, but instead, moderate levels are reportedly most effective for social competence.    
Concerning temperament, Eisenberg and colleagues (1996) expected children with high negative 
emotionality and low regulation to be prone to behavior problems, and children with high or 
optimal regulation, regardless of their emotionality, to not exhibit behavior problems.   
Eisenberg and colleagues (1996) measured emotionaliy in children by adult reports, 
physiologically, and through children’s facial expressions.  Upon arrival to the research lab, the 
child was connected to electrodes to measure heart rate and skin conductance.  As a baseline 
measure of physiological activity, the child was shown a film about dolphins that was originally 
created for use as a meditation video.  After the dolphin film, another video was shown which 
first depicts a girl at home playing in her room, and then a fire starts from the lamp and the girl is 
seriously burned.  This film was used to elicit distre s reactions in the child. Mean heart rate was 
coded for both the dolphin and distress film.  Facial expressions for sadness, distress, and gaze 
aversion were coded every 20 seconds through the entir first film and during the distress 
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sequence of the second film.  The primary parent and the child’s teacher completed measures to 
assess children’s problem behaviors, regulation, and emotionality.  The secondary parent 
(typically the father) completed measures of their ch ld’s problem behavior and emotional 
intensity.   
Regulation was measured by parent and teacher questionnaire, and behaviorally in 
children.  Parents and teachers completed measures of ego resiliency and control that included 
approximately 50 scaled items such as ‘Is inhibited or constricted’ and ‘Is resourceful in 
initiating activities’ (Block & Block, 1969).  For behavioral observation of regulation, children 
were instructed to try and complete a puzzle withou l oking at it.  For this task, the puzzle was 
hidden behind a cloth and inside of a transparent box that the children had to reach into to 
complete the puzzle.  The children could cheat by lifting the cloth that hides the puzzle pieces.  
They were told that they would receive a prize if they completed the task within five minutes, 
and a timer was set in the room for the child to start when they began the puzzle.  They were 
instructed to ring a bell if they finished before th  timer went off.  While doing the puzzle task, 
observers marked how long they worked on the puzzle without cheating, and how long they 
lifted the cloth to look at the puzzle (Eisenberg et al., 1996). 
In their analyses, researchers determined that reported problem behaviors tended to be 
associated with low attentional control, low ego contr l, and lower scores on the puzzle task.  
Ego resiliency was negatively related to behavior pr blems.  This means then, according to the 
authors’ spectrum of resiliency, that the more ego brittle the child, the more problem behaviors 
the child exhibited.  According to Eisenberg et al. (1996), when a child has ego brittleness, they 
are less flexible in their environment, and have a t ndency to become disorganized when under 
stress.   
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As expected, children viewed as high in negative emotionality were rated by all reporters 
as relatively high in problem behaviors.  Further, t achers’ and fathers’ (but not mothers’) reports 
of conduct problems were also associated with reports of high positive emotional intensity, 
although this finding was somewhat weaker than for measures of negative emotionality.  In 
general, children rated high in emotional intensity were viewed as high in problem behaviors. 
These results conclude that children who are reactive in general may have more difficulty than 
other children behaving in an appropriate manner (Eisenberg et al., 1996).   
The authors reported that regulation was a strong buffer against negative emotionality, 
especially for children with higher degrees negative emotionality.  Thus, although regulation by 
itself generally predicted low levels of problem behavior, regulation ability was seemingly 
particularly important for children who experience fr quent and intense negative emotion 
(Eisenberg et al., 1996).   
Physiologically speaking, children who exhibited relatively high heart rate and facial 
distress during the baseline period tended to be relativ ly low in problem behavior.  These 
children were also observed to make quick, small gaze aversions from the distress sequence.  
Eisenberg and colleagues (1996) postulated that these finding indicate the usefulness of shifting 
attention as a useful mode of emotion regulation.  The findings in this study were consistent with 
the view that individual differences in regulation a d emotionality, separately and in 
combination, predict externalizing problem behaviors children.  Overall, children high in 
attentional and behavioral regulation, as well as resiliency, were viewed as lower in problem 
behavior. 
In general, it appears as though temperament plays a role in the development of emotion 
regulation.  However, the research cannot accurately decipher the strength of the influence 
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without taking into consideration the environmental influences, which will be discussed further a 
bit later.  First, another internal influence that interplays with temperament and the environment 
is children’s cognitive abilities.  
Cognitions.  As children develop, their cognitive abilities change and expand. Cognitive 
abilities are considered to be another important factor impacting emotional development. As 
children internalize cognitive appraisals offered by others, they begin to evaluate their own 
feelings in comparable ways, and thus learn how to regulate their emotions.  Saarni (1979) notes 
that the development of understanding how and when to regulate the display of emotions 
depends on both social experiences, whereby children learn the rules of interpersonal behavior, 
and cognitive capacity, which is necessary to predict how one will be perceived by others.  
Therefore, when a child is in an environment where int rpersonal relationships are not positive, 
these are the lessons they are internalizing and adapting for use in their lives.  In addition, when 
children are given mixed messages regarding emotional displays, they may find it more difficult 
to manage their feelings and to decide cognitively what needs to be done in any given situation 
(Thompson & Meyer, 2007).    
Use of display rules.  One of the primary constructs hypothesized to underlie motion 
regulation in children is that of display rules.  Knowledge of emotional expression can be 
systematically measured through studies that test th  use of display rules.  The first study 
identified to use the term ‘display rules’ and introduce the concept was one conducted by Ekman, 
Sorenson, and Friesen in 1969.  Display rules are defined as “procedures learned early in life for 
the management of affect displays and include de-intensifying, intensifying, neutralizing, or 
masking an affect display. These rules prescribe what to do about the display of each affect in 
different social settings; they vary with the social role and demographic characteristics…” 
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(Ekman et al., 1969, p.87).  In other words, ‘display rules’ are guides which determine how one 
regulates their emotions, and are used when one wants to express an emotion that is different 
than what they are feeling inside (Gnepp & Hess, 1986).  Several examples of display rules are 
offered by Saarni (1979); for instance, intensifying may be evoked when one opens an 
undesirable gift in the presence of others yet facially expresses positive affect to please the gift 
giver.  De-intensifying, or minimization of affect may occur when it is considered socially 
inappropriate to express such affect, such as excitement upon receiving good news in light of 
another’s misfortune.  One may neutralize their affect when receiving criticism or being scolded 
in public, such as in school or at work.  Lastly, Saarni (1979) argued that masking of emotions 
may be done when the feeling is anger but the situation does not socially or culturally allow for 
the anger to be expressed, such as when a directive is given by a superordinate who is expecting 
enthusiasm.   
Cognitively, making the decision of which display rule to employ develops throughout 
childhood (Saarni, 1979; Gnepp & Hess, 1986; Harris, Olthof & Terwogt, 1981), along with the 
ability to control the degree to which one’s internal emotional experiences match their emotional 
expressions (Saarni, 1979).   In other words, as children learn display rules, they also learn that 
their internal and external affect don’t necessarily have to match (Saarni, 1979).  Several studies 
conducted to research this concept are described below (Gnepp & Hess, 1986; Harris, Olthof & 
Terwogt, 1981; Saarni, 1979). 
Saarni (1979) was the first to research the development and use of display rules in 
children.  The goal of her study was to determine wh ther there was an age effect in the 
utilization of display rules, the nature of reasoning which display rule is used, the 
implementation of display rules, whether additional people involved had an effect in the choice 
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of display rule, and whether display rules were used more frequently after prompting (Saarni, 
1979).  The author presented three groups of ten girls and ten boys, with average ages of 6.7, 8.6, 
and 10.7 years old, with four scenarios of a child an one other person engaging in a conflict or 
stressful situation (e.g., boasting about skating abilities and then falling down; Saarni, 1979).  To 
examine the influence of the person involved in the sc nario, the author provided two variations 
of each scenario; one included a familiar peer or adult, and the other an unfamiliar.  The 
scenarios were depicted over four photographs, with the last photograph showing the target child 
turned away so as not to see their facial expression.  The subjects were asked to choose the facial 
expression for the target child from four pictures, of which one depicted a neutral expression, 
one matched the expression of the child in the nextto last photograph, one had an expression that 
represented the normal emotion expected in the situation, and one that was incongruent to the 
situation.  Each child was asked the reasoning for thei choice, why it was appropriate for the 
situation, and if there were other emotional expressions that could have been chosen and why.  
Analysis included the number of spontaneously given display rules, number of display rules 
offered after prompting, reasoning behind implementing a display rule (when one was offered), 
and a descriptive of why a facial expression was chosen (despite use of display rules).  The 
analysis of reasoning was divided into four subgroups including ‘maintaining self-esteem,’ 
‘avoiding further trouble or worse consequences,’ ‘maintaining a relationship’ (e.g. you wouldn’t 
want to hurt your friend’s feelings) and ‘maintenance of norm’ (e.g. it’s impolite to show you 
feel that way). Complexity of reasoning was scored on a continuum from 1 to 5, with 1 
representing a random choice of facial expression (e.g. “I don’t know why I picked it”) and 5 
representing the choice of a facial expression discrepant to what the subject identified the child 
as feeling, i.e. they implemented a display rule.   
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Saarni (1979) found that the ten-year-olds surpassed the six and eight year-olds in their 
number of spontaneously given display rules, their complexity of reasoning, and their use of 
norm maintenance in their reason for using a display rule.  Six- and eight-year-olds only 
implemented display rules about 25% of the time, while ten-year-olds used display rules 50% the 
time.  When display rules were used, all three age groups reported use in order to avoid negative 
consequences for themselves more than they reported use to maintain a relationship or prosocial 
norms.  Saarni (1979) offers that the small percentage of display rules implemented by the two 
younger age groups may be a representation of a lack of knowledge of display rules, or, it could 
be a representation of a lack of knowledge of the ability to regulate facial expressions (which 
could also represent the inability at that age to regulate facial expressions).  In addition, Saarni 
(1979) postulated that children develop use of self-protective display rules much earlier than 
prosocial display rules.  However, one limitation t these findings is that three of four of the 
stories given elicited self-protective display rules.   
To further research the development of emotions and the use of display rules, Harris and 
colleagues (1987) surveyed 72 children that were divided into three age groups (6- 11- and 15- 
years-old).  Specifically, across age groups, they compared the ability to identify emotions, the 
strategies used to regulate emotions (i.e. maintain self-control), and the children’s perspective on 
the effects their emotions have on cognitive processes.   Each child was interviewed separately 
and asked two sets of questions; one pertaining to happiness and the other pertaining to either 
anger or fear (split within groups).  In response to the questions eliciting the identification of 
when and how an emotion is felt, the researchers found that the number of children who identify 
situational cues (e.g. Q: When are you happy?  A: When it’s my birthday) decreases with age, 
while the number offering mental cues (e.g. internal thought verifies thinking everything is fine) 
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increases (Harris et al., 1987).  In other words, the six year olds were typically not able to 
identify internal aspects of emotion, which possibly s an indication, according to the authors, 
that they have a harder time realizing that outward expression is not always an indication of inner 
feeling.  Two questions given to the subjects targeted this hypothesis.  The answers the children 
gave alerted researchers that the two older groups were better able to provide reasons of how and 
why they or someone else might be able to mask their emotion.  Furthermore, the researchers 
concluded that the older children realized the detection of their emotion depends on how they 
behave in a situation (Harris et al., 1987).   
When the children were asked if it were possible to pretend an emotion, and how they 
would do this if they wanted, all age groups stated they could pretend another emotion by their 
actions or facial expressions.  When asked whether they could actually change their emotional 
state, the youngest group attributed that only a change in situation could alter their emotion, 
whereas the two older groups proposed using cognitive s rategies, such as redirecting thoughts, 
as a means to change their emotion.   
Lastly, Harris and colleagues asked the subjects about the effects their emotions have on 
how other people perceive them and how they perceive others.  All age groups acknowledged 
that people seem nicer when one is experiencing a positive rather than negative emotion, and that 
happiness typically has a positive effect on person perception and task performance.  To the 
contrary, the children mention that negative affect has a negative effect (Harris et al., 1987).  In 
summary, Harris and colleagues suggest that for younger children, emotions are identified in 
themselves and others by situation (e.g. birthday, fight) and behavioral reactions (e.g. laughing, 
crying), and for older children, cognitive strategis are incorporated in their identification.   
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Gnepp and Hess (1986) conducted a study that found results in agreement with both 
Saarni (1979) and Harris, Olthof and Terwogt (1981).  In their study of 1st, 3rd and 5th graders (18 
boys and 18 girls in each group), the researchers compared the development of display rule 
knowledge, and how and when prosocial versus protective display rules are utilized.  Each child 
was read eight brief affect-laden scenarios from one f three conditions; alone (child in story is 
alone), audience (child in story is with at least one ther person), or prompted audience (the child 
is with others but wants to mask their emotion).  The scenarios used were borrowed from the 
Saarni (1979) research study described earlier.  After the scenario, the subjects were asked what 
response the child in the story would give, what their facial expression would be, and why they 
would give both of these responses.  The subjects were given drawings of five facial expressions 
to choose from (happy, sad, angry, afraid, and neutral).  Gnepp and Hess (1986) decided on five 
categories by which to code responses:  unregulated emotional reaction, where the child 
expressed true feelings with no indication that social norms may be appropriate (e.g. sadness 
upon receiving a disappointing gift); emotional reaction does not require regulation, where the 
child expresses true feelings and it is not necessary to conceal them (e.g. happy to receive a gift, 
even if it’s not exactly what was wanted); motivated expression of true emotion, where true 
expression was given due to a prosocial or self-protective reason (e.g. should always tell the 
truth); display rule, where the child’s expression did not reflect his true feelings, but masked it 
for prosocial or self-protective reasons (e.g. pretending to like a gift to not hurt the givers 
feelings); and coping, where the expression did not reflect the child’s true feelings and the 
purpose of masking was to help the child feel better (e.g. she would feel better if she pretended 
she was happy).   
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Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Saarni, 1979), Gnepp and Hess (1986) found an 
age-related increase in the ability to use and describe display rules.  They found the ability to use 
display rules increased steadily from 1st to 5th grade, with a plateau in use between 5th and 10th 
grade.  As expected, children in the ‘alone’ condition were marked to express their true emotion 
80% of the time, suggesting that the subjects were aware of the social expectations to control 
their emotions when around others, as made evident by their answers using display rules or 
coping.   
Of the 96 children who included the use of display rules in their answers, 85 indicated 
verbal more often than facial display rules (i.e. noti g what the child would say in the scenario to 
mask an emotion as opposed to how they would change their facial expression).  The authors 
explain that this may be due to more verbal reinforcement than expression.  In other words, 
children are redirected or coached in what to say more readily than they are told how to look, and 
most likely learn facial expression display rules through observation rather than redirection 
(Gnepp & Hess, 1986).  In addition, subjects utilized display rules more in situations that 
involved prosocial means as opposed to self-protective.  Gnepp and Hess (1986) explained that 
these findings make sense in light of the fact that c ildren are often coached on how to modify 
their expressive behaviors to protect other’s feelings, but are often left to their own devices to 
learn how to manage their own emotions.   
Overall, the authors found that first graders steadily reported facial expressions that were 
congruent with the emotion in the scenario and only have minimal understanding of verbal 
display rules, and do not use them regularly.  By third grade, the use of verbal display rules has 
increased significantly, but facial expressions still match the true emotion elicited in the scenario.  
By Fifth grade verbal display rules have developed even further, as well as an understanding of 
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the ability to change one’s facial expression, but the use of facial display rules were still not 
employed on a consistent basis.  By tenth grade however, there was not much change in the 
subject’s suggestion of using verbal display rules or facial display rules, suggesting that the 
learning curve for display rules reached its cap sometime around the age of eleven (Gnepp and 
Hess, 1986). 
 In conclusion, for emotion regulation to occur in development, cognitive strategies, 
particularly the use of display rules, must be employed.  The learning of display rules, while a 
cognitive component, is highly influenced by environmental factors.  Environmental influences 
in fact, are a crucial aspect in the development of emotion regulation.  The internal influences 
may determine how regulation is learned, but the enviro ment is what offers material for 
learning.  Several environmental influences are discus ed below. 
Environmental influences.  As previously noted, parental influences and family 
environments are considered to play an enormous role in the development of emotion regulation 
abilities (e.g. Eisenberg, Cumberland & Spinrad, 1998; Eisenberg et al., 2003; Thompson & 
Calkins, 1996; Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  The ways in which parents respond to their 
children’s emotions, and the ways in which parents motionally express themselves, are thought 
to either undermine or facilitate the development of emotion regulation (Eisenberg et al., 1999).  
For instance, research has found that during infancy, emotion regulation is in part dependent on 
the parent’s timely response and level of sensitivity to the child’s need for intervention (Gable & 
Isabella, 1992; Kogan & Carter, 1996).  Furthermore, as Thompson and Meyer (2007) suggest, 
parents can structure children’s experiences to make emotional demands predictable and 
manageable.  They have observed for instance, that emo ion regulation becomes more readily 
apparent when parents construct daily routines that include a consideration for their children’s 
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temperament, activity level, and tolerance for stimulation (Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  In the 
environment, Thompson and Meyer (2007) have agreed that parents can foster emotional 
development by making attempts to distract children f om events that may be too frightening or 
distressing; assisting in problem solving when the c ild becomes too frustrated; and helping the 
child with cognitive restructuring when he or she becomes aggravated (e.g. reminding the child 
“It’s just a game”).  By being role models of emotion regulation, parents inadvertently teach their 
children ways to respond emotionally (Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  
Thompson and Meyer (2007) generalize that children who are raised in environments that 
support positive emotional expression, and where emotion regulation is modeled, typically learn 
emotion regulation skills.   For instance, research suggests that when parents display positive 
emotions, and respond supportively and sympathetically to their children’s emotions, the 
children learn adaptive ways of coping with their emotions not only in the immediate situation 
but for ones to come (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  In addition, constructive responses can affirm 
a child’s feelings, which provide social support in coping with the situation (Thompson & 
Meyer, 2007).   
Implications during infancy.  Research demonstrates development of emotion regulation 
skills as early as infancy. Those in the field of emotional development have indicated several 
ways in which parents have the ability to foster the development of emotion regulation skills.  
Researchers have documented that mothers who positively facilitate their infant’s arousal during 
face-to-face play are structuring and modeling emotion regulation (Gable & Isabella, 1992; 
Kogan & Carter, 1996).   Furthermore, the reactions t  cues given by the infant to stop playing or 
to increase the activity, can inadvertently teach emotion regulation skills through the feedback 
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they receive via supportive or insensitive responses to their behaviors (Thompson & Meyer, 
2007).   
A study conducted by Lamb and Milkin (1986), that included either mothers or 
unfamiliar women responding to an infant’s cry, found that at one month, infants began to soothe 
themselves just prior to being picked-up (caregiver n site), and that by six months of age, infants 
in distress were able to somewhat calm themselves upon hearing footstep’s approaching.  They 
also found that by five months, if they were not picked-up, their cries became increasingly 
louder.  The researchers concluded that infants quickly learn social expectations related to 
distress and soothing, and when this expectation is violated, they become confused and more 
upset (Lamb & Malkin, 1986), especially considering they have not learned another form of 
regulation upon which to rely.  Thompson and Meyer (2007) have stated that inconsistencies in 
the structure of when an adult responds (i.e. sometimes soothing, sometimes walking past, 
sometimes entering the room and leaving), will typically influence how easily infants soothe to 
the adult or to the anticipation of the adult’s approach.    
In a study of 32 infant-mother couplings, Gable andIsabella (1992) examined the 
relationship between maternal interactions with their infants, and resulting abilities of the infant 
to regulate their arousal. The researchers monitored mother-child interaction over two 3-minute 
video taped sessions at one and four months of age.  In the first segment of each session, mothers 
were instructed to play with their infants as they normally would, and for the second video they 
were instructed to keep their infants attention, to get them excited, and to try to make them smile.  
The infants were rated on state, physical activity, head orientation, gaze behavior, facial 
expressions, vocalizations, and fussiness.  The mothers were rated on ten items including most of 
the infant behaviors and also silence during infant gaze aversion, infantile/imitative behaviors, 
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contingent responses, and game playing (Gable & Isabella, 1992).  Infant arousal regulation was 
defined as measured by infant head orientation, gaze behavior, and facial expressions.  Gable and 
Isabella (1992) found that the infants whose mothers were more attentive and interactive with 
them at age one-month were better able to regulate their own arousal at age four-months.  In 
other words, the authors were able to predict that mothers who provided appropriate levels of 
stimulation had infants who exhibited more positive affect and were able to spend more time 
gazing at their mothers.  Gable and Isabella (1992) conclude that that maternal interaction during 
the first four months of life set the groundwork for emotion regulation.   
A similar study conducted by Kogan and Carter (1996) looked further into the 
relationship between attachment and emotion regulation of infants at four months of age and then 
again at one year.  As part of a larger study, 29 mothers and infants were observed, and in 
particular, the reengagement of the mother and chil was of interest.  For the experiment, when 
the infants were four months of age, the mothers were asked to play with their child for five 
minutes as they normally would.  After five minutes he mothers were instructed to stop all 
social interaction and remain still with a neutral face while looking eye to eye with their infant, 
for two minutes or after 60-seconds of continuous crying.  At this point, the mothers were 
instructed to resume normal play.  As a measure of attachment, when the infants were 12-months 
old, the dyad returned to the lab and participated in the Strange Situation task (Ainsworth & 
Wittig, 1969; described previously).  Kogan and Carter (1996) measured gaze, affect, emotional 
availability, reengagement behaviors, and attachment.  Their findings supported the theoretical 
assumption that the mother’s sensitivity towards her c ild is related to the coping strategies that 
the infant employs during stressful situations. Specifically, the researchers determined that the 
infants became less positive, more negative, and averted their gaze away from their mothers 
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during the still-face, middle portion of the segment filmed at four months.  This finding 
confirmed that the researchers were successful at eliciting stress for the infant before allowing 
reengagement by the mother.   
During the reengagement at four months (the second play period), the infants’ negativity 
and gaze aversion significantly decreased, but did not return to the same positive levels observed 
during the first play phase. Furthermore, Kogan and Carter (1998) determined a relationship 
between more emotionally available mothers and decreased negativity during the second play 
phase.  In other words, the infants whose mothers we more emotionally available were more 
quickly able to decrease negativity and return to a play state.  The researchers noted that in the 
dyads that included relatively more sensitive mothers, the infants reengaged by looking at their 
mother, making positive or neutral vocalizations, smiling, or reaching, and exhibited low levels 
of avoidant or resistant behaviors.  On the other hand, in dyads characterized by relatively low 
maternal sensitivity, infants were observed to be either avoidant to reengage (e.g., gaze aversion 
or delayed responsiveness), resistant (e.g., persistent negativity or unsoothability), or a 
combination of the two (Kogan & Carter, 1998).   
Kogan and Carter (1998) only commented briefly regading the relationship between 
their findings at four months and predictability at twelve months.  They observed some 
continuity and association between the infant’s capa ity to self-regulate at four months and at 
twelve months. They concluded that an infant’s ability to soothe or be soothed after a stressful 
event is a critical adaptive tool and indicative of the mother-child relationship.   
In sum, the body of research on infants and emotion regulation suggest that mothers who 
provide ample stimulation for their very young infats, including being attentive and interactive, 
are laying the foundations of healthy emotional development (Gable & Isabella, 1992; Kogan & 
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Carter, 1998; Lamb & Milkin, 1986; Thompson & Mayer, 2007).  Additionally, infants who 
form a positive attachment with their mother, which can partly be attributed to the mother’s 
sensitivity to her child’s needs, are more prone to self-soothe, as well as accept soothing, after 
stressful events (Gable & Isabella, 1992; Kogan & Carter, 1998).  Emotional development and 
regulation have just begun in infancy however, and the opportunities to build emotion regulation 
development continue throughout childhood. 
Implications during toddlerhood.  The development that begins during infancy carries 
into toddlerhood, when the child is more independent and therefore needs to gain more control 
over their emotions.  At the same time, parents are developing a management style, which also 
influences the development of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007). With the 
knowledge that each emotional expression or response changes the situation, and elicits another 
response, it is easy to see that the opportunities to teach children effective and appropriate 
emotion regulation strategies are endless (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
Several studies conducted by Eisenberg and colleagues have focused on the effects of 
parents’ reactions to children’s emotions.  In 1994, a study was published by Eisenberg and 
colleagues that examined six specific reactions parents may have to their child’s emotion, and 
related them to the social functioning of the child.  Three reactions were considered to be 
negative: minimizing the child's negative emotion, punitive reactions, and parental distress 
reactions (e.g. showing discomfort).  Three were considered to be positive: encouragement of 
expressing emotion, emotion-focused reactions (i.e., comforting), and problem-focused reactions 
in which the child is encouraged to, or helped to, deal with the problem (1994; Eisenberg, Fabes, 
Carlo, & Karbon, 1992).  
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Based on their research, some more of which will be described below, Eisenberg and 
colleagues (1994; 1996; 1999) have adopted the perspective that deficiencies in emotion 
regulation result in part from exposure to conflict in he home.  They argue that being exposed to 
conflict, such as arguing or violence, undermines emotion regulation development, including 
arousal and adjustment (Eisenberg et al., 1996). Furthermore, they found that after repeated 
associations between their emotions and negative reactions, many children gradually learn to 
hide their emotions, but continue to feel anxious when in emotionally charged environments 
(Eisenberg et al., 1999).   
According to Eisenberg and many others, high levels of ongoing emotional intensity in 
childhood are believed to result in unregulated and inappropriate behavior (Dunn & Brown, 
1994; Eisenberg et al., 1996, 1999; Gottman, Katz, & Hoven, 1996).  When emotional reactions 
of children are left unattended to by parents, children do not learn that their behavior is 
inappropriate or socially unacceptable; these behaviors may lead to long-term deficits in 
interpersonal abilities (Eisenberg et al., 1992).  Furthermore, Eisenberg, Fabes, and Murphy 
(1996) suggest that children who receive unsupportive eactions to negative emotions, such as a 
punitive, belittling, or minimizing response, are likely to remain emotionally aroused and 
become, or remain, dysregulated in their behavioral response. On the other hand, when parents 
consistently attempt to suppress their children's emotions and reactions, the child’s view of the 
negative situation is left unresolved, so that in the future, when similar situations arise, the 
negative emotion once again resurfaces without a strategy for dealing with it (Eisenberg et al., 
1992, 1996, 1999).  Therefore, research concludes that the development of socially competent 
behavior may be a balance between parental encouragement and regulation of the expression of 
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emotion rather than parental efforts to simply suppress children's expression of negative emotion 
(Eisenberg et al., 1996). 
One study conducted by Eisenberg and colleagues (1996) assessed reactions to negative 
emotions in 148 third through sixth graders from three different schools.  The purpose was to 
examine the relation between parental emotion-related reactions and children's social 
competence, as defined by the authors to include socially appropriate behavior, peer acceptance 
(as reported by adults), constructive coping, and prosocial behavior.  
To answer their questions, the research team administered the bulk of the measures to the 
primary parent (in all but five cases the mother) to gauge the parent’s reaction to their child’s 
negative emotions, and in general, the child’s emotionality, coping, and social functioning.  In 
addition, fathers also completed a measure of theirchild’s negative emotionality to determine 
differences between parental reaction styles and the report of the child’s behavior (Eisenberg et 
al., 1996). Teachers were administered many of the same measures as the primary parent 
including those to gauge negative emotionality, coping abilities, and social functioning (social 
skills and peer acceptance) in the classroom.   
To observe the child’s degree of prosocial behavior, the researchers created a scenario 
whereby the child had the opportunity to assist or ignore a crying infant.  While the researcher 
was meeting with the child to administer questionnaires in one room, a recording of a crying 
infant was played into a 2-way baby monitor from another room. The receiving end of the 
monitor was in the room with the child and researche , and when the crying was heard, the 
researcher apologized and explained that at the last minute she had to help out a friend and take 
care of their baby for a few hours. It was the baby’s naptime and the experimenter was trying to 
leave the child to sleep. During the two minutes of varying intensities of crying, the experimenter 
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attempted to soothe the baby through the monitor, and asked the child to assist.  For each subject, 
after the first incident of crying has subsided, the experimenter explains she has to go down the 
hall to retrieve a forgotten questionnaire.  Upon leaving, the experimenter informs the subject 
that if the baby starts crying they can feel free to turn off the monitor or attempt to soothe them 
on their own.  At this point, the two minute segment of crying is played again, and via hidden 
video, the number of seconds the child talks to the baby through the monitor, as well as the 
number of seconds the child has the monitor turned off were recorded.  In addition, children were 
rated on whether their tone with the baby was comforting, irritated or angry (Eisenberg et al., 
1996). 
The authors drew several pieces of information from the study.  First, they found 
differences between maternal and paternal reactions to egative emotions.  Mothers scored high 
on supportive reactions to their child's negative emotion whereas fathers scored higher on 
punitive and minimizing reactions.  Eisenberg and colleagues (1999) suggest that this finding 
supports the gender stereotype that emotion socialization or comforting is more appropriate for 
mothers than fathers.  Secondly, a link was found between  mother’s who reported minimizing, 
avoiding, or punitive reactions to children's negative emotions, and low levels of socially 
appropriate behavior, productive coping, and teacher-reported popularity in their children.  
However, the researchers did not find a correlation between maternal reports of distressed or 
upset reactions and children's coping or social competence (Eisenberg et al., 1999).  
In addition, the authors found that parental perceptions of their child’s negative 
emotionality were associated with the child’s behavioral reactions. Specifically, mothers who 
perceived their children as high in negative emotionality most commonly reported frequent use 
of minimizing reactions and infrequent use of problem-focused reactions. For both boys and girls 
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there was a positive correlation between fathers' perceptions of their children's negative 
emotionality and distressed and punitive reactions, a d for boys specifically, father’s minimized 
emotional responses and offered only low levels of pr blem-focused reactions. Generally, the 
researchers did not find an association between parents’ reports of their emotion-related reactions 
or teachers' reports of children's negative emotional ty, suggesting that parents develop their own 
perception of their child's negative emotionality (Eisenberg et al., 1999). 
Lastly, for the measure of prosocial behavior, parental reports of emotion-related 
reactions were associated with children's comforting of the crying infant.  For girls whose 
mother’s reported moderate levels of encouragement of the expression of emotion, a high degree 
of comforting (of the infant) was found.  On the other hand, for boys, maternal encouragement of 
problem-focused reactions to handling negative emotions resulted in higher quantity (time spent 
soothing) and/or quality (what they said to soothe) of their sons' comforting the infant.  Thus, 
Eisenberg and colleagues (1999) suggest that supportive and problem-focused maternal reactions 
may foster boys' sensitivity to others' negative emotions, whereas, for girls, moderate maternal 
encouragement of expressivity may be optimal for emotional development.  The researchers 
further state, that girls who are encouraged to express moderate but not high levels of emotion, 
are perhaps learning to regulate their emotion by learning that moderate levels are more socially 
acceptable and thus avoid over-arousal.  
Another study conducted by Eisenberg and colleagues (1999) was longitudinal and 
looked specifically at the relation between parental egative reactions to their child’s negative 
emotions, and the child’s resulting behavior.  Since researchers were observing this relationship 
over time, they were also interested to in whether parental reactions would become more 
negative in adolescence, when conflict between parents and children is typically more frequent. 
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The study included data from 94 children, their parents, and their teachers.  The first data 
collection was when the child was in kindergarten, followed by assessments two, four, and six 
years later.  At each assessment point, measures of social functioning, regulation, and negative 
emotionality were administered.  One parent (most often the mother) was asked to describe how 
their child would react in twelve stress- or negative affect- inducing scenarios (e.g. being nervous 
about public embarrassment, being scared to receive an injection).  The parent was given a score 
from 1-7 on three levels of their hypothetical reaction to each situation including: parental 
distress reactions (the degree of negative emotion), punitive responses, and minimization 
responses (including devaluing the problem).  In addition, both parents and teachers were asked 
to complete a child’s observed behavior checklist (Eisenberg et al., 1999).  At assessment points 
two, four, and six years later, the child’s emotional i tensity levels were also assessed according 
to measures completed by both parents and teachers.  Also at these later time points, parents 
completed measures of their child’s regulation abilities, including attention focusing and 
behavioral control (e.g. impulsivity, inhibition control). 
As the authors predicted, parental reactions that were unsupportive, especially those that 
were punitive, resulted in externalizing problem behavior and inappropriate social behavior in 
children.   Children's externalizing emotion at ages 6-8 marginally predicted parental negative 
reactions at ages 8-10. In addition, punitive reactions at age 8-10 predicted children's parent-
reported externalizing negative emotion at age 10-12. Thus, as children approached early 
adolescence, the authors found that unsupportive reactions to negative emotion expression 
contributed to further negative behavioral reactions in children (Eisenberg et al., 1999).   
Eisenberg and colleagues (1999) found a moderate corr lation between parents who 
reported punitive or distress reactions and children with observable problem behaviors by age 8-
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10 or 10- 12, even when mothers usually provided data on their reactions and fathers provided 
information on problem behaviors.  Non-supportive parental reactions were correlated with low 
social functioning at school (problem behavior and low socially appropriate behavior). 
Reports of early problem behavior (age 6-8) predict punitive or distress reactions by 
parents at age 10-12.  In fact, the authors found a bi irectional response, whereby some of the 
late problem behavior was predicted by punitive or distress reactions at the earlier assessment 
points (Eisenberg et al., 1999). The research team postulates that parents who become easily 
distressed or upset by their child’s negative emotions could have a negative impact on their 
child's regulation because in these situations, the par nt may disengage themselves in order to 
de-stress themselves, rather than help their children learn to manage emotions (Eisenberg et al., 
1999) 
This area of research has consistently demonstrated that parents' negative reactions to 
children's experience of emotions generally found to be associated with negative emotional 
competence in children (Dunn & Brown, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1996, 1999; Gottman, Katz, & 
Hoven, 1997).  On the other hand, supportive parental reactions to children's negative emotions 
may facilitate children's ability to regulate emotion and to learn about others’ needs in emotion-
laden situations (Eisenberg et al., 1994, 1999). 
To summarize, when parents are demeaning, punitive, or indifferent to their children’s 
emotions, children may not learn the most appropriate coping strategies, or worse, they may 
learn to believe that their emotions are irrelevant.  (Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998; 
Gross & Thompson, 2007; Thompson & Meyer, 2007).   These types of responses also add stress 
to the challenges of how to regulate emotions.  Critical or punitive reactions can send several 
signals to the child.  First, the child may understand criticism to mean that their emotional 
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expression is not appropriate to the situation.  Secondly, they may interpret a demeaning 
response to mean that they are not competent to know the ‘right’ emotion for the situation.  
Lastly, a child may interpret a dismissive response to mean that their parent or caretaker does not 
care about their emotional response to the situation (Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  In fact, when 
others are critical, demeaning, or dismissive, it can exacerbate the emotions the child is trying to 
manage by often arousing further emotion.  Also, the opportunity for learning adaptive modes of 
emotion regulation, or even discussing one’s feelings with the other person, is lost.  Studies 
indicate that how parents respond, supportively or unsupportively, to children’s emotions, and 
the behaviors that result, predict children’s emotion-related coping in later assessments 
(Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  In addition, the ways in which parents express their emotions are 
also internalized by children for future reference.   
Parental emotional expressivity.  Modeling of emotional expressivity, as opposed to 
responding to a child’s emotional expressivity (as de cribed above) is another influence on 
emotion regulation development.  According to Eisenberg et al. (2001), there is reason to believe 
that children whose parents express more positive emotion around them and do not express 
frequent hostile or hurtful emotions (e.g., disappointment in the child) will be particularly likely 
to be well regulated.  General emotional expressivity by parents can also influence the 
development of emotion regulation.  This type of influence is different than a direct reaction to a 
child’s emotions, as was discussed above.  In an article outlining the development of an 
instrument to measure emotional expressivity within e family, expressivity was been defined 
by Halberstadt and colleagues (1995) as "a persistent pattern or style in exhibiting nonverbal and 
verbal expressions that often but not always appear to be emotion related; this pattern or style is 
usually measured in terms of frequency of occurrence" (Halberstadt, Cassidy, Stifter, Parke, & 
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Fox, 1995, p. 93). According to a meta-analysis of family and children’s emotion expressiveness, 
conducted by Halberstadt and Eaton (2002), parental motional expressivity is typically 
measured in one of two ways; by the parent’s expression of emotion while interacting with their 
child, or as the parent’s general tendency to express emotion in interactions with the family.  The 
latter is more related to parenting styles, and tens to reflect the emotional tone for the home 
(Halberstadt & Eaton, 2002).    
In a study of 46 boys, 34 girls, and their parents, Denham and colleagues (2000) 
researched the emotional and behavioral aspects of parents’ emotions (happiness and anger) and 
parenting styles (proactive and reactive vs. restrictive) as they related to children’s externalizing 
behavior problems, including their ability to emotionally regulate.  In order to obtain a full range 
of behaviors amongst the sample, the researchers not only recruited based on age but for children 
who were ‘hard to manage.’ There were three assessment points.  At the first, the children were 
in preschool or kindergarten, the second was after the child had completed first grade, and the 
third was between third and fourth grade.  Emotional factors were assessed through observing 
parent–child interactions and obtaining parents reports of their children’s levels of hostility. 
Behavioral factors were assessed via observation of parent–child interactions and maternal 
reports of child-rearing styles (Denham et al., 2000).   
Observed interactions included the mother, father, and child playing two competitive 
board games together, and fifteen minutes of free tim , sharing a snack in between the games.  In 
addition, three interactions involved the mother and child only.  The first was to complete a 
puzzle together, the second was to develop a story together based on a picture book depicting 
disruptive behavior in a fancy restaurant, and the third was for the mother to elicit emotion 
memories from the child. Raters coded maternal and paternal behavior patterns including 
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supportive presence, limit setting, allowance of autonomy, negative affect, quality of 
instructions, and confidence.   In addition, a separate coding consisted of ratings of maternal and 
paternal expressions of anger and happiness.  The parents were also asked to complete written 
measures of their child’s hostility, as well as questionnaires that assessed their parenting styles 
and negative affect (Denham et al., 2000). 
First, in all but one case, multiple regressions indicated that later externalizing problems 
were able to be predicted from parenting variables, and were found for children with initially 
high externalizing scores. Second, negative parenting variables, such as anger or hostility, were 
especially strong predictors of later externalizing problems in their children, and especially for 
those who scored high in the initial assessment of behavior problems. In fact, parental anger was 
the most prominent predictor across reporters (i.e., mother or teacher) and time periods. This 
finding further supports that when parents’ negative emotions are dysregulating, they can effect a 
child’s social and emotional development, such as their ability to behaviorally regulate their 
emotions.  Third, positive parenting variables, such as proactive parenting (observed) and 
maternal proactive parenting styles (reported), strongly predicted fewer behavior problems in the 
later assessments for children that scored high in behavior problems at earlier time points.  
Improvement across time in these children was consistently linked with parenting behaviors that 
provided positive support, structure, and an enviroment with less anger and hostility.  In sum, 
parenting factors, especially mother’s anger and proactive parenting styles, were notably 
important in predicting behavior problems in those children showing more difficulty initially 
(Denham et al., 2000).  The authors also note that combined, these findings support the idea that 
parents’ emotions and behaviors contribute to both risk and resiliency in children initially at risk 
for behavior problems.  Therefore, this study indicates that with more effective parenting styles, 
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children’s behavior problems can be remedied, at least to some extent, and therefore, their ability 
to learn emotion regulation evolves and can change direction over time.   
 In an article published in 1998, Eisenberg, Cumberland, and Spinrad posited that parents' 
emotional expressivity may affect children’s abilities to self-regulate, and may in turn affect their 
social competence and adjustment. Eisenberg and colleagues (2001) attempted to test this 
hypothesis several years later, for both positive and negative parental expressivity.  The authors 
tested a model to explain the effects of positive and negative parental expressivity (Eisenberg et 
al., 2001).  They hypothesized that positive parental expressivity would be associated with 
adequate emotion regulation in children.  On the other hand, the authors predicted that negative 
parental expressivity, especially hostile expression, or negative expression that was a result of 
the child being irritating, disappointing, or upsetting to the parent, would be associated with 
inadequate emotion regulation.  Furthermore, the authors predicted emotion regulation to 
mediate the relationship between parental positive expressivity and both high levels of social 
competence and low levels of adjustment (especially externalizing behavior).  The model tested 
found that maternal expressivity could predict children's adjustment and social competence, 
which in turn could predict children's regulation. 
 The study included children between the ages of 4.5 and 8-years-old, their parents and 
teachers.  The researchers selectively screened children to determine those who had externalizing 
or internalizing behavior problems.  This was done through a phone administration of a brief 
screen of the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991). Out of a pool of 315 children, 
all children with T scores of 60 or above on either externalizing or internalizing behavior 
problems (or both) were asked to participate, with scores of 60-63 being viewed as moderate risk 
for behavior problems.  Eighty children had T scores for externalizing behavior above 63, 
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whereas 70 had scores for internalizing behavior abve 63. The children identified as having 
behavior problems were matched with non-problem children of the same sex and race (when 
possible), with similar socioeconomic class, and of the same age (Eisenberg et al., 2001). 
 As a measure of the child’s regulation, Eisenberg and colleagues (2001) asked the child 
to complete the ‘hidden puzzle task’ (described earlier in this paper; Eisenberg et al., 1996). 
During this task, persistence in completing the puzzle within the allotted time was used as an 
observed index of emotional control.  Questionnaires w re distributed to mothers and teachers as 
an additional measure of children's regulation, including indices of attention focusing, attention 
shifting, and inhibitory control.  Additionally, mothers and teachers completed the CBCL 
(Achenbach, 1991). The Aggressive Behavior and Delinquent Behavior subscales were 
combined and used as a measure of externalizing behavior, and the Withdrawn, 
Anxious/Depressed, and Somatic Complaints subscales were used as a measure of internalizing 
behavior. Mothers and teachers also completed a scale developed by the authors (1996) as a 
measure of their child’s social competence, including socially appropriate behavior and 
popularity. 
 A second task was administered as a measure of themother’s expressivity (Eisenberg et 
al., 2001).  For the second task, the mother was asked to join the child to help them complete 
another puzzle.  For this task, mothers sat on the side of the table where they could visually 
observe the puzzle pieces they were allowed to verbally instruct the child (as the puzzle pieces 
were not visible to the child) to help them complete the puzzle.  During this task the mothers' 
emotion and behavior with their child was coded every thirty seconds for both positive and 
negative affect according to their tone of voice and facial expressions.  In addition, each mother 
reported her own emotional expressiveness with her family by completing the Self-
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Expressiveness in the Family Questionnaire (Halberstadt et al., 1995).  On this scale, subjects are 
asked to rate on a 9-point scale the frequency with hich they express emotions in typical family 
settings. 
 The authors used structural equation modeling to test whether children's regulation 
mediated the association between mothers' expressivity and children's adjustment and social 
competence.   The model included observed maternal affect, mother self-reported expressivity, 
regulation, both externalizing and internalizing behaviors, and social competence.  In general, the 
authors determined that mothers' expressions of positive and negative emotion, both in 
interactions with their children and more generally in the family, affect children's social 
competence and adjustment.  In addition, Eisenberg and colleagues (2001) suggest that according 
to their model, it is plausible that children’s regulation serves as a mediator of the effects of 
maternal emotional expressivity, and that children's social competence and externalizing 
problems with peers can have some effect on children's r gulation. This model suggests that 
emotional arousal experienced in children as a result of their parents’ frequent or intense 
negative emotions may increase the vulnerability to become hyperaroused in emotionally 
evocative situations.  Overarousal in turn may make it difficult for the child to regulate their 
attention, emotions, and behavior, and may result in a negative emotional response from their 
parent (Eisenberg et al. 2001).  Additionally, exposure to maternal negative emotion may also 
disrupt the ability to learn coping strategies, andmay reduce the child's motivation to regulate in 
general, by exposing the child to a model of dysregulation.  When this is the behavior exhibited 
in their environment, Eisenberg and colleagues (2001) suggest that children may come to believe 
that such unregulated patterns of emotion are socially appropriate, and possibly effective.  
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 The studies presented here add to the growing bodyof evidence that parents' expression 
of emotion is related to their children's socio-emotional competence (Denham et al., 2000; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Eisenberg et al., 2001).   Parental expressivity may also contribute to 
children's abilities to interpret and understand others' emotional reactions and to their beliefs 
about how much and what types of emotional expression  are appropriate and effective in social 
interactions.  Such knowledge may foster both self-regulation and social skills (Denham et al., 
2000; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Furthermore, heightened expression of negative affect by parents 
may reflect their own dysregulation and can serve as a model for children's imitation or 
contribute in other ways to children's dysregulation (Eisenberg et al., 2001).   
A second line of related research examined not how expressive parental emotion is 
influential, but rather the difference between types of emotions exhibited.  While Eisenberg and 
colleagues (1998) suggest that it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of parental 
negative emotion in general, and parental negative emotion directed specifically at their child, 
they determined that mothers who expressed “negative emotion directed at their children may be 
particularly likely to undermine their regulation ad behavior” (Eisenberg et al., 2003; p. 16).  In 
their review of the literature, Thompson and Meyer (2007) suggested that the effects of emotion 
expressivity by parents may lie in the type of negative emotion.  They theorized that children 
raised in an environment where “negative dominant” emotions (e.g. anger and hostility) are 
normal will be less likely to develop effective emotion regulation because these emotions elicit 
fear; a relatively more heightened response that can cause more vulnerability to ongoing 
dysregulation (as discussed in the internal effects section of this paper). On the other hand, those 
children who are raised in environments where “negative submissive” emotions (e.g. sadness and 
distress) are the norm, will most likely not have as heightened a response, and therefore may not 
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be as vulnerable.  As noted by Thompson and Meyer (2007) and others (e.g. see Eisenberg et al, 
2001) it is most likely useful for children to be exposed to occasional non-hostile negative 
emotions as a means to learn that negative emotions can be safely expressed and managed.   
Overall, theorists have observed that children are more likely to have a limited 
understanding of emotion, and a limited knowledge of how to control their emotions when they 
are raised in environments that are less sensitive or that are inconsistent (Eisenberg et al., 2003; 
Thompson & Meyer, 2007).  Stress that is chronic and severe, such as the stress experienced by 
children in emotionally or physically neglectful situations, and in overly punitive or critical 
environments, will be expressed in all levels of a person’s vital activity, as emotional 
development affects all levels (Gunnar & Vazquez, 2007).   More specifically, Eisenberg and 
colleagues (1998) have suggested that children, who receive negative or no response to their 
negative emotions, are likely to remain in a negative emotional state.  From this perspective, 
children in these situations can become more easily emotionally dysregulated, either by 
displaying heightened levels of negative emotionality or, alternatively, by suppressing their 
negative emotional expression (Thompson & Meyer, 2007).   Living in environments such as 
these both add stress, and undermine the child’s opportunity to learn more adaptive forms of 
coping with their emotions, whereas over-involvement may limit a child’s ability to integrate 
emotion regulation ‘skills.’  In these contexts a child’s emotional behavior can contribute to the 
risk for developing psychopathology involving emotion dysregulation (Thompson & Meyer, 
2007).  In fact, emotion regulation difficulties are observed in several mental diseases including 
mood disorders, psychotic disorders, and personality disorders.  One such disorder that involves 
clear deficiencies in emotion regulation is BPD.   
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In conclusion, there are numerous influences on the dev lopment of emotion regulation.  
As will be described below, there are many steps that lead to one having to regulate emotions.  In 
other words, for emotion regulation to exist, an emotion has to be created and processed.  
Therefore, the processing of emotion is one aspect leading to the utilization of (or lack of) 
emotion regulation skills.  In the next section, this step in emotion regulation will be thoroughly 
reviewed. 
Emotion Processing and Perception 
 Emotion regulation has been thoroughly reviewed here, including all of the influences on 
its development.  The second goal of this paper is to explain the current literature on the 
processing of emotion. Further, the paper will explain how it relates to the development of 
difficulties in emotion regulation.   According to heorists, the processing of information, which 
often includes emotions, occurs within a series of teps, and prior to the response, or regulation 
of, emotion. In fact, in the theories that pose step  of information processing, emotion regulation 
is the common last step (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001; Mayer 
& Salovey, 1997; Saarni, 1999).  Considering the review of all of the influences on the 
development of emotion regulation, it is plausible that what occurs during the steps of processing 
also influence the emotional response.  For instance, faulty information processing of a situation 
can result in misguided reactions.  Therefore, in order to fully understand, it is important to 
consider the role of emotion processing in emotion regulation.  However, thus far, processing has 
not been thoroughly researched in terms of its impact on the development of emotion regulation.   
 Development.  It can be agreed that the ability to communicate eff ctively and to have 
mutually rewarding, positive relationships relies at le st in part on our ability to interpret other's 
emotional responses (Bland, Williams, Scharer & Manning, 2004; Eronen, Nurmi, & Harvey, 
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1999; Keltner & Kring, 1998). In fact, perception and expression of emotional information are 
integral components of human experience and behavior, as they are essential for effective social 
interaction (Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001; Schaffer, Gregory, Froming, Levy, & 
Ekman, 2006).  People rely on their emotional experiences to assess the conditions of their 
relationships, and likewise, mood or emotion states influence the evaluation of relationship 
satisfaction.  For instance, as noted in a review article by Keltner and Kring (1998), residual 
anger can negatively influence ongoing interactions, a d underlying fear can influence the 
misperception of a risk associated with social interactions.  Two developmental theories have 
posited that the functionality of emotional processing in social situations is dependent on the 
accuracy of the appraisal of the situation, the alloc tion of priorities among multiple goals in the 
situation, and the selection of proper responses to the situation (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000; 
Parrott, 2001).   
Just as has been explained in the development of emtion regulation, according to 
Thompson and Meyer (2007), children begin to learn how others perceive emotions through their 
parent’s emotional signals to events.  Especially when events are ambiguous or confusing, 
children observe their parents’ facial expressions a d listen to their vocal tone to determine the 
emotionality of a situation (e.g. is their tone raised because they are angry or excited?).    
Beyond facial expressions, it is theorized that each time an adult labels a child’s behavior 
with an emotion term, or a child observes the emotion term being used to label someone else’s 
behavior, the child stores several pieces of information, including the psychological situation and 
environment in which the label was used, the behavior l responses that correspond to the label, 
as well as the regulation strategies implemented (Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007).  All of this 
new information is integrated with past information that is already stored in memory.  In 
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addition, since emotions are dynamic processes involving numerous sensorimotor components 
(e.g. physiological activation and facial and vocal behaviors), the child acquires a plethora of 
exemplars of what different emotions “feel like” and “look like” and stores these as fuzzy 
categories (Wranik et al., 2007). As with emotion regulation, the development of emotional 
processing is important to understand in order to fully conceptualize the entire process of 
emotional responding.  The theories of processing, as well as research related to this area, are 
presented below, followed by a summary of processing development research. 
Theories of Emotion and Social Information Processing.  Based on their research 
regarding emotion regulation, several theorists have developed models to explain the 
development of emotional or social competence.  These theories, while labeled differently, all 
have two common steps within them-- a step of emotional processing, and a step of emotional 
response (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Halberstadt, Denham & Dunsmore, 2001; Mayer & Salovey, 
1997; Saarni, 1999).  The theories are removed fromliteral brain processes; with an 
understanding that there is a fundamental difference between the way the brain operates and the 
way one can explain these operations (Halberstadt e al., 2001).  In fact, neural connectivist 
researchers have noted that because information processing occurs within such a small time 
frame, it is far from clear whether the steps in neural models of information processing coincide 
with models of cognitive processing (Smolensky, 1988).  The theories being offered here have 
come to be known as ‘on-line,’ as they relate to conceptual real time brain activities that have 
thus far been very hard to link directly to the inta gible substrate neural activities with which 
they most likely coincide (Crick & Dodge, 1995; Halberstadt et al., 2001; Lemerise & Arsenio, 
2000). In conjunction with the connectivist researchers, all of the recent theories of information 
processing recognize that processing most likely occurs in simultaneous parallel paths, with 
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individuals engaging in multiple processes at the same time (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Lemerise & 
Aresenio, 2000; Halberstadt et al., 2001; Smolensky, 1988).  The theories described here mainly 
stem from the research that has documented the developm nt of emotion regulation.  These 
theories offer explanation of a process that ultimately leads to the expression of emotion.  
Hypothetically, if problems within the steps towards emotion regulation were to be identified, 
interventions could be created to ultimately influenc  effective emotional expression.   
Emotional competence.  Saarni (1999) has proposed a theory of emotion processing 
including eight skills, or steps, that lead to ‘emotional competence.’  Saarni (1999) has noted, 
that when one achieves emotional competence one is able to demonstrate “one’s self-efficacy in 
emotion-eliciting transactions, which are invariably social in nature” (p. 2).  Emotional 
competence is explained to be a simultaneous interaction including applying knowledge about 
emotions, regulating such emotions, and negotiating interpersonal exchanges. Saarni (1999) has 
posited that culture plays a large role in this theory, whereby all of one’s responses to emotional 
stimuli are based on “cultural messages we have absorbed about the meaning of social 
transactions, of relationships, and even our self definitions” (p.2).  
According to Saarni (1999), the eight skills of emotional competence include: 1) 
awareness of own emotional state, 2) recognition of other’s emotion, 3) use of emotion and 
expression language, 4) ability to be empathetic, 5) realization that inner state and outer 
expression in self or others does not always correspond 6) coping adaptively with aversive or 
distressing emotions by using self-regulatory strategies, 7) awareness that relationships are 
largely defined by emotional communication and 8) emotional efficacy:  feeling in control and 
accepting of one’s own emotional experiences (Saarni, 1999).  While theoretically the 
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importance of process is emphasized, an explanation of how the proposed eight skills develop or 
interact with each other is not clearly explained by the theory.   
Emotional intelligence.  Mayer and Salovey (1997) applied their concept of emotional 
intelligence to a theory of processing and regulation of emotion.  The authors define emotional 
intelligence as “the capacity to process emotional information accurately and efficiently, 
including that information relevant to the recognition, construction, and regulation of emotion in 
oneself and others” (p. 197).  The authors theorize that the generation, perception, and regulation 
of emotions play a large role in positive emotional growth and adaptation.  In addition, they note 
that emotions facilitate thinking and therefore, regulation of emotions will promote intellectual 
growth (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  The authors identify four abilities: 1) perceiving and 
appraising others’ and one’s own emotions, 2) accessing and generating emotions to assist a 
thought, 3) recognizing and analyzing emotion in others, and 4) regulating emotion, to promote 
emotional and intellectual growth.  While Mayer and Salovey (1997) do acknowledge perception 
and processing of other’s emotion, their model, unlike Saarni’s (1999), is focused internally on 
self-awareness, and on emotions enhancing thought by t inking intelligently about one’s own 
and other’s emotions. This theory is to suggest therefore, that one with more intellectual abilities 
should have better ability to process and regulate emotions, and one may logically be able to 
realize that these two components do not necessarily coincide.   
Reformulated theory of information processing.  Crick and Dodge (1994) reformulated 
a model of information processing originally created by Dodge (1991).  Their goal was to reflect 
a convergence between developmental, clinical, and cognitive psychological theory.  In this 
reformulated model, they acknowledge the likelihood f parallel processing, as introduced by 
connectivist theorists (Smolensky, 1988), in contrast to Dodge’s original model that simply 
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depicted a linear process.  Crick and Dodge’s (1994) reformulated model depicts a feedback loop 
and cyclical structure, whereby theoretically, processing is continuous and simultaneous, yet 
following a logical path from a particular stimulus (e.g. provocation by a peer) to a behavioral 
response (e.g. retaliation). 
According to Crick and Dodge (1994), an individual enters a situation with both 
genetically predisposed traits (e.g. intelligence, temperament) and stored information from past 
experiences (e.g. memory of past emotional reactions). I  any given environment, a person 
receives an overwhelming amount of information (or cues), both relevant and irrelevant, which is 
used to process the situation and respond.  Crick and Dodge (1994) proposed six steps to the 
processing and response to these cues.  The steps of the reformulated model include: 1) encoding 
of external and internal cues, 2) interpretation and mental representation of those cues, 3) 
clarification or selection of a goal, 4) response access or construction, 5) response decision, and 
6) behavioral enactment. 
As noted, the main focus of this paper is to consider the steps of processing that involve 
perception of another’s emotions and the self-regulation of emotion.  In the Crick and Dodge 
(1994) model, steps 1, 2, 5, and 6 are relevant.  During steps one and two, encoding and 
interpretation of social cues occurs.  According to Crick and Dodge (1994), encoding includes 
simply absorbing cues from the environment.  Some of the Crick and Dodge theory development 
is based on previous work by Kahneman (1973) who conceptualized that there are two 
dimensions of attentional behavior when absorbing cues: intensity and selectivity.   Kahneman 
(1973) proposed that the intensity of attention refers to the number of processing resources used 
to decipher cues, and the selectivity of attention refers to the degree to which codes are 
encoded—with some being encoded more completely and accurately than others. This nosology 
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was also adopted by Crick and Dodge (1994).  In this model, some cues are readily encoded with 
little attention because of their familiarity (such as ‘reading’ a friend’s expressions during 
conversation), whereas encoding of other cues are mo attention demanding (such as ‘reading’ a 
new supervisor’s expressions during a meeting).  In his first model, Dodge (1991) proposed that 
during the encoding phase, it is likely that facial information has greater salience than other cues 
because of the wealth of information provided by facial expressions.  He further theorized that 
when meeting someone new, both intensity and selectivity of attention are likely heightened as 
the individual is encoding new information.  Subsequ nt research studies have elaborated on this 
view. 
Both in the original (Dodge, 1991) and in the reformulated model (Crick & Dodge, 
1994), the second step in emotion processing is referred to as interpretation. According to the 
authors, during this step, cues are matched to the possible interpretations available in memory (or 
a novel interpretation is generated), and through an almost instantaneous decision tree, 
information is given meaning. For instance, in an example offered by Dodge (1991), this model 
suggests that if a child is playing a game with peers and one peer moves his piece out of turn, the 
child encodes the peer’s cues (moving the piece out of t rn), and the encoding will lead to an 
interpretation, which could either be that the peer is “cheating” or that the peer made a 
“mistake.” The interpretation that is made will be ased on previous information or situations to 
which the interpreter has been exposed (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1991), and will thus 
influence the next outcome in the situation. 
Crick and Dodge (1994) acknowledge that individuals often fail to adequately encode 
information and this can negatively impact interpretation. Based on the theory that processing 
occurs simultaneously, when a miss-encode happens, the process loop begins again (Smolensky, 
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1988).  According to Crick and Dodge (1994), while re-encoding is happening, the person may 
experience a sense of perplexity or enhanced concentratio , and when the interaction requires a 
quick response, the interpreter will default their decision to whatever exists in memory, despite 
its accuracy to the situation. 
During the third step in emotion processing, immediately following an interpretation of 
the situation, Crick and Dodge (1994) propose that c ildren select a goal or desired outcome for 
the situation (e.g., staying out of trouble, getting even with a provocateur, making a friend, 
getting a toy). The authors state that goals are focused arousal states that function to orient the 
person towards producing desired outcomes.  Following in step four, it is hypothesized that 
children access from memory past responses to the situation and whether they should be used 
again, or, if the situation is novel, they may formulate a new response to the social cues.  
According to Crick and Dodge (1994) there are several things that are considered in these very 
brief moments.  For instance, they hypothesize that one considers the interpersonal consequences 
(e.g. Will I be liked?), instrumental consequences (e.g. Will I get what I want?), and the moral 
value (e.g. “Do I approve of this behavior?”) of their behavior and how it relates to their goals in 
the situation.  
Step five of Crick and Dodge’s (1994) model proposed that a response is chosen based on 
an evaluation of their goals.  And then finally, at step six, the theory posits that the chosen 
response is behaviorally enacted.  It is at this stage that emotion regulation coincides with 
emotion processing.  Crick and Dodge (1994) note that the response may include motor, verbal, 
or a combination of both behaviors.  It is presumed that the behaviors that are enacted are ‘skills’ 
that have been acquired over time and are chosen based on the frequency they have been used 
and the success they have offered in past situations (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1991).  This 
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being considered, according to the emotion regulation literature previously discussed here, when 
one has not acquired, or learned, responses that are effective, an individual’s ‘skills repertoire’ 
will be lacking, and therefore their interpersonal i teractions may suffer (Eisenberg et al., 1994, 
1996).   
According to both Lemerise and Arsenio (2000), and Halberstadt et al. (2001), the Crick 
and Dodge theory (1994), while thorough, failed to take into account the full capacity that 
emotion is involved in processing social information.  Therefore, both Lemerise and Arsenio 
(2000), and Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) attemp  to correct this in their own model, the 
Integrated Model, and the Affective Social Competence model, respectively. 
Integrated model of emotion and social information processing.   Lemerise and Arsenio 
(2000) acknowledged that the difference between emotion and cognitive processes may be 
difficult to delineate.  Nonetheless, they have strssed the importance of incorporating emotion 
into processing models because, as they concur, the two processes undoubtedly influence each 
other in any given situation (Lemerise & Aresenio, 2000).  The authors propose that individual 
differences in both emotionality and regulatory ability affect both processing of social and 
emotional information, and decision-making in social s tuations. Furthermore, Lemerise and 
Arsenio (2000) believe that maladjusted children, who have shown to be poor regulators of their 
emotions (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1996), most likely also have social information processing 
deficits.   
Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) enhanced the steps of enc ding and interpreting (1&2) of 
the Crick and Dodge (1994) model so that in their model, emotion influences the process.  They 
proposed that self and others' emotional signals provide ongoing information about how the 
situation is progressing, and that these signals allow for adjustments to behavior. The authors 
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suggested that the level of emotional investment in a situation may influence encoding and 
interpretation. For instance, they explained that being teased by a friend would be quite different 
than being teased by the class bully.  In this case, while the situational cues are the same 
(teasing) the encoding and interpretation will most likely be different, because the pre-existing 
feelings towards the friend or the bully are different (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000).  Additionally, 
Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) suggested that encoding and interpretation can be influenced by 
mood and level of arousal during the situation.  They ypothesized that mood, emotions, and /or 
arousal can affect what is noticed about a social encounter by influencing what memories are 
drawn upon during the interpretation phase.  In other words, if a child is in a negative mood 
state, their interpretation of a situation will probably be negatively skewed, or, children who are 
experiencing strong emotions may be too overwhelmed to generate a variety of responses from 
which to choose the best solution. In these cases, Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) postulated that  
children may engage in "preemptive processing" as coined by Crick and Dodge (1994) which 
can result in an impulsive behavioral response that is unlikely to positively influence the 
situation (e.g., running away or aggressively retaliating). 
Affective social competence.  Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) developed their model 
of affective social competence (AFC) based on the notio  that emotional content, communicated 
verbally, facially, or through body language, plays  role in nearly every interaction, and often 
determines the meaning of the interaction. The authors conceptualized a model of affective social 
competence that includes three basic components:  sending affective messages, receiving 
affective messages, and experiencing affect (Halberstadt et al., 2001).  Within each component, 
the authors further suggested that four abilities ar  essential for positive social interactions 
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including awareness, identification, working within a social context, and management and 
regulation.   
While other models identify the receiving of a message as the trigger for the processing 
cycle (e.g. encoding), Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) identified sending a message as the first 
step, and receiving as the second.  According to Halberstadt and colleagues (2001), several 
conditions play a role during the sending process, including an awareness that an affective 
message needs to be sent, an identification of whatthat message will be, sending the message, 
and finally managing the sending of the affective mssages. The authors suggested that what 
happens in ‘sending’ can “make or break the social encounter” (p.90), as these decisions need to 
be made quickly and will have a synergistic effect on what is then received from others engaged 
in the interaction.  
According to the ASC theory, the second step of receiving others’ affective signals is 
crucial.  During this step, immediate feedback is provided about the effects of behavior and 
others’ intentions in the situation.  Halberstadt and colleagues hypothesized that the use of 
display rules occurs during the receiving of affective messages (Saarni, 1979), whereby receivers 
interpret whether the sender is enacting display rules and in turn whether they are sending an 
accurate or masked emotional signal. In addition, the receiver is hypothesized to note the 
intensity used by the sender, and how this level relates to their emotional state.   Furthermore, 
Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) recognized that receivers need to differentiate between 
messages that have already been sent (and thus would be repetitive in processing), and those that 
provide new information to the situation. Lastly, during the receiving process, informative 
signals need to be differentiated from those that are useless to the situation.  Halberstadt and 
colleagues (2001) offered an example: a receiver notices and inquires about one’s frowning 
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while the sender is simply concentrating on the intraction.  In this situation, for a less-skilled 
receiver, they would be perceiving affect from an expr ssion where none was intended.   While 
these processes are happening, the authors theorized that all information is being considered 
within the environment it is occurring.  According to Halberstadt and colleagues (2001), in this 
model, a peer to peer engagement process will be different than a parent to child process because 
of the influence of emotional investment.  
Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) defined the thirdcomponent of their AFC model as 
emotional experiencing.  The authors intended this component to refer not only to awareness and 
recognition of one’s own emotions, but also to effective regulation of one’s emotional 
expression. The authors noted “emotion regulation is a large, complex part of ASC which is still 
not defined to all developmentalists’ satisfaction” (p.102). They further stated that “all elements 
of emotional experience—arousal, cognitive construal, and behavioral action—involve 
regulation” (p.102).    Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) defined the goal of the arousal 
dimension of emotion regulation to either be self-soothing and arousal reducing, or to increase 
physiological arousal.  The cognitive dimension of emotion regulation is believed to include a 
refocusing of attention and reasoning for problem solving.  Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) 
postulated that behaviorally, emotion regulation includes expressing appropriate and/or 
inhibiting inappropriate expressions, thoughts, or behaviors related to the emotional experience.   
All of the theories mentioned here offer sound ideas as to how one processes emotional 
stimuli during social interactions. While Crick and Dodge (1994) did not fully embrace the role 
of emotion into their theory, it is the most comprehensive theory of social information processing 
offered.  Lemerise and Aresenio (2000) did an adequate job of considering how Crick and 
Dodge’s theory could be improved upon with the inclusion of emotional influences. Halberstadt 
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and colleagues (2001) offered a very thorough explanation of what social competence entails, but 
their theory lacks empirical support of the actual process described.  All of the theorists would 
agree that processes are most likely occurring simultaneously and therefore, it may be impossible 
to delineate a step by step organization.  Thus instead, it may be preferable to focus on the 
influences on accurate processing.   
A thorough review of the theoretical understanding of information and emotion 
processing has been offered.  Now, the developmental research related to these theories will be 
presented. 
Development of normal vs. psychopathological emotion processing.  There is a large 
body of research examining how emotion processing in ch ldren is related to behavior (e.g. Crick 
& Ladd, 1993; Dodge & Somberg, 1987; Nelson & Crick, 1999). In general, studies have shown 
that those children who are identified as having behavior problems differ from normal controls in 
emotion processing (Stegge & Terwogt, 2007).  It has been suggested that while encoding, they 
pay more attention to threatening information, they more readily interpret cues as hostile, they 
consider instrumental goals over interpersonal ones, th y offer more aggressive options than 
healthy controls and finally, at the enactment step, they choose to become aggressive more often 
(Crick & Ladd, 1993; Dodge & Somberg, 1987).  The bulk of the research in this area has 
focused on cue interpretation and making intent attributions during the interpretive process 
(Nelson & Crick, 1999).  This research is premised on the notion that children’s and adolescent’s 
behavior is related to differences in their intent attributions, or in their ability to interpret social 
cues and motives from others (Dodge, 1991; Nelson & Crick, 1999). 
For a study of children’s perceptions of their peer xperiences, Crick and Ladd (1993) 
had three goals.  They wanted to compare the social feelings of neglected, controversial, and 
57 
 
rejected children to children who were considered to be popular and of average status.  Secondly, 
they wanted to assess the amount and forms of distress experienced in each group.  Lastly, they 
wanted to determine if children’s feelings were relat d to their attributions about social outcomes 
(Crick & Ladd, 1993).   
The subject pool consisted of 175 third graders and 164 fifth graders from five different 
schools.  Based on nominations, researchers divided the pool into five status groups including:  
popular, average, neglected, rejected, and controversial (Crick & Ladd, 1993).  The researchers 
also identified a group of high distress children based on scores that were more than half a 
standard deviation above the mean on at least two of the three perception measures.  These 
measures included ratings of loneliness, social anxiety, and social avoidance.   
First, the authors found that rejected children repo ted significantly higher levels of 
loneliness than their popular, average, neglected, an  controversial peers, and they were more 
likely to attribute negative, relational outcomes to peers (i.e. blamed peers for rejection). 
Controversial students were less likely than averag status peers to attribute positive, relational 
outcomes to themselves (others like you) or to mutual cause (you like doing the same activities). 
Crick and Ladd (1993) found that children’s feelings were directly related to their attributions.  
For popular children, feelings of loneliness were negatively related to taking credit for 
relationship successes.  For rejected children, avoid nce of peers was positively related to 
blaming others when relationships fail.  For averag children however, feeling lonely was found 
to be positively related to blaming the self for relationship failures.  And for neglected children, 
feelings of loneliness were negatively related to taking credit for both relational and instrumental 
successes (Crick & Ladd, 1993).    
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The hypothesis that rejected children were more likely than other children to view peers 
as the cause of their social difficulties (e.g., because other kids are mean) was supported (Crick 
& Ladd, 1993).  The authors postulate that rejected hildren may become keenly aware of their 
peers' negative sentiments toward them and feel distressed about their relative lack of positive 
relationships and/or their abundance of negative relationships. In addition, the results 
demonstrated that children's feelings of distress in social situations may depend on the causal 
attributions they make in those situations.  
Likewise, children who score higher on ratings of aggression and depressive symptoms 
have been shown to process social situations in a more negative way (Quiggle, Garber, Panak, & 
Dodge, 1992).  When they assess situations that involve rejection, children with higher levels of 
depression interpret these situations to be more emotionally distressing than how their healthy 
peers view the same situation.  The behavioral response that is readily chosen is avoidance of 
social situations, instead of a more effective problem solving, or cognitive reappraisal technique 
(Quiggle et al., 1992).   
A similar study was conducted by Dodge and Somberg in 1987, yet it only included 
observing attribution biases among aggressive boys.  For this study, social cognitive processes 
were assessed under relaxed (watching videos) and threatening (overhearing an indirect verbal 
threat of physical violence) conditions.  The study included 32 boys who had been identified 
from a larger sample as rejected and aggressive, and 33 boys who were identified as adjusted-
nonaggressive.   
There were several interesting results of Dodge and Somberg’s (1987) study.  Overall, 
aggressive boys gave more hostile attributions to the peer provocateur in the vignettes than 
nonaggressive boys.  Under the manipulation of threat, the aggressive boys became even more 
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likely to attribute hostility to the peer provocateur, whereas the nonaggressive boys did not 
change their attributional tendencies (Dodge & Somberg, 1987).  Nonaggressive boys were more 
likely to interpret accidental intentions than their aggressive counterparts. Both groups however, 
were very adept at interpreting hostile cues made by the peer provocateur.  In the accidental 
situations, aggressive boys responded with more retaliatory aggression, in both the relaxed and 
threat trials.  In the ambiguous vignettes, aggressiv  boys were more likely to attribute hostile 
intent than nonaggressive boys.  In general, the beavioral responses indicated by nonaggressive 
boys closely matched their interpretation of the situat on, whereas for aggressive boys the 
situation seemed somewhat arbitrary, unless it was clearly prosocial (Dodge & Somberg, 1987).     
On a different note, Nelson and Crick (1999) researched social information processing in 
prosocial adolescents. They hypothesized that highly prosocial children would have a benign 
attributional bias that serves as a buffer against negative peer interactions.  Further, they 
hypothesized that prosocial adolescents would favor relational goals over instrumental, and more 
favorable evaluations of response options.  Lastly, Nelson and Crick (1999) wanted to observe 
the influence of emotion on social cognitive performance in this population.  They predicted that 
prosocial youth would be significantly less likely to report feeling angry or upset by altercations 
with peers, and therefore less likely to be aggressiv .  
Research subjects included 887 fourth- through sixth- grade adolescents from 12 
elementary schools. Similar measures were employed in this study as those described above.  
Children nominated classmates according to their relational and overt aggressiveness and 
prosocial tendencies.  In addition, ten vignettes with unambiguous situations including two peers 
were shown.  Questions following the vignettes assessed goal preference and response 
evaluations (Nelson & Crick, 1999).   
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Findings revealed that prosocial adolescents could be ifferentiated by social cognitive 
patterns that are most likely support their prosocial nature. For example, the hypothesis was 
supported that prosocial adolescents would exhibit a enign attributional bias.  They were 
significantly more likely than even their average peers to perceive benign intent behind a 
provocation (Nelson & Crick, 1999).  Further, prosocial status corresponded with lower levels of 
anticipated distress to a hypothetical provocation. Therefore, according to Nelson and Crick 
(1999), prosocial adolescents are less likely to experience negative emotions that are connected 
with an aggressive or otherwise maladaptive reaction.   
To summarize, while the exact process of social information processing at this point is 
still theoretical, there appears to be clear processing differences between children who have 
developed healthy emotion regulation skills and those who have not.  The research presented 
here suggests that dysregulation and aggressive behavioral reaction in part results from 
misinterpretation of cues in processing.   
The research regarding emotion processing and percetion in both children with anger / 
aggression (Crick & Ladd, 1993; Dodge & Somberg, 1987) and in children with depression 
(Quiggle et al., 1992) indicates that unless targeted, these processing difficulties, and ineffective 
behavioral responses will continue into adulthood.  As mentioned several times here within, 
borderline personality is a disorder diagnosed in adulthood and includes difficulties with emotion 
regulation, mood fluctuations including aggressive behavior, and interpersonal difficulties such 
as vacillations in close relationships (APA, 2000).  It is quite possible that attributional biases 
developed in childhood carry into adulthood, and these difficulties make processing of social and 
emotional cues more haphazard. Indeed, research has been conducted in populations with 
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emotion regulation difficulties.  The next section will review this literature, with a specific focus 
on emotion processing in borderline personality disorder. 
Emotion Regulation and Processing in BPD 
Emotion regulation in BPD.  It has been mentioned previously that children who are 
raised in environments where there is inconsistent, unsupportive, over-involved, or critical 
parental reactions to emotional expression, may struggle with the ability to control their emotions 
(Denham et al., 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1996; Gable & Isabella, 1992).  If ignored, the inability to 
control emotions in childhood may lead to emotion dysregulation and impulsivity in adulthood 
(Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan & Bohus, 2004).   Emotion dysregulation is defined as “the 
inability, despite effort, to change or regulate emotional cues, experiences, actions, verbal 
responses, and/or non-verbal expressions under normative conditions” (Linehan, Bohus, & 
Lynch, 2007, p.583).  While emotion dysregulation ca  exist in someone without a clinically 
diagnosable disorder, as well as be an aspect of any number of psychiatric disorders, it has been 
noted as a fundamental aspect of BPD (Linehan, 1993; Linehan et al., 2007).   This disorder, 
which is characterized by persistent and pervasive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
dysregulation, is among the most severe and perplexing behavioral disorders (Crowell et al., 
2009).  
Characteristics of emotion dysregulation are consistent with most of the criteria for BPD 
and inhibit the entire emotional network including the behavioral, physiological, and cognitive 
subsystems (Linehan et al., 2007).  Emotion dysregulation includes an overload of aversive 
emotional experiences, an inability to regulate extreme physiological arousal, problems turning 
attention away from emotional stimuli, cognitive distortions regarding emotional situations, 
impulsive behaviors related to overwhelming affect, a lack of non-mood dependent goal 
62 
 
direction, and a tendency to dissociate under very high stress.  Pervasive dysregulation occurs 
across the entire emotional system, including the behavioral, physiological, cognitive, and 
experiential subsystems of emotional responding (Linehan et al., 2007).  
The developmental research presented here clearly describes how emotion regulation can 
be underdeveloped based on internal (neurobiological; cognitive) and environmental (parental; 
peer) influences.  The neurobiological, cognitive, and environmental literature on the 
development of emotion regulation capacities is very consistent with Linehan’s (1993) 
conceptualization that those with BPD are often raised in invalidating environments, and the 
effects of this environment continue through adulthood. Described earlier, an invalidating 
environment is one where there is an intolerance of the expression of emotions, or an intermittent 
reinforcement of extreme expressions of emotion (Crowell et al., 2009). Linehan (1993) 
hypothesized that when a child is raised in this type of environment, it is communicated to the 
child that such emotional displays are unwarranted and that emotions should be coped with 
internally and without parental support. Consequently, the child does not learn how to 
understand, label, regulate, or tolerate emotional responses and instead learns to oscillate 
between emotional inhibition and extreme emotional lability (Crowell et al., 2009; Linehan, 
1993).  In adulthood, this inability to control emotional reactions manifests as BPD.  
Linehan’s (1993) theory suggests that emotional respon es and behaviors are learned 
through repeated behavioral interactions whereby emotional responses are often punished and 
dysfunctional or ineffective responses are reinforced. Thus, Crowell and colleagues (2009) have 
asserted that in childhood, vulnerability interacts with learning to shape and maintain 
dysregulated emotions, maladaptive behaviors, faulty interpersonal relationships, and cognitive 
distortions that are later categorized as borderlin personality disorder.  The characteristics of 
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borderline individuals can be directly connected to their emotional responses.  Impulsive 
behaviors, interpersonal problems, dissociative behaviors, and self-injurious behaviors often 
function to modulate intense emotional experience, or to increase the experience of emotion or 
sensation in the absence of emotion (Wagner & Lineha , 1998; Westen, 1991). 
Longitudinal research on development of the disorder is lacking, and direct links between 
childhood emotional development and adult emotion regulation have not been made (Crowell et 
al., 2009), it is simply observed that emotion dysregulation is pervasive throughout BPD.  
Recently however, one group of researchers (Crowell et a ., 2009) extended Linehan’s biosocial 
theory for the purpose of conceptualizing BPD from a life span developmental perspective.   
They developed five testable hypotheses regarding the development of the disorder.  The first 
hypothesis is that poor impulse control and emotional sensitivity are early biological 
vulnerabilities for BPD (e.g. temperament, see Eisenberg et al., 1996).   
The second hypothesis presented by Crowell and colleagues (2009) is that broad emotion 
dysregulation is promoted and maintained within an invalidating environment (e.g. parental 
responses to emotional expressions, see Eisenberg et al, 1999). The third hypothesis of this 
developmental theory is that reciprocal transactions between biological vulnerability and 
environmental risk potentiate emotion dysregulation and lead to more extreme behavioral 
dyscontrol (e.g. cortisol levels, see Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007). The last two hypotheses are 
grounded in the first three and fit together.  They posit that there are early behavioral indications 
of risk for BPD, and that traits and behaviors indicative of BPD emerge much earlier than the full 
diagnosis (Crowell et al., 2009).    
The theory that Crowell and colleagues (2009) present d is consistent other 
developmental literature, and explains a possible longitudinal relationship between inefficient 
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emotion regulation development and BPD.  In fact, their hypotheses regarding precursors to BPD 
are nearly identical to precursors of emotion regulation difficulties in children that have been 
identified in the emotion regulation literature. 
While Crowell and colleagues (2009) were thorough in explaining a theoretical role of 
emotion regulation as it relates to the development of BPD, they did not include the influence of 
emotion processing.  As described earlier, it is theorized that one precursor to emotional 
responding is the interpretation of emotional cues given by others (Dodge, 1991).  As has been 
noted, inaccuracies in emotion processing in children are related to emotion regulation 
difficulties.  Therefore, since emotion regulation difficulties in childhood are hypothesized to 
continue into adulthood when left unaddressed, it would make sense that emotion processing 
difficulties would also continue.   
Emotion regulation development and its role in BPD have been discussed.  In addition, 
emotion processing development, especially its role in emotion regulation, has been presented.  
What is missing from this review is the role of emotion processing in BPD.  Therefore, in the 
next section, emotion processing in BPD will be reviewed. 
Emotion processing in BPD.  Ever since several researchers have observed that 
borderline individuals have difficulty regulating their emotions and most likely process 
emotional cues differently than others (Kernberg, 1985; Linehan, 1993), they have worked to 
verify this observation.  The research has mainly focused on emotion facial expression 
recognition, and stems from Ekman’s (1994) research of t is topic.      
Ekman and his colleagues were the first to research nd develop measures of the six basic 
emotions expressed through the human face (1969).  They noted that human faces are a rich 
source of information regarding subjective emotional st tes and social communication. The six 
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basic emotions he identified have been observed to be universal across cultures: happiness, 
surprise, sadness, fear, disgust, and anger (Ekman, 1992). Ekman and Friesen (1969) suggest that 
while there are cultural differences in what elicits certain emotions, and which emotions are 
considered appropriate responses, there is universality in the recognition of emotions when they 
are expressed through the face.   In cross-cultural studies of 31 groups, Ekman (1994) found 
consistent evidence of agreement in judgment of facial expression of these basic emotions. These 
emotions appear to have unique features, which include signal, physiology, and antecedent 
events.  In general, people are able to identify these features to determine the emotion (Ekman, 
1992).   
Termed FER, Facial Emotion Recognition measures are the most common assessments of 
one’s ability to perceive emotion.  The measures us the faces of the six basic emotions that 
Ekman developed and tested (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1979; Ekman & Matsumoto, 1992; Schaffer 
et al., 2006). Many researchers have investigated id as surrounding FER and its influence on 
social interactions. Hassin and Trope (2000) demonstrated that we make inferences about 
conversations with someone based on what we are reading in their facial expression, and these 
inferences can dramatically alter ongoing interactions (Keltner & Kring, 1998).  In addition, we 
tend to build on our interactions (Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer, 1980); in other words, over time, as 
we are developing relationships, we use facial exprssions and communication (i.e. language) to 
build on existing information.  As we build on existing information, our interpretations of others' 
behavior and emotions improves. For instance, if our partner suddenly looks sad, this can shift 
the direction of a hostile interaction, as we may puse to express concern or offer support (Gross 
& Thompson, 2007).  In contrast, if a hostile interaction is occurring with someone we don’t 
know well, the shift in emotion may not be as easily identifiable.  It is possible to comprehend 
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that either consistently inaccurate emotional perception, or inconsistent emotional responses 
given by others, could lead to faulty interpersonal i teractions and one becoming emotionally 
dysregulated (Wagner & Linehan, 1999).    
In this way, emotion perception and conceptual knowledge about emotions are closely 
interrelated, with conceptual knowledge of emotions influencing the way emotions are perceived 
and vice versa.  Both emotion perception ability and conceptual knowledge of emotions are 
mostly developed during childhood.  The research involving the relationship between perception 
and conceptual knowledge also involves measures of FER.  For example, researchers have found 
that supplying individuals with verbal information about still faces improves discrimination of 
different facial expressions (Gauthier, James, Curby, & Tarr, 2003; Russell et al., 2003).  It has 
been speculated that individuals with more complex emotion knowledge will perceive and adapt 
to a variety of emotional signals or feelings and will probably generate more suitable plans for 
regulation, whereas those with less complex knowledge may be comparatively limited (Wranik 
et al., 2007).   
Studies comparing FER in those with BPD versus healt y controls (HCs) have produced 
mixed results, without an overwhelming amount of evid nce to suggest whether there is 
enhanced, impaired or equivalent perception ability compared to healthy groups.  The findings of 
FER studies will be presented in terms of whether tir overall results found the BPD Group to 
be less accurate (Bland et al., 2004; Dyck et al., 2009;  Levine, Marziali & Hood, 1997; Merkl et 
al., 2010; Unoka, Fogd, Fuzy, & Csukly, 2011), of similar accuracy (Domes et al., 2008; Dyck et 
al., 2009; Minzenberg, Poole, & Vinogradov, 2006;  Schilling et al., 2012; Wagner & Linehan, 
1999), or more accurate (Fertuck et al. 2009; Lynch et al., 2006) in identifying emotion 
compared to non-clinical groups.  Within each study there are discrete differences in ability, such 
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as bias toward fear response, or a difficulty in distinguishing neutral from emotion states, which 
will be reported along with the general perception results.   
BPD less accurate. Bland and colleagues (2004) conducted a study to examine emotion 
processing in BPD utilizing an in-patient sample of 35 women with BPD and 35 HCs.  To test 
their hypotheses, the authors administered an abbreviated form of the Pictures of Facial Affect 
(PFA; Ekman & Friesen, 1979, 1984) and the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM; Larsen and 
Diener, 1987).  The PFA (Ekman & Friesen, 1979, 1984) measures the ability to identify facial 
expressions of emotions. The PFA includes photographs of either a male or female face 
depicting one of six basic emotions-anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, or a  
neutral expression. The pictures are presented randomly to subjects who are asked to select the 
emotion that best describes the expression in the photograph. Responses are scored for overall 
accuracy and for accuracy within each specific emotion category.  The authors also administered 
the AIM as a measure of affect intensity, to determine whether it related to perception abilities.  
On the AIM, subjects use a six-point scale to rate the strength of their emotional reactions to 40 
ordinary life events. Of the 40 items, 28 (70%) reflect positive emotions, and 12 (30%) tap 
negative emotions.  
First, Bland and colleagues (2004) found that those with BPD were overall less accurate 
in identifying the facial expression of emotion.  More specifically, the BPD group was 
significantly less accurate in identifying anger, sadness, and disgust.  Secondly, they found that 
the BPD group reported significantly higher levels of emotional intensity, accounted for by their 
levels of reported negative emotional intensity.  Lastly, the researchers found that the more 
negative affect intensity reported, the less accurate one was in differentiating between negative 
facial affect.  They did not find any differences between groups in FER of positive emotions.  
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The findings reported by Bland and colleagues (2004) should be interpreted with caution.  
The researchers used a convenience sample of all inp tie t BPD participants.  Without diversity 
in the clinical sample, the results are less generalizable than had the BPD sample included both 
in- and out-patient participants.  Further, considering that everyone in the healthy control sample 
was void of any current or past psychopathology, the extreme differences in participant groups 
may have contributed to the results.  Therefore, future research should include a clinical 
participant sample with varying degrees of psychopathology.   Another limitation is that the 
researchers utilized only two measures to test their hypothesis.  Had the researchers incorporated 
additional measures to corroborate their findings they would have been able to corroborate their 
findings and offer more insight about their results.   
As part of a larger study, Dyck and colleagues (2009) specifically tested ability to 
discriminate between fearful, angry, and neutral facial expressions.  Their sample included 19 
BPD outpatient participants and 19 HCs.  Fourteen of the subjects in the BPD group had a 
comorbid diagnosis of PTSD, substance dependence, a eating disorder, or panic disorder. The 
Fear Anger Neutral Test (FAN) was used and comprises 16 angry, 16 fearful, and 32 neutral 
facial expressions depicted by men and women from Caucasian, African, and Asian ethnicities.  
Stimuli are presented for two seconds each and subjects are asked to respond within that time 
frame.  They are given their choice of two of the tree emotions for each stimulus.  
The results indicated that the BPD group was significantly less accurate in choosing the 
correct emotion.  More specifically, those with BPD chose either fear or anger more frequently 
than the HC group when the stimulus was neutral, and therefore, the significant difference was 
accounted for by the number of inaccurate responses to neutral stimuli.  However, when the 
authors divided the BPD group into those with and without comorbid PTSD, they found that the 
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non-PTSD group did only marginally worse in identifying neutral, and performed the same in 
identifying negative emotions, as the HC group (Dyck et al., 2009).  It is difficult to conclude 
that the PTSD diagnosis accounts for the difference i  accuracy when several other co-morbid 
disorders were identified in the sample and not analyzed further.   
The authors implicated a negativity bias (Dyck et al., 2009). However, the only choices 
available were neutral or negative so it is unknown whether the subjects would have been less 
biased had they been given a more choices.  It is in eresting that the measure used incorporates 
three ethnicities and the images are in color.  This is divergent from most of the FER studies that 
utilize gray scale images from the Ekman and Friesen (1979) catalog.  However, the authors 
failed to expand upon the implications of this and do not report the ethnic representation of their 
sample or if there was any bias toward any one ethnic stimulus or another.     
Levine et al. (1997) conducted a FER study that also determined the BPD group to be 
significantly less accurate in emotion perception than a HC group.  They studied 30 outpatient 
subjects (10 male) meeting DSM-III-R criteria for BPD and compared them to 40 age and 
education matched HCs.  The measures of emotion perce tion included the abbreviated PFA 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1984), the AIM (Larsen & Diener, 1987), The Ambivalence Questionnaire 
(AMBQ; Westen & Gaborit, 1989), and the Levels of Emotion Awareness Scale (LEAS; 
Quinlan, Lane, & Schwartz, 1988).   
The abbreviated PFA and AIM have been described previously.  The AMBQ was 
originally designed to measure children's ambivalence or their capacity to coordinate mixed 
emotions, but for this study was adapted for use with adults.  The subject is given a situation and 
asked to predict what the character’s emotional respon e would be, and describe the 
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characteristics of the person in the given situation (e.g., good friend, irresponsible, dishonest).  
The responses are coded as negative, positive, or mixed.   
The LEAS measures the respondents' ability to differentiate emotions in self and others. 
The measure includes 20 vignettes (the authors do not make it clear whether they are presented 
in written or auditory form) of two-person situations eliciting four emotions: anger, fear, 
happiness, and sadness. Subject’s responses are tape-recorded and coded on ability to identify 
emotion in self and others, and to express empathy.  A five point scale ranging from ‘no 
awareness of emotion’ to ‘awareness of discrete, multiple emotions,’ is used.   
Levine and colleagues (1997) found that the two groups differed significantly on all four 
measures of emotion processing. On the AMBQ, the BPD group showed significantly less ability 
to identify what emotions were being expressed in the vignettes compared to the control group. 
On the LEAS, the BPD group showed significantly lower levels of emotional awareness than did 
the control group. Similar to Bland and colleagues (2004), Levine et al. found that the BPD 
group showed significantly greater intensity of negative emotions than did controls on the AIM, 
but did not differ from controls for intensity of positive emotions. And again as similar to Bland 
and colleagues (2004), on the PFA, the BPD group was significantly less accurate than the 
control group at identifying facial expressions of emotions. More specifically, the BPD 
participants were less accurate in identifying anger, fear, and disgust on the PFA.    
This study was interesting because it included several aried measures of emotion 
perception. This allowed the researchers to determine various abilities or deficiencies, and in this 
case, found consistent deficiencies within the BPD group.  However, there are some limitations.  
The researchers were liberal with inclusion criteria, allowing any Axis I disorder besides 
schizophrenia.  For that reason, it is difficult to know whether the results are attributable to 
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characteristics of BPD or whether symptoms of another psychological disorder may have 
influenced the results.  Unlike other studies presented here however, the sample in this study 
includes BPD participants from various resources, creating a more diverse clinical sample.  In 
addition, the researchers made a concerted effort to have a demographically matched control 
group.   
As part of a larger magnetoencephalographic study, Merkl and colleagues (2010) 
administered a set of 112 male and female faces from the Ekman and Friesen (1979) catalog, 
including both neutral and emotional expressions.  Their sample included 13 BPD inpatient, and 
11 HC community participants.  The authors excluded those with current major depression, 
schizophrenia, substance abuse, or a neurological disorder.  The measure was timed and included 
stimuli from Ekman and Friesen’s standardized catalog (1979) with all six of the basic emotions 
included.  During administration however, the subjects were given a choice between only two of 
the emotions. The authors reported that the BPD group was less accurate for all emotional and 
neutral faces.  There was a slight tendency for the BPD group to choose fearful faces more 
incorrectly than the HC group.   This is one of four studies reported here that found a bias toward 
the emotion of fear.  Limitations of this study include a homogenous inpatient BPD sample and 
overall small sample size, making the results less g neralizable than some of the other research 
findings presented.  
Last within the ‘less accurate’ category is study conducted by Unoka and colleagues 
(2011).  They aimed to investigate specific impairments and error patterns in perception of 
negative emotions.  Their sample included 33 BPD inpatient and 32 matched HC participants.  
The subjects were administered the Ekman 60 Faces test, which includes male and female 
picture depicting the basic six emotions, each presented ten times for five seconds each. For each 
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stimulus, the participant was able to choose from all six emotions.  Neutral facial expressions 
were not included in this study.   
Unoka et al. (2011) reported that the BPD patients were significantly less accurate than 
the HC group.  Further, the BPD group was less accur te in differentiating between fear, sadness, 
disgust, and anger.  The BPD group almost never confused positive and negative emotions, a 
finding consistent with other studies reported here (Levine et al., 1997; Bland et al., 2004; 
Domes et al., 2008), suggesting that ability to differentiate between positive and negative valence 
is intact in BPD.  
Similar accuracy between groups.  Other studies have indicated that FER in BPD is not 
impaired, as their results have found no significant difference between BPD and HC groups. A 
study by Domes and colleagues (2008) tested 25 women with BPD and 25 HCs on two measures 
of emotion perception. Eleven of the BPD group had co-morbid PTSD.   
 For the first part of their study the researchers morphed facial expressions from the PFA 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1993) from a neutral to an emotional facial expression.  For this task, the 
authors wanted to determine how long it took participants to correctly identify the emotion of the 
facial expression (Domes et al., 2008).   
The facial expressions were electronically morphed in 5% increments of intensity from 0-
100%.  As the subjects were watching the face morph in intensity they were instructed to press a 
‘stop’ button as soon as they became aware of the emotion being displayed.  Overall, the 
researchers did not find any significant differences b tween groups in ability to accurately 
identify the emotion being displayed.  The researchers found one significant difference; they 
determined that the BPD subjects made significantly more errors on the trials showing surprised 
faces.     
73 
 
The second portion of the study tested whether participants had difficulty identifying 
ambiguity in facial expressions.  Domes et al. (2008) used the same set of slides and morphed 
two emotions together in 10% increments to produce a s t of new slides, each of which 
represented a blend of two basic emotions (e.g. 90% anger/10% fear; 70% anger/30% fear).  The 
blends included anger to disgust, anger to sadness, anger to fear, anger to happiness, fear to 
disgust, fear to sadness, and fear to happiness.  The subjects were asked to report the emotion on 
the face displayed as quickly as possible.  Again, no significant group differences were found.  
However, there were discrete differences in the typs of emotions chosen by each group.  The 
BPD group responded ‘anger’ more readily than the HCs to both the anger/disgust blend and the 
anger/happiness blend.  This finding led the authors t  suggest that those with BPD have a more 
difficult time identifying ambiguous faces, and that they have a negativity bias when the 
expression is ambiguous (Domes et al., 2008).   
There were some methodological limitations to this study.  First, while the study did 
match for age and education, only women were included.  Additionally, 11 out of 25 women in 
the BPD group met criteria for PTSD.   The emotional i tensity found in PTSD might be 
different than that of individuals diagnosed with BPD without PTSD, and the authors did not 
account for this possible confound. Furthermore, while altering a FER measure to morph the 
faces from neutral to emotionally laden is interesting, the altered measures used in this study do 
not have any reliability or validity indices, and therefore, the results should be interpreted with 
scrutiny. 
Results of a study conducted by Dyck and colleagues (2009) supported the notion that, in 
general, perception is not a deficiency found in those with BPD.  As part of a larger study, the 
Emotion Recognition Test (ERT) was administered to 19 BPD outpatient participants and 19 
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HCs.  The ERT includes 40 colored pictures of faces and requires subjects to choose one of four 
emotions (happy, sad, afraid, or angry) or neutral.  No significant between group differences 
were found (p = 0.58).  Though not significant, they found that ppiness was most readily 
accurately identified, followed by neutral, and fear.  Subjects had the most difficulty identifying 
sadness and anger.   
The authors noted this was the first study to include in-color facial expressions, though 
neither the racial representation of the stimuli or of the participants was described, making it 
difficult to decipher whether this had an effect on the results.  Another limitation, as cited in 
other studies presented here, is the fact that only one measure was used for analysis and 
therefore, nothing is available by which to compare or synthesize the findings.     
Only one study has been identified to date that has tested emotion perception in more 
than one modality.  Minzenberg and colleagues (2006) sought to determine the ability of BPD 
individuals to recognize both facial and prosodic emotions.  Prosody is defined as “the study of 
versification” or “the rhythmic and intonational aspect of language” (Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 2009).  The changes in one’s tone when angry, excited or happy are all examples of 
prosody.  The researchers hypothesized that subjects with BPD would have several social-
emotional processing deficits, and that these deficits would be related to interpersonal conflicts.  
Five measures were administered in total.  Two measur s of FER were administered; a 
version of the PFA (Ekman & Friesen, 1979), and the Benton Facial Recognition Test—Long 
Form (BFRT; Benton & Van Allen, 1968). The former has been discussed previously, and for 
the purposes of their study, the researchers included photos representing the six basic emotions.  
The latter is a test of facial feature matching.  Subjects are asked to match each target face with 1 
75 
 
of 6 and then 3 of 6 faces shown on the same page. There are 22 trials, and each gets 
progressively more difficult.  
Two measures were given to determine prosodic emotion recognition.  The Bell-Lysaker 
Emotion Recognition Test (BLERT; Bell, Bryson, & Lysaker, 1997) was designed to determine 
a person’s ability to differentiate between the six basic emotions and neutral, given facial, voice-
tonal, and upper body movements.  The subject views the ame actor portraying one of the seven 
choices while speaking one of three monologues involving work-related topics (21 vignettes 
total).  The only instructions given are to select which emotion (or neutral) is being represented 
in each vignette.  In addition, the Prosodic Emotion Recognition Test (PERT; Bowers, Blonder 
& Heilman, 1991) was given.  On this test, neutral sentences (e.g. The chairs are made of wood) 
are read in five prosodic tones (happy, sad, surprised, angry, or neutral) four times in random 
order (20 trials total; Minzenberg et al., 2006). Finally, the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory 
(BDHI; Buss & Durkee, 1957) was administered as a me sure of interpersonal hostility.  This 
measure includes 75 self-report items measuring several emotions that can lead to interpersonal 
conflict (e.g. hostility, irritability). 
On the PFA measure of FER, Minzenberg and colleagues (2006) did not find any 
significant differences in accuracy between the BPD and the HC groups.  However, they did find 
that the BPD group was significantly less accurate than the HC group on the BFRT.  On 
measures of prosody, Minzenberg and colleagues (2006) found that the BPD group was less 
accurate than HC group on the BLERT and that their scores on the BLERT were inversely 
correlated with their total hostility scores on theBDHI.  In other words, the less accurate in 
emotion perception, the more hostility one was repoting. However, on the PERT, no significant 
differences in accuracy were found between groups (Minzenberg et al., 2009). 
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The authors’ findings are consistent with several studies reported here (Domes et al., 
2008; Dyck et al., 2009; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Schilling et al., 2012; Wagner & Linehan, 
1999) indicating that individuals with BPD do not have more difficulty interpreting facial 
expressions of emotion.   However, the authors concluded that in general, as integrations of 
social appraisals become more complex, individuals with BPD may begin to evidence 
impairments.   
This study was the first of its kind to report on multiple measures of social-emotion 
perception in BPD, including comparison of the ability to recognize emotions in isolated sensory 
modes versus integrated perception.   However, there w e limitations of the study.  The 
researchers (Minzenberg et al., 2006) excluded patients with BPD who had comorbid major 
depression, PTSD, bipolar, or substance dependence.  Comorbidity is extremely common in 
BPD, and thus, their study may represent an unusual subgroup of the BPD population. Similarly, 
this study did not include a clinical comparison group; therefore, it is unclear whether these 
findings are specific to patients with BPD or may reflect symptoms that are also found in other 
disorders. Furthermore, psychometric properties of the prosody recognition task had not been 
established at the time of the study.    
Schilling and colleagues (2012) conducted a FER study utilizing the Reading the Minds 
in the Eyes (RMET) task.  They administered the task o 31 BPD and 27 HC participants.  The 
majority of the participants had a co-morbid depressive or anxiety disorder.  The RMET consists 
of 36 black-and-white photographs of the eyes region of various human faces. Participants are 
asked to identify the mental state of the stimuli by choosing one of four possible adjectives (three 
distracter words and one correct word). Participants re provided with a glossary, which contains 
the meaning of words describing mental states.  
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On the RMET, the authors failed to find any differenc s between groups in accuracy. Due 
to the measure used in this study, the results are not directly relatable to other FER findings, but 
interesting nonetheless as it suggests that on tasks with less emotional information, the BPD 
group maintains accuracy.  However, it could also be considered that both the BPD and HC 
groups found the task difficult, and any differences were counteracted.   
 The purpose of a study conducted by Wagner and Lineha  (1999) was to compare the 
facial expression abilities of three groups of Caucasian women, ranging in age from 18 to 45.  
The groups included:  BPD with a history of childhood sexual abuse (BPD group; N= 21); a 
history of childhood sexual abuse without BPD (CSA; N=20); no history of CSA or BPD 
diagnosis (HC; N=20). 
Two measures of FER were used, the Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of 
Emotion (JACFEE) and Japanese and Caucasian Neutral Faces (JACNeuF), both developed by 
Ekman and Matsumoto (1992). The slides represented anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, surprise, and neutral, but according to the researchers, they wanted to observe the most 
accurate ability by the groups and thus, did not give the participants choices of emotions 
(Wagner & Linehan, 1999).   
Wagner and Linehan (1999) did not find significant differences between the groups on 
any of the emotion slides except for fear.  The authors determined that the BPD group was the 
most accurate group on recognition of fear slides, and in addition, falsely attributed fear more 
frequently than the other two groups.  In other words, when the BPD group misidentified an 
emotion, they were more likely to choose a fear emotion.  In regards to the non-emotional, or 
neutral slides, both the BPD and CSA group scored significantly lower, or were less accurate, 
than the control group (Wagner & Linehan, 1999).  
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Several limitations of this study are apparent.  First, the measures included both Asian 
and Caucasian facial expressions, but there were not any Asian participants. Further, the subjects 
were not given choices of emotions and were not infrmed that an expression could be neutral.  
The authors noted that many participants had to be instructed to shorten their responses because 
they were giving more description than a basic emotion.  Considering this, it is unclear whether 
the answers given were prompted or were spontaneous r sponses.  Lastly, the researchers did not 
include any measures of proposed influence on FER ability.  For instance, they did not measure 
anger, hostility, or depression; traits that are thought to be related to emotional competence.  
Additional measures would have offered more insight regarding discrete group differences. 
BPD more accurate.  Two studies of FER found that those with BPD are more accurate 
in their ability to identify expressions of emotion (Fertuck et al., 2009; Lynch et al., 2006).  
Fertuck and colleagues (2009) conducted a study similar to Schilling et al. (2012) in that they 
utilized the RMET as a measure of FER.  For their study, a group of 30 individuals with BPD 
were compared to 25 HCs on RMET performance.  Participants were also assessed for 
depression using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; eck & Steer, 1993), and emotional state 
using the Profile of Mood States (POMS; Lorr & McNair, 1982) which is a 65-item 
questionnaire measuring general negative affect.   
The results indicated that the BPD group was significantly more accurate than the HC 
group in perception, as indicated by higher overall scores on the RMET.  The BPD group was 
more accurate in identifying neutral, positive, and negative mental states.  They did not find that 
the POMS correlated significantly to the RMET, but the authors did find a significant positive 
correlation between the BDI and RMET, suggesting that greater depression is related to 
enhanced perception abilities (Fertuck et al., 2009).   
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This study offers an alternative finding to the majority of the FER literature. 
Unfortunately, because the RMET cannot be directly compared to FER measures that use a full 
face, it is difficult to determine how generalizable these findings are.  As mentioned above when 
reviewing the Schilling et al. (2012) study, differences may simply be due to both groups finding 
the task challenging.  More RMET specific research is needed.   
A study utilizing morphed facial expressions was decribed above, but Lynch and 
colleagues (2006) were the first to assess emotion perception in BPD using a morphing measure.   
The authors used the Multimorph Facial Affect Recognition Task (Blair, Colledge, Murray, & 
Mitchell, 2001), which utilizes slides from the PFA (Ekman & Friesen, 1979), morphing them 
from a neutral facial expression to one of the six basic emotions.  For each of the 36 trials 
presented (6 for each of six emotions), the subject saw a neutral face morphing into an emotional 
expression over 39 stages, for 450ms each stage. Participants were asked to click their choice of 
emotion as soon as they were able to recognize it.    
The study compared 20 participants with BPD (17 women) to 20 matched HCs.  Overall, 
participants with BPD were able to correctly identify emotional faces more quickly and more 
accurately than the HC group.  Contrary to several other studies reported here, there was not a 
significant difference between groups in their ability to identify anger or happiness relative to the 
other emotions.   This finding suggests that those with BPD have heightened sensitivity to facial 
expression of emotion (Lynch et al., 2006).  Further, the authors postulate that the BPD group’s 
ability to more accurately recognize emotional exprssions may be related to increased emotional 
experience, and may exacerbate any emotional arousal they are already experiencing, 
contributing to emotion dysregulation. 
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There are limitations to be noted.  First, the sample included all Caucasian’s with a fairly 
high level education, making generalizability of results questionable. In addition, there was not a 
neutral stimuli included.  Research that has included a neutral choice option has typically found 
that those with BPD have the most difficulty identifying emotion when it is ambiguous.  
Therefore, without ambiguity, the results may be skwed. If the study had included a neutral 
option the results may have different.  
Summary of FER studies.  In sum, the results of FER and multimodal perception are 
inconsistent at best. While there are studies that report the notion that those with BPD are more 
accurate, one tested morphed FER (Lynch et al., 2006), and the other used RMET, a variation of 
FER and not directly comparable to the majority of FER research findings (Fertuck et al, 2009).     
Moreover, of the studies that reported no overall differences between BPD and HC 
groups (Domes et al., 2008; Dyck et al., 2009; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Schilling et al., 2012; 
Wagner & Linehan, 1999), several found significant differences on discrete emotion subtests.  
For instance, one study (Domes et al., 2008) found that the BPD group more readily identified 
angry over both happy and disgust, while another study (Wagner & Linehan, 1999) found more 
accuracy in identification of fear.  A third study in this category (Minzenberg et al., 2006) found 
no overall differences, but found that those with BPD were less accurate on matching faces with 
the same emotion. 
Of the five studies that found BPD groups to be less accurate than healthy control groups 
on FER measures (Bland et al., 2004; Dyck et al., 2009; Levine et al., 1997; Merkl et al., 2010; 
Unoka et al., 2011), four used variants of the PFA (Ekman & Friesen, 1979), making these 
results more easily comparable and reliable. 
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In sum, there are significant limitations to this body of research.  Sample sizes are 
universally questionable, and as previously noted, differences in samples and operationalization 
of key variables, make interpretation of results difficult. None of the research findings have been 
adequately replicated.   
New Direction in BPD FER Research  
A single study was reported here that included multi odal measures of emotion 
processing (Minzenberg et al., 2006).  This is the only study of its kind to date, as the majority of 
research completed in the area of emotional processing in BPD has involved FER.  Research on 
multimodal integrations of emotion perception in BPD is sufficiently lacking.  The lone study 
that integrated varying measures of facial and auditory perception reported mixed results.  
Results from both FER and multimodal research studies have not determined whether facial 
expression interpretation is deficient, or possibly hyper-sensitive, in the BPD population.  Not 
only is further FER research needed in order to clarify discrepancies, the next avenue that may 
provide fuel to this debate is to observe auditory emotion perception in borderline individuals. In 
addition, it has been noted several times that the static observation of emotion is probably not as 
useful as the observation of dynamic emotional exprssion.  
 In an attempt to address the discrepancies in the existing research and to expand upon the 
understanding of emotion recognition in BPD, the prsent research study was conducted utilizing 
measures of auditory as well as facial emotion recognition, and also a dynamic measure of social 
interpretation. Recently, a tool was developed from Ekman and Friesen’s (1979) ‘face catalog’ to 
measure emotional perception and processing on three lev ls: facial expression, prosody, and 
lexical function. This measure, called The Comprehensive Affect Testing System - Abbreviated 
(CATS; Schaffer et al., 2006) allows researchers to accurately determine one's ability to perceive 
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emotion, and can determine if there are specific areas of perception that are less accurate than 
others. For instance, it can be determined if one was able to understand semantic content but 
unable to detect tonal fluctuations in a spoken langu ge, whereby for instance, anger is missed 
because someone is unable to detect a change in tone. The measure can answer whether an 
individual is able to recognize subtle changes in prosody without being able to recognize a 
change in facial expression. If this were the case, the pout that often accompanies the classic “I'm 
fine" response would not be detected and the individual would go about business as usual, 
unaware of the emotional upheaval that awaits them in their relationship. While this measure still 
does not replicate a 'real world' setting, it is a much better depiction of actual communication and 
emotional perception than looking at still photographs.  Originally developed as a 
neuropsychological measure, it has yet to be used in a study assessing emotion recognition in 




Chapter 3:  Project Design 
Introduction and Purpose  
The primary aim of the study was to expand upon research in the area of emotion recognition 
processing in individuals diagnosed with BPD. This was be the first study of its kind to utilize a 
single measure of varying types of emotion perception to determine whether there are differences 
between those diagnosed with BPD and healthy controls.   
Previous research in this area has focused primarily on facial emotion recognition, with only 
one study identified that incorporated measures of pr sody perception (Minzenberg et al., 2006).  
The study conducted by Minzenberg and colleagues however, did not use a unitary construct of 
varying degrees of emotion perception, and therefore, analysis of differences between visual and 
auditory perception were not completely reliable.  For that reason, a second goal of this study 
was to provide a more accurate representation of any differences that exist between abilities to 
perceive facial versus auditory emotion information.  A third goal was to explore group 
differences between performance on a dynamic social interpretation task, in order to evaluate 
emotion processing in a more complex context requiring processing of multiple social cues. 
Measures of both visual and auditory affect perception were administered, in addition to several 
written self-assessments of anger, impulsivity, andemotion intensity.   
Hypotheses.  Specific hypotheses are as follows: 
1. To date, research on emotion processing in BPD has not yielded clear results. Utilizing 
the CATS, a newly developed instrument that incorporates multimodal assessment of 
multiple domains of emotion processing, helped clarify the question of whether 
individuals with BPD are more or less accurate at identifying emotional expression 
compared to others.  The measure includes 13 subtests and an Emotion Recognition 
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Quotient (ERQ), which includes the 11 subtests of emotion recognition (the other 2 are 
baseline non-emotion recognition scales).  It was hypothesized that, in general, 
individuals diagnosed with BPD would be significantly worse at accurate identification 
of emotion expression compared to healthy controls. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
predicted that the BPD group would have significantly lower CATS-ERQ scores than the 
healthy comparison group.  
2. More specifically, the following findings were hypothesized to be evident on CATS-A 
subtests:  
a. Because auditory perception and conflicting prosody have not yet been measured in 
BPD, this hypothesis was largely exploratory. However, based on the single previous 
result in auditory recognition in BPD (Minzenberg et al., 2006), it was predicted that 
those with BPD would be less accurate in several areas of recognition.  Scores for 
BPD participants were predicted to be significantly lower on the subtests Emotional 
Prosody Discrimination (discrimination of nonaffective sentences read in varying 
emotional tones), Conflicting Prosody—Attend to Meaning (ignore the expressed 
emotion), and Match Emotional Face to Emotional Prosody subtest (choose face that 
matches the emotional tone of the sentence) compared to healthy controls.  
b. Several previous studies have reported discrepancies in ability for those with BPD to 
accurately identify neutral stimuli (Dyck et al., 2009; Fertuck et al., 2009; Wagner 
and Linehan, 1999).  Therefore, it was predicted that ose with BPD would be less 
accurate than the HC Group in differentiating betwen neutral and emotional 
expressions.  This was measured by the number of accur te responses on items 
including both an emotional and neutral stimuli, found in the Affect Discrimination, 
85 
 
Conflicting Prosody/Meaning—Attend Meaning, and Match Emotional Face to 
Emotional Prosody CATS subtests. 
c. The CATS facilitates direct comparison of facial and prosody perception. Previous 
research supported the notion that individuals withBPD are hyper-sensitive to 
emotional cues.  Therefore, it was predicted that te BPD Group would have 
significantly higher scores on two subtests of the CATS: Conflicting Prosody—
Attending to Prosody (ignore meaning and attend to em tion), and the Match 
Emotional Prosody to Emotional Face.  Both of these subtests require heightened 
attention to directed stimuli and therefore, higher scores on these subtests would 
suggest a greater ability to differentiate more complex emotional cues.   
3. Based on the findings in FER research suggesting that those with BPD are inconsistent 
perceivers of emotion (e.g. Minzenberg et al., 2006; Wagner & Linehan, 1999), it was 
predicted that this trend would translate into lower scores on a social perception task in 
the BPD group compared to the Healthy Control Group.  It was predicted that healthy 
controls would score significantly higher than BPD subjects on the Interpersonal 
Perception Task-15 (IPT-15) indicating better appreciation of expressive and 
interpersonal relationship cues.  
4. Several studies have identified a relationship betwe n emotion recognition accuracy and 
levels of negative emotion (Bland et al., 2004; Levin  et al., 1997; Minzenberg et al., 
2006).  Based on these previous findings, it was predicted that those with higher levels 
of trait anger and impulsivity would be less accurate in emotion recognition.  It was also 
predicted that higher levels of affect intensity result in less accurate emotion perception 
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ability.  Therefore, the fourth hypothesis predicted negative correlations between trait 
anger and impulsivity, and affect intensity, across the whole sample. 
a.  Trait scores on the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) were predicted 
to be negatively correlated with CATS-ERQ scores.   
b.  Scores on the Barett Impulsivity Scale (BIS) were pr dicted to be negatively 
correlated with CATS-ERQ scores.   
c. Scores on the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM) short f m were predicted to be 
negatively correlated with CATS-ERQ scores.  
5. It was anticipated that those who have stronger abilities in perception on the CATS would 
also have stronger abilities to interpret social situat ons on the IPT, in comparison to 
other group members. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis predicted a positive correlation 
between scores on measures of emotion recognition and perception of social cues; thus 
total scores on the CATS measure were expected to increase with total scores on the IPT 
measure. 
Method 
All subjects were administered diagnostic and clinial measures.  Diagnostic measures 
were administered first as they determined inclusion/exclusion criteria.  The appropriate version 
of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders (SCID; Axis I and Axis II disorders; 
patient and non-patient versions) was utilized for diagnostic purposes.  The clinical measures 
included the CATS for assessing both facial and auditory emotion perception and the IPT-15 to 
assess for identification of emotion social cues.  Additionally, surveys of anger, impulsivity, and 




Recruitment.  All participants were recruited from the community.  Separate 
advertisements were used for the clinical and healty control groups.  Ads were posted on 
craigslist.org (a free community website to post various types of classified ads). Advertisements 
and any other materials were approved by the IRB before being distributed (see Appendix A).   
Subjects.  According to G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) in order to detect a 
moderate effect size of .20, using an alpha level of .05, a sample size of 70 was required.  The 
BPD Group included 36 participants, and the HC Group included 35 participants.  All 
participants were between the ages of 18 and 55, signed an informed consent, and were fluent in 
English.   
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria.  For inclusion in the BPD clinical sample, participants 
needed to meet five of the nine DSM-IV BPD criteria (diagnosis requires at least five of the nine 
criteria).  Subjects with co-morbid disorders were included, except for those with a psychotic 
disorder (e.g. Schizophrenia) or with active drug or alcohol dependence.  Anyone exhibiting 
psychotic symptomatology or evidence of cognitive impairment was excluded.  Sixty-five 
individuals responded to the clinical group advertis ments.  Of these inquiries, 51 were screened 
and 36 qualified and were tested.  Nine were disqualified for various reasons including: 
diagnosis of Asperger’s, active substance dependence, or not meeting enough criteria for BPD 
diagnosis.  Fourteen individuals who called about the study did not follow through with further 
contact.    
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  The healthy control (HC) sample included individuals who did not meet criteria for any 
psychological disorder, including an alcohol or drug abuse disorder.  Those reporting any history 
of any psychological disorder were excluded. Anyone who evidenced cognitive impairment or 
reported taking psychotropic medication was also excluded from the healthy control sample.  
Forty-six individuals were screened for the HC sample.  Eleven were excluded from participation 
due to endorsing more than three but less than five BPD criteria, active alcohol or substance 
abuse, or a history of being prescribed psychotropic medication.  Inclusion and exclusion 




Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Clinical Sample  
Criterion Method of Ascertainment 
A. Inclusion: 
1. Meet DSM-IV-TR criteria for BPD   
2. Age 18-55 years 
3. Willing to give informed consent 
4. English speaking 
B. Exclusion: 
1.  Current substance dependence disorder 
2.  Evidence of cognitive impairment 
3.  Significant psychotic symptomatology  
A. Inclusion: 
1. Phone Screen (preliminary); SCID-II 
2. Phone Screen 
3.   Patient Interview 
4.   Patient Interview 
B. Exclusion: 
1.  Phone Screen; SCID-I Section E 
2.  Phone Screen; Patient interview 
3.  Phone Screen; SCID-I Section B 
Healthy Controls  
Criterion Method of Ascertainment 
A. Inclusion: 
1. Age range 18-55 years 
2. Able and willing to give informed 
consent 
3. English speaking 
B. Exclusion: 
1. Current or past Axis I or II Disorder 
 
2. Current alcohol/substance abuse or 
dependence 
3. Taking psychotropic medications 
4. Evidence of cognitive impairment 
A. Inclusion: 
1. Phone Screen 
2. Patient interview 
 
3. Patient interview 
B. Exclusion 
1. Phone Screen; SCID-NP; SCID-II  
(BPD Section) 
2. Phone Screen; SCID-NP 
 
3. Phone Screen 




Study procedures.  The study followed the following procedures.  First, subjects called the 
advertised number to express their interest in participating.  At the time of phone contact, it was 
determined to which ad they were responding, and the caller was given a brief overview of the 
study.  Once the caller gave their verbal consent, a pre-screen was conducted to determine if 
preliminary inclusion and exclusion criteria were mt.  The phone screen included gathering 
information about age, how many (if any) characteris ics of BPD were being met, and whether 
there was evidence of an alcohol/substance abuse, psychotic, or cognitive disorder.  Those who 
responded to the HC or the BPD advertisement, but met between 3 and 4 criteria for BPD (5 is 
needed for diagnosis) were excluded from participation as they did not meet inclusion for either 
group.  Those who met preliminary criteria for eithr group were invited to the research lab for 
participation.  
Upon arrival to the research lab, all subjects were giv n a detailed, verbal explanation of the 
project by an investigator.  Before beginning the assessment, all subjects participated in the 
informed consent process which included review of the document, signing the informed consent 
and being given a copy for their records. Following consent, participants were administered the 
diagnostic and clinical measures.  Lastly, each volunteer was given a list of local clinical 
resources and websites related to BPD.  All participants were offered the opportunity to debrief 
about their experience. 
Measures.  The following measures were administered: 
A.  Phone Screen (10min; all participants).  All persons interested in participating in the 
study were administered a Phone Screen to determine whether they met preliminary 
inclusion/exclusion criteria.  The Phone Screen included relevant demographic 
questions, as well as questions related to BPD diagnosis, substance use, psychotropic 
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medications, symptoms of psychosis, and traumatic brain injury.  The Phone Screen is 
available for review in Appendix B. 
B.  Demographic Questionnaire (10 min; clinical participants only). Subjects in the BPD 
Group were administered a questionnaire that is an expansion of the phone screen.  This 
questionnaire was developed by the P.I. of the project and assessed any history of self-
injury or suicide attempts, as well as any history f psychiatric treatment. The 
Demographic Questionnaire is available for review in Appendix C. 
C.  Diagnostic Measures 
1. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I – Non-Patient Edition (SCID-NP). 
(20 min.; healthy control group only).  The SCID-NP allows the screening of specific 
psychiatric diagnoses.  Any endorsed items on the NP screen can then be addressed 
using the SCID-I clinical version (listed below) if necessary (e.g. more diagnostic 
clarification is needed to determine inclusion/exclusion criteria).  For the purposes of 
this study, anyone not meeting criteria for BPD but meeting criteria for any other 
diagnosis will be excluded from participation.   
2. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R and DSM-IV Axis I Diagnosis (SCID-I; 
First et al. 1997). (25 min; relevant sections) The SCID-I was designed for 
differential diagnosis and assessment of psychiatric disorders, using DSM-IV criteria.  
Field trials with this instrument have shown evidenc  of good inter-rater reliability. 
Inter-rater reliability for SCID diagnoses varies but typically ranges from .6 to .9, 
with most diagnosis exceeding .7.   
3. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID- II; 
First et al., 2002). (30min; BPD section to both groups).   The SCID-II is a counter-
part measure to the SCID-I with comparable inter-rater reliability.  This is a 
structured personality disorder examination for use by a trained clinical interviewer 
and developed to systematically survey the phenomenlogy and life experiences 
relevant to diagnoses of all Axis II personality disorders in DSM-IV.   
D.  Clinical Measures 
1. The Comprehensive Affect Testing System-Abbreviated (CATS; Schaffer et al. 2006). 
(30 min.) The CATS is the first standardized, cross-culturally valid 
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neuropsychological measure of emotion processing. The CATS utilizes a 
computerized measure of visual and auditory emotional processing of the six basic 
emotions. The subtests assess facial identification, emotion matching with and 
without verbal denotation, emotional tone or prosodic processing with and without 
verbal denotation, and with conflicting or congruent semantic content.  Preliminary 
reliability on the CATS-A subtests range from .57 to .79, with several subtests 
reaching the .79 level. Construct validity analysis i  ongoing as the measure develops. 
Table 2 lists the Alpha and Split Half reliability of the composite scales, and what 
subtests are included in each scale.  Table 3 lists and describes the 13 CATS subtests.   
2. The Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15; Arche & Constanzo, 1988). (20 
min.) The IPT-15 is a shorter version of the Interpersonal Perception Task. It was 
specifically designed for use in research.  It is a measure of nonverbal social 
perception.  The measure utilizes stimuli of a videotape consisting of 15 scenes 
depicting social interactions, ranging in 20-60 seconds in length.  After each scene, 
participants are asked to reach a conclusion about people who appeared in the scene 
by answering a multiple choice question. Interrater reliability was found to be .81.    
3. State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & 
Crane, 1983). (10 min) The STAXI is comprised of several subscales corresponding 
to “state” and “trait” anger and several aspects of anger expression.  The STAXI has 
been repeatedly demonstrated to have a high degree of internal consistency, and this 
reliability is comparable for both males and females (coefficient alpha < .80 for males 
and females for the “trait” anger scale and > .90 for both genders for the “state” anger 
scale).  Numerous studies have found the STAXI to be highly correlated with self-
report measures of aggression and hostility, behavior l indices of aggression, and 
physiological measurements (Speilberger, 1986).  
4. Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Barrett, E.S., 1985). (10 min) The BIS is a 30-item 
self-report measure for assessing dimensions of impulsivity, including three factors:  
Attentional, Motor, and Nonplanning Impulsiveness.  It is scaled from 1 
(rarely/never) to 4 (almost always/always). It is designed to measure a trait related or 
enduring dimension of impulsivity. Internal consistency coefficients for the BIS-11 
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total score that range from 0.79 to 0.83 for separate populations of under-graduates, 
substance-abuse patients, general psychiatric patients, and prison inmates. 
5. Affective Intensity Measure-Simplified (AIM; Larsen & Diener, 1987). (10 min.) The 
AIM-Simplified contains 20 items assessing neutral (e.g., feeling calm and context), 
positive (e.g., feeling exuberant and euphoric), and negative (e.g.  feelings of shame, 
guilt, and anxiety) emotional intensity. The AIM has been used in multiple studies 
and has good reliability and good internal consistency (rs¼.44–.82, all ps<.005). The 
measure obtained a coefficient in the range of 90 to .94 across four separate samples.   
 
Table 2. Cronbach’s Alphas and Spearman-Brown split-ha f reliabilities for CATS-A component 
scales and quotients 
 
Composite Scale  Subtests 
Included 
Alpha Split-Half 
Simple Facial Scale                                                           2, 5 .6589 .5927 
Facial Matching Scale   7, 8, 13 .7747 .7337 
Prosody Discrimination Scale  4, 9 .7045 .6971 
Prosody Identification Scale 6 .8558 .7917 
Lexical Scale 10 .7993 .8490 
Affect Recognition Quotient (ARQ)  2, 5, 7, 8, 13 .8101 .6462 
Prosody Recognition Quotient (PRQ) 4, 6, 9 .8404 .8349 
Emotion Recognition Quotient (ERQ) 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
















Table 3.  List of CATS-A Subtests and Descriptions 
Subtest Description Items 
1: Discriminate Facial 
Identity 
Two same sex faces are shown; decide if the faces are the 
same or different actors. 
12 
2: Discriminate Facial 
Affect 
Same actor; decide if the emotional expression is the same 




No faces are shown. A pair of non-affective message 
(e.g., The boy opened the window. The boy opened the 
window?) are either both said as simple declarative 
sentences, as questions, or one of each; decide if th y are 
the same or different. 
6 
4: Discriminate Emotional 
Prosody 
No faces are shown. A pair of non-affective sentences is 
read in either an emotion or neutral tone; decide wh ther 
the tone is the same or different. 
6 
5: Name Affect The examinee is asked to choose the motion (or neutral) 
expressed within the single face presented.  
6 
6: Name Emotional 
Prosody 
No faces are shown. One sentence at a time is read; s lect 
which emotion, or neutral, the voice is expressing. 
12 
7: Match Affect One face is shown above five others, ach of which 
expresses a different emotion; select which of the five 
faces expresses the same emotion as the top face.  
12 
8: Select Affect Five portraits of the same individual are shown, each 
expressing a different emotion. A target emotion is 
displayed and announced orally (e.g., Which face is 






No faces are shown. A sentence is read and the examinee 
is instructed to ignore the affective meaning and to focus 





No faces are shown. The same sentences are presented as 
in Subtest 10, but the examinee is instructed to focus on 
the affective meaning of the sentence and to ignore the 
emotion expressed by the voice. 
12 
11: Match Prosody To 
Face 
A single sentence is read by the actor on each trial; select 
the face that exhibits the corresponding emotion. 
12 
12: Match Face to Prosody Three sentences are read by the actor on each trial; select 
which sentence expresses the same emotion as shown by 
the face. 
12 
13: 3 Faces Test A trio of portraits of the same gender is displayed. Two 
portraits show the same individual expressing different 
emotions. The examinee must select the two portraits that 
express the same emotion.  
24 




Chapter 4:  Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The community sample obtained for this study included a racially diverse group of 71 
individuals ranging in age from 20 to 55 years old (M=33.39; SD=10.41).  Fifty five (76.4%) 
were female, and 16 (22.2%) were male.  All individuals reported having at least a high school 
diploma (n=22; 30.6%), and the majority reported earning a college degree (n=40; 55.6%).    
The sample consisted of two groups: A Borderline Personality Disorder group (BPD; 
n=36) and a Healthy Control Group (HC; n=35). Individuals in the BPD group each met DSM-5 
criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder. The HC Group was screened for Mood, Anxiety, 
Psychotic, Substance, and Personality Disorders, and were only included if they did not meet 
criteria for any of the disorders in these categories.  Although the two groups were not matched, 
most of the comparable characteristics were fairly evenly represented across groups.  Table 4 
provides entire sample and sub-group demographics.   
Descriptive Statistical Analysis: BPD Group.  The BPD Group included 27 (75%) 
females and 9 (25%) males ranging in age from 20 to 52 (M=34.06; SD=10.48).  These 
percentages reflect those of BPD gender differences in the general population. Well over half 
(66.3%) had obtained a college or graduate degree (N=12; 33.3% with high school diploma 
only).  During the interview process, specific BPD symptom information was gathered from this 
group, as well as any history of self-injury, suicide attempt(s), psychotherapy, and being 
prescribed psychotropic medication.   There are ninsymptom criteria of BPD, with at least five 
criteria needed for diagnosis.  The Mean number of BPD criteria met was 7.06 (SD=1.17).  






Characteristic BPD Group  HC Group  Total Sample 
 n %  n %  n % 
Female 27 75.0  28 80.0  55 77.4 
Age         
     20-25 11 30.6  14 40.0  25 35.2 
     26-35 10 27.8  8 22.9  18 25.3 
     36-45 8 22.2  8 22.9  16 22.5 
     46-55 7 19.4  5 14.3  12 16.9 
Race         
     White, non-Hispanic 13 36.1  22 62.9  35 49.3 
     Hispanic 4 11.1  2 5.7  6 8.5 
     Black, non-Hispanic 15 41.7  10 28.6  25 35.2 
     Asian 1 2.8  1 2.9  2 2.8 
     Other 3 8.3  0 0  3 4.2 
Level of Education         
     High School 12 33.3  10 28.6  22 30.9 
     College 21 58.3  19 54.3  40 56.3 
     Graduate School 3 8.3  6 17.1  9 12.7 
 
Table 5 
BPD Group Symptom Characteristics 
 Item Endorsed by BPD Group Participant 
BPD Criteria n % 
1. Fear of, or avoid abandonment 36 100 
2. Pattern of unstable and intense relationships 34 94.4 
3. Identity disturbance 26 72.2 
4. Impulsivity 26 72.2 
5. Suicidal behavior, gestures, threats, or self-
mutilating behavior 
15 41.7 
6. Affective instability 32 88.9 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness 27 75.0 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty 
controlling anger 
27 75.0 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or 





Of the 36 BPD participants, 15 (41.7%) reported a history of self-injury, including 
incidents of cutting, burning, hitting or pinching themselves, banging their head, or punching 
objects. Thirteen (36.1%) reported at least one suicide attempt.  Reported incidents included 
attempting over-dose, cutting wrists, and by hanging.  Within the group, 13 (36.1%) reported 
being in psychotherapy at the time of participation, 12 (33.3%) reported a history of 
psychotherapy, and 11 (30.6%) reported never going t  psychotherapy.  Five (13.9%) were 
taking psychotropic medication to address symptoms related to BPD at the time of participation, 
11 (30.6%) had been prescribed psychotropic medication in the past, and 20 (55.6%) reported 
never taking prescribed psychotropic medication.  Participants had the opportunity to report any 
previous diagnosis they had been given by health care professionals.  Fifteen participants in the 
BPD Group (41.7%) reported having a past or current diagnosis, not included in the exclusion 
criteria, and other than BPD.  Examples include a history of major depressive episodes, anxiety 
disorders, and eating disorders. Table 6 represents d scriptive statistics for the BPD Group.     
Table 6 
BPD Group Clinical History Data 
 Characteristic Endorsed by BPD Participant 
Characteristic n % 
History of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) 15 41.7 
History of suicide attempt 13 36.1 
Psychotherapy   
     Current 13 36.1 
     In the past 12 33.3 
     Never 11 30.6 
Psychotropic Medication   
     Currently prescribed 5 13.9 
     History of taking prescription 11 30.6 
     Never prescribed 20 55.6 




Inferential Statistics  
Tests of hypotheses.  The first hypothesis proposed that the BPD Group would be 
significantly less accurate in their ability to perc ive emotional expression compared to the HC 
Group.  This hypothesis was assessed by comparing scores between groups on the CATS 
Emotion Recognition Quotient (ERQ).  The ERQ is an overarching scale that includes all 11 
emotional subtests of the CATS. The CATS includes facial and auditory cues and is the best 
indicator of overall emotion perception ability. This hypothesis was supported. The results of a t-
test between groups indicated that scores on the CATS-ERQ for the HC Group (M = 96.17, SD = 
12.87) were significantly higher than the BPD Group (M = 89.50, SD = 12.87), t(69) = -2.27, p = 
.026  
 The second hypothesis included several predictions about specific emotion perception 
abilities, as measured by CATS subtests.  Hypothesis 2a predicted that the BPD Group would be 
significantly less accurate in three areas of emotion perception.  First, Hypothesis 2a predicted 
that the BPD Group would be less accurate in their ability to discriminate between emotional 
tones expressed in auditory sentences (as measured by the Emotional Prosody Discrimination 
subtest).  Secondly, Hypothesis 2a included the prediction that the BPD Group would be less 
accurate in identifying the affective meaning of a sentence when it is read with a conflicting 
emotional tone (as measured on the Conflicting Prosody – Attend to Meaning subtest).  Finally, 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that the BPD Group would be less accurate in identifying a match 
between a facial expression of emotion and emotional t e, as expressed in a sentence (measured 
on the Match Emotional Face to Emotional Prosody subtest).  T-tests failed to reveal statistically 
significant differences in scores between the BPD and HC Groups on all three of these CATS 
subtests.  Table 7 provides the specific statistical findings.   
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Hypothesis 2b predicted that the BPD Group would be less accurate in differentiating 
between neutral and emotional expressions.  This was measured by the number of accurate 
responses on the nine items of the CATS that include neutral or non-emotional facial or auditory 
expressions, compared to emotional expressions.  A t-test was conducted and results did not 
indicate a significant difference between groups in the number of correct responses on these nine 
items (M = 5.89, SD = 1.55) and the HC Group (M = 6.46, SD = 1.20), t(69) = -1.73, p = .09. 
Table 7 
Hypothesis 2a Results 
CATS Subtest Group Mean S.D. t p 
Emotional Prosody 
Discrimination  
BPD 5.75 .73 
.587 .559 
HC 5.65 .59 
Conflicting Prosody – 
Attend to Meaning 
BPD 6.44 2.84 
-.360 .720 
HC 6.69 2.83 
Match Emotional Face to 
Emotional Prosody 
BPD 9.42 1.93 
-1.29 .190 
HC 9.97 1.65 
 
 Hypothesis 2c predicted that the BPD Group would be significantly more accurate in two 
specific areas.  First, it was predicted that the BPD Group would be more accurate in their ability 
to attend to the emotional auditory tone of a sentence while ignoring the conflicting semantic 
meaning (as measured by scores on the Conflicting Prosody – Attend to Prosody subtest; MBPD = 
9.53, SD = 1.76; MHC = 9.71, SD = 2.02).  Second, it was predicted that the BPD Group would be 
more accurate in their ability to match an emotionally intoned sentence to a facial expression of 
the same emotion (as measured by the Match Emotional Prosody to Emotional Face subtest; 
MBPD = 9.42, SD = 1.93; MHC = 9.97, SD = 1.65).  Results of a t-test indicated no statistically 
significant differences in scores between groups on either of these subtests [(69) = -4.1, p = .68 
and t(69) = -1.29, p = .19 respectively].  
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 Hypothesis 3 predicted that the HC Group would be more accurate in identifying social 
and relationship statuses between individuals, as measured by the number of accurate responses 
on the Interpersonal Perception Task-15. This hypothesis was supported.  The scores for the HC 
Group (M = 10.14, SD = 1.72) on the ITP-15 were significantly higher than the BPD Group (M = 
8.64, SD = 1.93), t(69) = -3.47, p = .001. 
 The fourth hypothesis predicted that in general, the more accurate one was in emotion 
perception abilities, the l ss anger, impulsivity, and affect intensity that indivi uals would 
endorse. Specifically, negative correlations were predicted between the CATS-ERQ and each of 
the self-report measures of anger (STAXI), impulsivity (BIS), and affect intensity (AIM). 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were used to identify whether there were any 
significant differences.  The results indicated signif cant differences in the predicted direction 
between each the STAXI and the BIS total scores when compared to the CATS-ERQ scores.  
Across the entire sample, levels of trait anger were negatively correlated with accuracy of 
emotion perception. The more trait anger (r = -.256, p = .016) or impulsivity (r = -.227, p = .028) 
one reported the less accurate they were in emotion perception.  On the contrary, there was not a 
significant correlation found between reported leves of affect intensity and emotion perception 
ability (r = -.79, p = .26).  These results are highlighted in Table 8 below.  
Finally, the fifth hypothesis predicted a positive correlation between accuracy of 
perceived facial/auditory expressions and accuracy of verbal/non-verbal social cues. Correlation 
analysis between total scores on the CATS and the IPT-15 indicated a significant positive 
relationship between total CATS score, the CATS-ERQ, and IPT-15 scores. As CATS/CATS-
ERQ scores increased, so did IPT-15 scores (r = .42, p<.001). This hypothesis was supported in 




Hypothesis 4 and 5 Results 
 STAXI BIS AIM  IPT-15 
CATS-ERQ 
r =  -.256 r = -.227 r = -.79 r = .42 
p = .016* p = .028* p = .26 p <.001* 
*denotes significant 
 Post Hoc Emotion Perception Analysis.   As previously noted in the first and third 
hypothesis, the HC Group was determined to have significantly better emotion and social 
perception ability than the BPD Group.  Additional analyses were conducted to determine 
whether more discrete significant differences in emotion and social perception existed between 
the two groups.  Further, post hoc analysis was conducted to determine within BPD Group 
differences.  The appropriate Bonferroni alpha corrections were used for all post-hoc tests, with 
the individual values noted when applicable. 
 Emotion perception discrete differences as measured by the CATS.  On the CATS, there 
are quotient and composite scales, as well as emotion subscales, which allowed for analysis of 
differences on a more specific level. Post hoc t tests, using a Bonferroni alpha correction of .005 
[.05/10 (number of subtests not tested previously)] was used to analyze subtest differences 
between the BPD and HC Groups. 
First, the most general, the Quotient Scales, were analyzed.  They include the Affect 
Recognition [ARQ; subtests that include facial affect identification (2, 5, 7, 8 and 13)], Prosody 
Recognition [PRQ; subtests that include prosody affect identification (4, 6 and 9)], and Emotion 
Recognition (ERQ; all subtests of emotional perception) Quotient Scales.  It was determined in 
the first hypothesis that there was a significant difference between groups on the CATS-ERQ.  
There were not significant differences found between groups on either the ARQ (MBPD = 46.28, 
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SD = 12.20; MHC = 48.86, SD = 5.15), t(69) = -1.15, p =.25 or PRQ (MBPD = 23.17, SD = 3.43; 
MHC = 22.23, SD = 3.94) t(69) = -.07, p =.94.   
Next, while the Quotient Scales differentiate between facial (ARQ) and auditory (PRQ) 
emotion perception abilities, the five Composite Scales are more discrete in that they divide the 
ARQ into Simple Facial (subtests 2 and 5) and Complex Facial (subtests 7, 8 and 13), and in 
addition to a Prosody scale (subtest 4), also include a Lexical (subtest 10) and a Cross Modal 
Scale (subtests 11 and 12).   As noted above, therew r  not significant differences between 
groups on the ARQ, but when the ARQ is divided intotw  composite scales, a significant 
difference was found between groups on the Complex Facial Composite Scale (MBPD = 29.31, SD 
= 4.46; MHC = 32.23, SD = 3.89).  A t-test determined that the HC Group did significantly better 
on this composite scale,  t(69) = -2.94, p =.004 indicating that the HC Group is more apt to 
correctly match facial expressions of emotion as presented in a variety of formats on three 
different subtests.   Further, a t-test determined that the HC Group approached significantly 
better ability in integrating facial and auditory emotion perception as evidenced through their 
ability to match emotional facial expressions to emotional tone on the Cross Modal Composite 
Scale (MBPD =16.72, SD =3.39; MHC =18.06, SD =3.34) t(69) = -1.67, p =.099   It should be noted 
that the Quotient and Composite Scales include onlythe subtests that measure emotion 
perception.  The two subtests (1 and 3) that are non-emotional measures of facial and prosody 
discrimination were also analyzed for between group differences.  There were no significant 
differences between the BPD (Mfacial = 11.5, SD =.85; Mprosody =5.61, SD=.90) and HC (Mfacial 
=11.26, SD =1.22; Mprosody =5.80, SD =.58) Groups on either of these subtests, an indication of 
fairly equal ability to discriminate between two faces or sentences presented in two tones.  Table 
9 displays the between group differences on the Composite Scales, as broken down by subtest, as 
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well as the between group differences on the scales measuring non-emotional facial and prosody 
identification.   
Table 9  
Group Differences on CATS Subtests Grouped by Quotient and Composite Scale 
Subtest Group Mean S.D. t p 



































4. Emotional Prosody Discrimination  































































Note: Quotients: ER=Emotion Recognition, AR=Affect Recognition, PR=Prosody Recognition. 
Composite Scales: SF=Simple Facial, CF=Complex Facial, P=Prosody, L=Lexical, CM=Cross 
Modal. Non-emotional subtests=NE. * denotes significant at Bonferroni adjusted p< .005 
 
CATS Discrete Emotion Scales were also analyzed to de ermine between group 
differences.  The Emotion Scales are only comprised of facial affect identification (i.e. prosody 
is not included) and include Happy, Surprised, Fearful, Sad, Angry, and Disgusted.  As the scale 
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names imply, each scale score is representative of one’s ability to correctly identify each discrete 
emotion. Post hoc t tests, using a Bonferroni alpha correction of .008 (. 5/6) found that the HC 
Group did significantly better on the Angry (MBPD = 3.06, SD = 1.26; MHC = 4.2, SD = 1.39) t(69) 
= -3.63, p = .001, and Disgusted (MBPD = 4.89, SD = 1.46; MHC = 6.27, SD = 1.68) t(69) = -3.70, 
p = .00 scales, and approached significance on the Sad subscale (MBPD = 6.03, SD = 1.65; MHC = 
6.94, SD = 1.3) t(69) = -2.59, p = .01, These results indicate that the BPD Group had a more 
difficult time correctly identifying these emotions in facial expressions.  
Social perception discrete differences as measured by the IPT-15.  As noted previously, 
the IPT-15 is a measure of social perception ability.  Each scene/item on the test is representative 
of relationships involving kinship, intimacy, competition, status, or deception.  The third 
hypothesis found that the HC Group scored significantly higher overall than the BPD Group on 
the IPT-15.  Further analysis was conducted to determin  whether there were significant 
differences between groups in their scores on the five categories of social interaction listed 
above.   Post hoc t tests, using a Bonferroni alpha correction of .01 was used to determine 
differences.   The HC Group was found to have significantly higher scores on scenes measuring 
perception of competition (MBPD = 2.00, SD = .72; MHC = 2.49, SD = .70) t(69) = -2.88, p = .01, 
and approached significance on scenes measuring rception of intimacy (MBPD = 1.53, SD = .77; 
MHC = 1.89, SD = .68) t(69) = -2.07, p = .04, and deception (MBPD = 1.31, SD = .92; MHC = 1.80, 
SD = .87) t(69) = -2.33, p = .02.   
Additional BPD Group analyses.  Within the BPD Group, it was of interest to determine 
whether specific symptoms of BPD were associated with performance on the measures of 
emotion and social perception.  Scores of those with a history of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) 
or a suicide attempt (SA) were compared to those who had neither of these characteristics.  On 
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the measure of emotion perception (CATS-ERQ), no significant differences were found between 
either the NSSI (n = 15, M = 88.73, SD = 15.63) or SA (n = 13, M = 88.62, SD = 14.65) BPD 
sub-groups compared to the remaining BPD subjects (no history of NSSI or SA); MNoNSSI = 
90.05, SD = 10.88, tNSSI(36) = -.29, p = .77 and MNoSA = 90.0, SD = 12.08,  tsa(36) = -.31, p = .76.    
When analyzing IPT-15 scores, both the NSSI and SA BPD sub-group were found to 
have scored significantly higher than the remaining BPD subjects, indicating that these sub-
groups had an easier time interpreting social cues than the sub-group of BPD participants without 
NSSI or SA.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted controlling for race and 
gender to determine whether either factor accounted for this difference.  Further, the ANOVA 
controlled for any current or history of psychotherapy, and any current or history of psychotropic 
medication.  None of these factors were found to be a significant factor in the difference between 
the BPD sub-groups scores on the IPT-15.  There werno differences found between the two 
BPD subgroups on the self-report measures of anger, impulsivity, or affect intensity. 
Supplemental Statistics 
 In addition to testing the a priori hypotheses, several supplemental analyses were 
conducted. Supplemental analyses included comparisons between various demographic groups 
and the measures of emotion perception (i.e. CATS and IPT-15), as well as comparisons between 
the BPD and HC Groups on specific emotion perception variables that were not included in the 
hypotheses.   
Demographic findings.  A t-test was used to determine whether there were relationships 
between either age or gender and emotion perception ability. A significant negative correlation 
was found between age (M = 34.06; SD = 10.48) and the CATS-ERQ score (M = 92.79, SD = 
12.75), t(69) = -.21 p = .039. In general, younger participants scored higher on the CATS-ERQ, 
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indicating better emotion perception abilities than older participants.  This finding is consistent 
with the CATS normative data results, which also found that as age increased, CATS-ERQ 
scores decreased.  There was not a significant correlation found between age and IPT-15 scores.  
There is no normative age data for the IPT-15 availble to which this finding can be compared. 
With regard to gender, the trend was the same.  There was not a significant difference 
found between gender groups on total correct items on the IPT-15 (Mmale = 9.06, SD = 1.81; 
Mfemale = 9.47, SD = 2.02), t(69) = -.73, p = .47 but there were significant gender differences on 
the CATS-ERQ.  On the CATS-ERQ, the female group (M = 112.36, SD = 12.42) scored 
significantly higher than the male group (M = 104.56, SD = 12.30), t(69) = -2.22, p = .03 
suggesting that females have more accurate emotion perception abilities.  These findings are 
consistent normative data for both the CATS and the IPT-15. 
Interestingly, there was no significant relationship between level of education and 
emotion perception abilities (using either CATS-ERQ or IPT-15 scores).  However, this finding 
is also consistent with the CATS normative data, which found that neither education level nor 
estimated IQ significantly correlated with CATS scores.   The IPT-15 does not have published 
normative data regarding educational differences. 
 Analyses were conducted to determine whether significa t perception differences existed 
between the races of those who identified as White (n = 35) and Black (n = 25).  These two races 
were the two most heavily represented racial groups, and the others did not include enough data 
points for accurate analysis.  On the CATS-ERQ (M = 92.79, SD = 12.75), White participants (M 
= 98.40; SD = 8.98) scored significantly higher than Black participants (M = 87.68; SD = 13.57) 
t(60) = 3.68, p = .001.  However, there were no significant differenc s between these races on 
the IPT-15 measure of social perception.  The race diff rences on the CATS-ERQ cannot be 
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compared to the normative data as the authors only included Caucasian participants in their 
sample.  Further, the authors of the IPT-15 did not i clude any race characteristics of their 
normative sample so it is unknown if the current fiding is unique.  
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Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 The literature pertaining to the development of emotional experiencing and regulation, 
including theories of emotion processing and perception was reviewed.  Based upon limitations 
in that body of literature, the current study was proposed in order to comprehensively investigate 
emotion processing and perception in individuals diagnosed with BPD.  The results of the study 
were presented in the previous chapter.  Below, the findings of the current study will be 
discussed and interpreted in terms of prevailing emotion processing theories, and previous 
perception research. Implications of the current findings will be highlighted, along with 
limitations and suggestions for future research in this area. 
Summary of Results 
 Emotion perception findings.  It should first be noted that there were no significant 
differences between groups in identifying on-emotional facial expressions or prosody.  This 
suggests that both groups had relatively the same bas line perception abilities, including the 
ability to discern between two neutral facial expressions, and the ability to discern between tones 
used in non-affectively laden sentences.  However, on measures of affective, or emotion, 
perception, there were several significant differences found between the individuals diagnosed 
with BPD and the Healthy comparison participants.  
Identifying facial expression of emotion.  In general, the BPD Group was found to be 
significantly less accurate at identifying emotional expression compared to the HC Group.  
While there were no significant differences found i abilities to identify whether affect between 
two faces was the same or different, or to identify which emotion was expressed in a single facial 
portrait (e.g. What emotion is this face expressing?), there were significant differences on more 
complex facial perception tasks (i.e. two of the three subtests comprising the Complex Facial 
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Scale).  For instance, the BPD Group found it significantly more difficult than the HC Group to 
determine which two faces were expressing the same emotion when given a single facial 
expression to match to one of five different faces expressing various emotions.  The BPD Group 
also found it significantly more difficult to identify which of five facial expressions was 
expressing a target emotion (e.g. Which face is angry?).  These findings suggest that as facial 
perception tasks become more complicated, deficiencies in the BPD Group became more 
apparent.   
On facial perception items that included a neutral (no affect) target or choice selection, 
the BPD Group was able to differentiate between which expressions were neutral and which 
were exhibiting emotion as well as the HC group.  However, the BPD Group was significantly 
less accurate differentiating between the facial expr ssions of anger and disgust.   In other words, 
there was no difference in abilities between groups to discern between neutral and emotion facial 
expressions, but when the task involved choosing between several negative emotions, the BPD 
Group found it more difficult to discern which negative emotion was being portrayed. Previous 
research has found similar results, suggesting a trend.  Implications of this finding will be 
elaborated upon in the Implications section below. 
 Identifying prosodic expression of emotion.  Despite significant differences in overall 
emotion perception ability and in several specific areas of facial emotion perception, there were 
not significant differences between groups in accurately identifying emotion in prosody.  
Whether the prosody task was basic (e.g. identify whether tone is the same or different) or more 
complex (e.g. ignore the semantic meaning of a sentence and identify emotional tone, or match 
tone with facial expression), the groups performed relatively the same.  The significant group 
differences in ability to perceive facial expressions of emotion, and the lack of significant 
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differences in identifying emotional prosody, suggests that the significant overall differences in 
perception are mainly due to the deficiencies identifi d in facial emotion recognition. This was 
only the second study to test prosody perception in BPD, and possible explanations for this 
unexpected finding will be offered below.   
 Perception differences within the BPD Group.  After determining that there were 
several significant perception differences between th  BPD and HC Groups, it was of interest to 
determine whether more discrete differences existed within the BPD Group.  While it is outside 
the scope of this research to reason why some with BPD purposely harm themselves and some 
do not, the behavior of self-injury or making a suicide attempt offers an unambiguous 
measurable characteristic that can differentiate two sub-groups.  For analysis, the group was 
divided into sub-groups of those who had a reported history of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) or 
had made a suicide attempt (SA), compared to those meeting BPD criteria who denied any 
history of NSSI or SA.   
There were no differences between the sub-groups in accuracy of identifying emotion in 
either facial expressions or prosody.  While this sub-grouping was chosen for analysis, there are 
a number of ways the BPD group could have been morediscretely analyzed.  Considering that 
BPD criteria can manifest in a large number of different combinations, it is impossible to 
determine a specific combination of characteristics that would influence differences between 
subgroups in perception ability.  However, the lack of differences between the sub-groups 
created here suggests that the characteristic of engagi g in suicidal behavior is not by itself 
indicative of emotion perception ability.    
Social perception findings.  On the measure of social perception, which required 
participants to use both verbal and non-verbal cuesto draw conclusions about relationship 
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statuses in a variety of scenes, the BPD Group was found to be significantly less accurate than 
the HC Group.  Further, a positive association was found between emotion perception and social 
perception, whereby the less accurate individuals were in facial and prosodic emotion perception, 
the less accurate they were in perceiving social cues between others. More specific findings 
indicated that the BPD Group found it more difficult to interpret cues given in scenes portraying 
themes of intimacy, competition, and deception.  There was no difference in accuracy between 
groups in their ability to interpret cues in scenes d picting kinship or status.  Possible 
explanations for this finding will be discussed in more detail below. 
Social perception differences within the BPD Group.  As mentioned above, it was of 
interest to determine whether more discrete differences existed within the BPD Group on the 
measures of perception.  On the measure of social perce tion, it was determined that those in the 
BPD Group who had a history of either non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) or a suicide attempt, were 
significantly more accurate compared to those who denied either of these characteristics.  This 
finding is interesting considering the NSSI/SA group did not perform differently than the other 
BPD group members on the emotion perception task.  It suggests that, for reasons to be 
extrapolated below, those with NSSI behaviors and/or a history of SA, there is a heightened 
attunement to social cues. 
 Findings related to emotional experiencing. Participants were asked to report on their 
own experience of anger and impulsivity, including how intensely they experience emotions.   
Considering the characteristics of BPD, it was not surprising to find that; overall, the BPD Group 
reported significantly more anger and impulsivity than the HC Group.  They also reported having 
significantly more intense emotional experiencing than the HC Group.  When comparing self-
report measures to the measures of emotion and social perception, it was found that the more 
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anger and impulsivity one reported, the worse their p rception ability.  This finding suggests that 
while the BPD group experiences significantly more anger, they are not as able to accurately 
identify anger in others.  This finding is supported by the BPD finding reported earlier, which 
indicated that for the BPD Group, anger was difficult to differentiate from both sadness and 
disgust.  Considering that intense anger is a charateristic of BPD, this finding could suggest that 
anger is one characteristic that is specifically reated to perception ability.  Further, this finding 
suggests that the BPD criteria of impulsivity may also be related to perception ability, as the 
more impulsivity one reported, the less accurate their perception ability became.  
 However, when looking at the self-reported levels of affect intensity, which included both 
positive and negative affect, there was a significant correlation found only with social 
perception, not with emotion perception.   In other wo ds, the intensity of one’s emotional 
experiences did not significantly relate to their accuracy in emotion perception of facial 
expressions and prosody, but it did factor into their accuracy of social perception, whereby the 
more intensely one reported experiencing emotions the less accurate their social perception 
ability.  This would suggest that emotional intensity does not hinder perception in face-to-face 
interactions as much as it does when trying to decipher the emotional stance of those with whom 
they are not directly interacting.  In other words, when observing interactions, those with BPD 
may have a more difficult time relating to how others conduct themselves, and thus a more 
difficult time interpreting what is happening between others in an exchange.  
 Findings related to demographic variables.  It was also of interest to determine 
whether any of the demographic information collected from subjects related to their perception 
abilities.  There were a few significant differences found between the demographic groups that 
were represented in the general sample.  It was found that as age increased, accurate emotion 
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perception decreased.  On the contrary, age was not found to significantly relate to social 
perception ability.  Females were significantly more accurate in emotion perception, but there 
were no gender differences found in social perception ability.   Level of education was not found 
to relate to emotion or social perception ability.  There were no differences in accuracy between 
groups with a high school education compared to those with a college or graduate degree.  
 Lastly, those who identified their race as White did significantly better than Blacks in 
facial and prosodic emotion perception, but there were no significant differences between races 
in social perception ability.  Interestingly, all of the facial expressions on the CATS are gray 
scale Caucasians, and on the IPT-15 there are several races represented.  Therefore, while there 
is no data with which to compare this finding; it could suggest that the significant race 
differences on the CATS is a product of ‘other’ race unfamiliarity, rather than perceptual 
differences.  However, Ekman and Friesen (1979), the creators of the facial expression catalog 
used in most FER measures, suggest that while therear  cultural differences in what elicits 
certain emotions, there is universality in the recognition of emotions when they are expressed 
through the face (Ekman & Friesen, 1979).  This particular finding may have identified a 
potential weakness of the CATS, and serve as an indication that a validated emotion perception 
measure representative of multiple race groups is needed for more thorough results.   
Integration of findings with theories of emotion processing 
Five theories of emotion and social information processing were presented in the 
literature review.  Below, these theories will be interpreted in terms of the current research 
findings. 
To review, each includes a step of emotional processing and emotional response.  It was 
suggested that if there were glitches within the step  of any given theory, this could lead to faulty 
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processing, and in turn, faulty emotional response.  As mentioned, BPD is a disorder 
characterized by pervasive emotion regulation difficult es, and therefore, deficiencies in emotion 
processing could be related to faulty regulation of emotion.  The five theories will briefly be 
reviewed and compared to the findings of the current study.   
The first of the five theories presented was Saarni’s (1999) theory of emotional 
competence.  This theory includes eight skills and states that those who are emotionally 
competent rely heavily on awareness, acceptance, empathy, and using skills to cope adequately 
with emotional experiences.  The theory does not offer explanation as to how these skills are 
developed or implemented; only positing that one applies knowledge about emotions to 
ultimately achieve emotional competence (Saarni, 1999).  Some might say this theory is the 
antithesis of emotional experiencing in those with BPD, as BPD is often characterized by 
emotion dysregulation and non-acceptance.   In the present study, the BPD Group was found to 
be significantly less accurate in emotion perception.  According to the theory of Emotional 
Competence therefore, the BPD Group might be considered as emotionally incompetent.  
The second theory, offered by Mayer and Salovey (1997), addressed the idea of 
emotional intelligence (EI) and includes four abilities that lead to positive emotional growth and 
adaptation.  Their model is focused on self-awareness and analyzing emotional states.  They 
propose that those who are more self-aware are moreapt to regulate their own emotions and 
accurately perceive emotions in others.  Further, the theory suggests that general intelligence is 
related to increased emotional awareness and perception.  The current study inquired about 
feelings of anger, but did not inquire about participants’ self-awareness of their emotions in 
general.  While the BPD Group did report significantly more anger, impulsive behavior, and 
emotional intensity than the HC Group, this does not imply that either group is any more or less 
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aware of their emotional states in the moment.  From this aspect, it is difficult to interpret the 
current findings from the perspective of the EI theory.   However, education level of participants 
was accounted for in the current study, and there were not any differences found between level 
of education and emotion perception accuracy.  Therefore, the theory of EI, as it relates to 
education and emotion perception, is not a good fit for explaining the current findings.   
The third theory presented was a reformulated model f information processing offered 
by Crick and Dodge (1994).    This theory suggests that processing is continuous and cyclical 
through six steps.  The theorists suggest that one enters any situation with genetically 
predisposed traits as well as stored information frm past experiences, which both influence the 
cycle of processing.  Further, they suggest that while some cues are easily and accurately 
encoded because of a history with the stimuli (e.g. a very familiar person), new interactions 
require more attention, such as a heightened focus n facial expression, for an interpretation.  
When the interaction requires a quick response, it is theorized that the interpreter will default to 
similar information that is stored in memory, despite its accuracy. This encoding, along with all 
of the previous, is then stored in memory and effects future interpretations.   
Several aspects of the Crick and Dodge (1999) theory are relevant to the present study, 
including the pre-determinates of genetic traits, stored memory, and the steps of encoding and 
interpretation.    In the current study, the BPD group was asked to complete measures of emotion 
and social perception that included observations of faces and brief social interactions.  According 
to Crick and Dodge (1999), since the scenarios were unfamiliar, the subjects’ attention would 
likely be heightened.  While it cannot be determined whether any subject’s attention was more or 
less heightened, the results do conclude that the BPD group did significantly worse in emotion 
and social perception, and specifically in identificat on of the facial expressions of sad, angry, 
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and disgusted.  These findings could be supported by this theory in one of two ways.  First, it is 
possible that factors other than attention were intrfering with accurate perception.  Thus, those 
with BPD may have been less accurate in perception due to their genetically predisposed traits 
and/or stored information from past experiences.  For instance, those in the BPD Group may 
have been exposed to more negative experiences and environments (sometimes referred to as an 
invalidating environment in developmental theories of BPD) where they did not learn how to 
accurately express or perceive emotion.  Alternatively, at higher levels of intensity, individuals 
with BPD may have difficulty disengaging their attention, which can interfere with their ability 
to accurately identify an emotion.  Either way, a history of miscues or misinterpretations would 
theoretically continue to influence encoding and perception.  In other words, the BPD Group 
may have a processing ‘cycle’ that includes faulty information but nonetheless continues to alter 
their encoding and interpretation of emotion.  Furthe  to this point, for the current study, the 
participants were in a situation that expected them to rather quickly encode and make 
interpretations without any prior knowledge of the faces or situations they viewed.  Given this, 
Crick and Dodge (1999) would probably predict that p rticipants would default to stored 
memory for perception decisions, which for the BPD Group, may include selecting answers 
responses from a bank of faulty responses.      
The fourth theory, offered by Lemerise and Arsenio (2000), is an integrated model of 
emotion processes in social information processing, a d expands upon the Crick and Dodge 
(1994) model.  It is theorized in this model that there is a level of emotional investment, such as 
feelings and state of mood, which influence the steps of encoding and interpretation, as discussed 
above.  Further, they hypothesized that individual differences in emotionality and regulatory 
abilities affect processing of social and emotional i formation.   Considering this theory in terms 
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of the current study, it provides a rationale for why the BPD Group performed less accurately in 
both emotion and social perception.  The BPD Group reported more state anger, and significantly 
more trait anger, impulsivity, and affect intensity (combined negative and positive affect).  In 
fact, of the BPD criteria, 75% reported chronic feelings of emptiness and/or periods of intense 
anger, and 72% reported impulsive behavior.  According to the Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) 
theory, these characteristics would have an underlying effect in all encoding and interpretations, 
and therefore would have influenced the perception scores of those with these characteristics.  If 
this were the case, it would explain the significant differences between the BPD and HC Groups 
on the emotion perception measure, where the BPD Group found it significantly more difficult to 
discern negative emotions, and on the social perception measure, where the BPD Group found it 
more difficult to accurately identify relationships of intimacy, deception, and competition.  
Further, as was discussed in the previous theory, one’s stored memory and genetic traits are 
theorized to influence perception, and this information, combined with the current theory, offers 
a strong rationale for why those with BPD were found to have significantly less accurate emotion 
perception. 
Last to be discussed in terms of the current research is the theory of affective social 
competence (Halberstadt et al., 2001).  To review, this theory is organized around three 
components: sending, receiving, and experiencing affect.  The theory suggests that those with 
affective competence are aware what emotion they ar po traying, they accurately monitor 
emotional responses from the environment, and they respond to these receptions with a socially 
acceptable response.  One who is affectively competent uses the entire context of the situation, 
including verbal, facial, and body language cues, to make an interpretation.  Further, display 
rules are used in any social context to aid in effectiv  communication.  Display rules are 
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explained in the theory to be when someone sends more, less, or a different affective message 
than what they are feeling, as might be appropriate due to environmental expectations.  This 
theory, unlike the ones presented before it, includes the use of body language and decoding the 
social cues, as essential components of accurate emotion and social perception.  Further, the 
authors suggest that one needs to know when to invoke the use of display rules for ongoing 
effective communication (Halberstadt et al, 2001).   
The theory offered by Halberstadt and colleagues (2001) could aid in explanation of the 
results of the current study.  First, the finding that the BPD group was less accurate on the social 
perception measure relates to the proposition that body language is an integral part of accurate 
perception when used in conjunction with verbal andfacial cues.  On the measure of social 
perception, the viewer needed to utilize and decode the non-verbal cues to aid in an accurate 
interpretation (e.g. physical closeness, touching, gestures etc…), and the BPD Group was 
significantly less accurate in perception on this measure.  One explanation for this finding is that 
the BPD Group did not effectively use the non-verbal cues, or body language, when making their 
interpretations on this measure, perhaps due to faulty preconceived notions of emotional valence.  
Further, the theory proposes that the appropriate use of display rules is necessary for affective 
competence.  From this standpoint, it could be postulated that the BPD Group has not learned the 
most effective use of display rules for various social ontexts, and therefore they were not able to 
identify the display rules being used in the scenes of the social perception task, which led to 
more inaccurate responses.  Specifically, on the social perception task, the BPD Group did 
significantly worse than the HC Group in correctly identifying relationships of intimacy, 
competition, and deception.  There was not a significant difference on scenes that involved 
kinship and status.  Arguably, situations involving timacy, competition, and deception are more 
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emotionally loaded than the latter. As suggested prviously, emotional investment plays a role in 
perception. When thinking in terms of the characteris ics of BPD and the emotional upheaval 
that is often associated with the diagnosis, it would make sense to consider that intense emotional 
responses in certain situations (i.e. intimate relationships, deception) could lead to increased 
misperceptions across modes of perception.   While t is theory helps to explain the social 
perception differences, it does not offer suggestion as to why there were deficiencies in facial 
perception, but not prosody specifically.     
Integration of perception findings with previous research 
Eleven studies of emotion perception in BPD were discussed previously in the literature 
review.  The findings have been inconsistent, and one aim of this study was to move toward 
greater clarity of whether perception deficiencies exist in this population.   
Due to methodological differences (e.g. type of perception measurement used), as well as 
differences in sample characteristics (e.g. inpatient v rsus community), findings cannot be 
directly compared.  However, all but two of the studies are similar in that they included an 
emotion recognition test that drew facial expression  from Ekman and Friesen’s (1979) catalog, 
and all required subjects to ascribe a qualitative lab l to pictures of facial expression.  It should 
be noted that some of the studies had the goal of rting speed and accuracy, and others used 
morphing or blending techniques to gauge at what level of intensity accurate perception 
occurred.  For the morphing studies, the comparisons made here are to the findings of accuracy 
at 100% intensity (i.e. the equivalent to what is presented as stimuli in the CATS).  Only one of 
the studies included a measure of emotional prosody perception.  Obviously, only results offered 
in the previous research studies can be compared to the current findings, and therefore, 
unfortunately, there are not comparisons to each dimension analyzed here.  Comparisons that can 
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be made include general differences in emotion perception abilities between BPD and HC groups 
(facial and prosody), findings related to neutral and discrete emotion expressions, and emotional 
experiencing related to perception.    
Overall, current findings are in agreement with several of the previous studies that 
reported emotion perception deficiencies in BPD, compared to a HC group (Bland et al., 2004; 
Dyck et al., 2009; Levine et al., 1997; Merkl et al., 2010; Unoka et al., 2011).  Consequently, the 
present results do not support previous studies demonstrating more accurate perception ability in 
BPD (Fertuck et al., 2009; Lynch et al., 2006), nord  the results support the research that failed 
to find any significant differences between groups in perception ability (Domes et al., 2008; 
Dyck et al., 2009; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Schilling et al., 2012; Wagner & Linehan, 1999). 
Explanations for the discrepancies in results will be discussed below. 
Six of the FER studies reported results regarding dfferences in accuracy of 
differentiating neutral from emotion stimuli (Dyck et al., 2009; Fertuck et al., 2009; Merkl et al., 
2010; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Schilling et al., and Wagner & Linehan, 1999).  The current study 
failed to identify a significant difference between groups in ability to differentiate neutral from 
emotion expressions.  This finding is in agreement with three studies (Dyck et al., 2009; 
Minzenberg et al., 2006; and Schilling et al., 2012) and in disagreement with three (Dyck et al., 
2009; Merkl et al., 2010; Fertuck et al., 2009; andWagner and Linehan, 1999).  This finding is in 
contrast to the work published by Fertuck and colleagues (2009), which found the BPD group 
was more accurate in identifying neutral eyes in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RME), 
and is also in contrast with the three studies that found the BPD group to be less accurate in 
differentiating a neutral expression from an emotional one (Dyck et al., 2009; Merkl et al., 2010; 
and Wagner & Linehan, 1999).   
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Regarding specific emotional stimuli, two of the studies (Lynch et al., 2006; Schilling et 
al., 2012) found no significant differences in discrete perception ability.  The current study found 
that the BPD Group was significantly less accurate in identifying sad, angry, and disgusted facial 
expressions.  This finding is consistent with Bland  colleagues (2004), and Levine and 
colleagues (1997) who found that those with BPD were l ss accurate in identification of both 
anger and disgust.  Unoka and colleagues (2011) had similar results to the current study, finding 
that the BPD group had difficulty differentiating the emotions of disgust, surprise, and fear.  
Further to this point, five studies found significant differences in the identification of fear 
(Levine et al., 1997; Wagner & Linehan, 1999; Merkl et al., 2010; and Unoka et al., 2011), with 
only one study indicating that the BPD group was more accurate at identifying the emotion 
(Wagner & Linehan, 1999).  The current study does not support this finding, as there was not a 
significant difference found between groups in accura y of fear identification.  These 
discrepancies will be reviewed more specifically below in the Implications section, as negative 
emotions, particularly fear, are discussed frequently i  BPD perception literature.    
Lastly, four of the studies reported results of various scales of emotional experiencing 
(e.g. anger, depression, affect intensity).  Three of the research groups found negative 
correlations between emotional experiencing and emotion perception ability (Bland et al., 2004; 
Levine et al., 1997; Merkl et al., 2010); the current study lends support to these results.   
Only one of the previous research studies included a measure of prosody perception (Minzenberg 
et al., 2006).  Minzenberg and colleagues (2006) administered two tasks to measure prosody 
perception.   On the task that required subjects to choose the emotional tone represented in a non-
affective sentence, they found no significant differences between groups.  On the task that 
required subjects to choose the emotional tone of a 10 second work monologue that was read 
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aloud, the authors found that the BPD subjects were significantly less accurate than the healthy 
controls. The former measure is more in line with what was offered in the CATS, and their 
findings are in agreement as well.  From the description offered by Minzenberg and colleagues, 
the latter task seemed to be more similar to a social perception task in that the actor’s upper body 
and full face is shown in the videos, allowing the vi wer to use both verbal and non-verbal cues 
to make their decisions.  This being considered, the results of the social perception task, the IPT-
15, is a better comparison to their finding.  In this comparison, the current finding that the BPD 
Group was less accurate in social perception is supported by the results of the dynamic 
perception task administered in the Minzenberg et al. (2006) study.     
Implications of Research Findings 
Most FER research utilizes images from the catalog developed by Ekman and Friesen 
(1979).  The current study is no different.  However, unlike the FER measures described in other 
studies, the CATS is able to assess basic and more complex facial emotion perception ability, as 
well as prosodic emotion perception.  The inclusion of facial and prosodic perception in one 
measure offers a unique opportunity to integrate and directly compare perception ability in two 
different modes.  Further, because the CATS measures basic identity discrimination and non-
emotional facial and prosodic perception, it is possible to first determine whether baseline 
differences in perception exist, and to then determine whether there are more specific differences 
in emotion perception.  Most of the perception measure  used in the studies discussed previously 
included tasks requiring subjects to look at one stimulus at a time, and choose which one of the 
basic emotions the expression represented.  The CATS on the other hand, has 13 different 
subtests, each aimed at determining a specific perce tion skill (the 13 subtests and group results 
in Table 7 of the Results section).   
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Several findings of the current study extend those of previous research, and others 
provide more specific information about perception abilities that were not known until now.  One 
extension of previous research is the finding that ose with BPD were less accurate overall in 
emotion perception.  This lends support to previous research (Bland et al., 2004; Dyck et al., 
2009; Levine et al., 1997; Merkl et al., 2010; Unoka et al., 2011), as well as to the notion that 
those with BPD find it more difficult to interpret what others are feeling. This notion is 
supported by several of the theories described previously (Crick & Dodge, 1999; Lemerise & 
Arsenio, 2000; and Halberstadt et al., 2011), which imply that inaccurate emotion processing can 
lead to deficiencies in interpersonal communication and emotion regulation.   
By using the CATS it was possible to determine thate significant difference in 
perception ability was due specifically to deficiencies on the subtests comprising the Complex 
Facial Scale.  On the more complex items, subjects had to differentiate and make matches 
between several facial expressions and emotions.  This finding supports prior research that 
suggested as integrations of appraisals become more complex, individuals with BPD begin to 
evidence impairments (Domes et al., 2008; Dyck et al., 2009; Minzenberg et al., 2006; Schilling 
et al., 2012; Wagner & Linehan, 1999).   
 Across all emotion subtests, the BPD Group was significa tly worse at identifying anger 
and disgust.  This finding is consistent with several p evious studies that found BPD groups have 
a more difficult time differentiating between these specific negative emotions (Bland et al., 2004; 
Levine et al., 1997; Unoka et al., 2011).  There are several explanations for these emotions being 
more difficult to decipher.  Regarding anger, this is an emotion that is heavily emphasized in the 
diagnostic criteria for BPD.  Those with BPD are know  to be more prone to inappropriate, 
intense and uncontrollable outbursts of anger.  Indeed, facial displays of anger may induce higher 
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levels of arousal in these patients compared to healthy individuals.  As noted previously, 
individuals with these characteristics may make perception decisions based on what’s stored in 
their memory.  Further, as their own emotional intensity increases due to autonomic response to 
the social threat of the perception of anger, it may be difficult for them to disengage their 
attention, and make accurate appraisals, or identifications of another’s emotion.  On the contrary, 
it is also possible that intense internal anger results in avoidance of emotionally laden 
interactions with others, and in avoiding these intractions they disengage and attend less to 
perception.    
 Facial expressions of disgust were also significantly more difficult for patients with BPD 
to differentiate compared to healthy controls. Disgust-related perception may be highly relevant 
to BPD for two reasons.  First, there is some evidence to suggest that BPD patients have higher 
disgust sensitivity than healthy controls (Rusch et al. 2011).  Research has found that individuals 
with BPD report more experiences and situations as disgusting, and have a higher degree of 
distress associated with “disgusting” experiences (Rusch et al., 2011). If this is the case, than as 
with anger, disgust may induce higher levels of arousal in patients with BPD and cause cognitive 
interference, or avoidance of the stimulus, making accurate choices difficult in the moment.  
 This study failed to find a significant difference b tween groups in identification of fear, 
which is in contrast to several previous findings (Levine et al., 1997; Merkl et al., 2010; Unoka 
et al., 2011; Wagner & Linehan, 1999).  With respect to this inconsistent result, an explanation 
can be proposed. Since fear tends to be the least accurately recognized emotion in normal 
populations across cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), one could argue that the lack of 
differences demonstrated in fear recognition reflects the difficulty of the task for both groups, 
which may have eliminated significance.   
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Further, we did not find a significant difference btween groups in their ability to 
decipher between neutral and emotion expressions, smething that has been discussed in several 
studies presented here (Levine et al., 1997, Bland et al., 2004, Wagner & Linehan 1999, Dyck et 
al., 2009, Merkl et al., 2010, Fertuck et al., 2009, and Schilling et al., 2012), mainly regarding 
negativity bias toward neutral expression.   The CATS results for individual items are displayed 
as “Correct” or “Incorrect” and therefore, it was not possible to determine whether any bias to 
negative items existed within the sample.  However, given that the BPD and HC Groups 
performed similarly on the non-emotion scales of the CATS, and were just as accurate as the HC 
Group in detecting neutral stimuli within the emotion subtests, it can be hypothesized that neither 
group had difficulty differentiating neutral from emotional stimuli. However, as mentioned 
previously, when emotional choices involved two negative options, the BPD Group did have 
significant difficulty differentiating which negative emotion was being portrayed, specifically 
between the emotions of sad, angry, and disgusted. 
 Unlike previous research, the current study was able to measure prosody perception by 
incorporating and comparing it directly to facial perception.  Even though one of the scales 
included by Minzenberg and colleagues (2006) measurd both facial and prosodic perception, it 
did not combine the modalities to measure direct differences, and it excluded the emotion of 
disgust.  The researchers found that on this particular measure (BLERT; Bell et al., 1997), the 
BPD group performed significantly worse, but the authors failed to report or provide a 
suggestion as to what contributed to this finding.  On the CATS scales of prosody and combined 
prosody/facial perception, no significant differencs were found.  While it was not the predicted 
finding, it is interesting for two reasons.  First, it lends support to the findings related to the pure 
prosody task (PERT; Bowers et al., 1999) administered by Minzenberg and colleagues (2006), 
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who found no significant differences between their BPD sample and HC comparison group. 
Secondly, the absence of prosody deficiencies in participants with facial perception deficiencies 
is surprising. The difference in accuracy between facial and prosody perception could be for 
several reasons.  The most straightforward explanation is that the prosody tasks were difficult for 
both groups and therefore no significant differences emerged.  On the contrary, in today’s world 
of technology and multi-tasking, phone communication is frequent, and listening to someone 
while focusing on another task (i.e. not reading their facial expression) is commonplace.  When 
considering this, prosody perception skills in both groups could be more finely tuned than facial 
perception skills, leading to similar abilities in prosody perception skills for both groups. For 
instance, prosody is often the only option available to identify emotion during phone 
conversations, and for this reason prosody may be easi r to interpret due to fewer cues to encode.  
In facial perception on the other hand, one needs to attend to several areas of the face and encode 
all the cues before reaching a conclusion; it is theoretically a more complex process.  Further, the 
distance from which prosody perception typically occurs (e.g. over the phone), allows for a non-
threatening environment within which to focus on perception. In other words, if emotional 
investment is heightened during in-person interactions and, as proposed previously, interferes 
with emotion perception, then it would be reasonable to suggest that prosody perception from a 
distance would limit the amount of emotional investment and allow for perception to occur 
without distraction. 
Also unique to this study was the measurement of social perception in conjunction with 
the emotion perception task.  This provided an opportunity to begin investigating whether there 
were differences between groups in social perception, and to compare abilities between a static 
and dynamic perception task.   
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Consistent with emotion perception findings, the BPD Group did significantly worse in 
decoding verbal and non-verbal cues to determine relationship status.  This finding suggests that 
patients with BPD may have subtle deficits in the processing of social stimuli that extend beyond 
the range of emotional expressions.  More specifically, the significant difference was the result 
of BPD subject’s poorer accuracy in identifying specific types of relationships; those involving 
intimacy, competition, and deception.  This finding can best be interpreted in terms of either the 
integrated model of emotion and social information processing (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000), or 
the theory of affective social competence (Halberstadt et al., 2001).  The former theory implies 
that emotional investment affects processing of social situations.  The common BPD 
characteristics of struggling with intimate relationships, having paranoia about relationships, and 
general distrust may be related to the deficiencies found on the scales of intimacy, competition, 
and distrust.  This finding could lend support to the idea that when someone is not able to 
accurately perceive situations, can handicap individuals, interfering with their ability to maintain 
healthy interpersonal relationships. Given that there were differences in facial and social 
perception but not in prosody, it can be suggested that perception difficulties are mainly related 
to non-verbal cues such as facial expression and body language.  For instance, even when given 
more information, such as the conversations between actors on the IPT-15, the BPD subjects still 
found it more difficult than the HC Group to interpret the perception cues accurately.   
Interestingly, within the BPD Group, there were no differences in reported anger, 
impulsivity, or affect intensity, but those with a history of NSSI or suicide attempt were found to 
be more socially perceptive than the others in the BPD group.  This difference was not found in 
facial or prosodic perception.  It is difficult to understand this finding, and it may be that it is 
spurious, affected by small sample sizes and outliers in groups.  However, it may be that those 
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who are diagnosed with BPD as a result of a suicide attempt have emotion regulation difficulties 
that are inherently different, and affect perception differently, than those without a history of 
suicide attempts.   
Of note however, is that 14 of 15 in the NSSI/SA sub-group were either in therapy at the 
time of participation, or had been in therapy previously.  Participation in treatment could have 
contributed to more accurate social perception.  As described in the literature review, Saarni 
(1979) and then again in the Theoretical Implications above (Halberstadt et al., 2001), the 
valuable use of display rules is imperative for healthy communication.  When considering that 
those with BPD are frequently raised in invalidating environments, it would stand to reason that 
they did not learn how to correctly use display rules, if at all.  However, in treatment, they were 
probably exposed to techniques that helped to clarify interpersonal confusion, as well as how to 
approach various interpersonal encounters.  In other words, they may have learned how to be 
more ‘relationship appropriate’ but there may not have been a focus on the specifics of facial 
expressions (hence the lack of NSSI/SA differences on the CATS).  Therefore, this finding could 
be explained in terms of the NSSI/SA sub-group learning and improving upon their use of 
display rules and becoming more adept at correctly reading the use of display rules by others in 
social situations.        
Clinical Implications.  The findings presented here have implications for the study of 
emotion perception impairment and its treatment in BPD. First, patients with BPD exhibit poorer 
recognition of facial and social emotional cues, especially when the cues involved facial 
expressions of negative emotions.  Misperception of emotions in others interferes with 
interpersonal relationships and leads to misjudgments of others, and as has been noted numerous 
times, relationship problems are common among people with BPD.  Clinically, these findings 
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suggest that interventions targeting the differentiation and labeling of negative emotions may be 
a fruitful component of therapeutic intervention for BPD. For instance, psycho-educational 
sessions or groups that include learning to recognize and identify one’s own emotions and those 
of others could be a useful addition to treatment. Further, interventions targeting the 
understanding and implementation of socially acceptable non-verbal body language signals could 
aid in improving perception ability and social interactions in general. 
Though it is a lengthy therapy program with many other components, Dialectical 
Behavior Therapy (DBT) has been shown to be an effective treatment for individuals with BPD 
(e.g. Linehan et al., 2006; Neacsiu, Rizvi, & Linehan, 2010). It includes skills training 
components and education related to emotion regulation nd effective emotional expression in 
relationships (Linehan, 1993).   However, it may be that providing more specific information 
about accuracy of identification of emotion in others as well as in one’s self may be a useful 
addition to the treatment. Similarly, adding more psychoeducational material about emotion 
processing into the biosocial theory as it is presented to clients (and clinical providers) may be 
valuable. Further, examining ways in which prosody may be highlighted in the service of 
accurate emotion perception in individuals with BPD (as this ability appears to be intact) may be 
another helpful adjunctive element of treatment.       
Additionally, it would be ideal to inform those who treat BPD patients about the potential 
difficulty with recognition, intensity, and regulation of emotion.  Though the diagnosis includes 
criteria relative to intensity and regulation of emotion, there is not mention of perception 
deficiencies.  This information may enable staff to deal more objectively and therapeutically with 
this diagnostic group, especially considering that professionals have been known to use 
pejorative labels for BPD patients, which may be in part due to difficulty with BPD patients’ 
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expressions of distress.  Often, those interacting with BPD patients feel personally attacked 
during ‘outbursts’ rather than recognizing that the BPD patient’s maladaptive emotional 
expressions are more than likely in response to a history of invalidation.  From the perspective of 
the biosocial theory, an invalidating environment is a source of continued emotion dysregulation.  
It can also be considered that inaccurate perception contributes to dysregulation. If staff began to 
view these ‘outbursts’ as a response to misperceptions rather than as an attack, the staff could use 
the interaction as a teaching tool.  For instance, staff could help to clarify what emotions are 
being expressed (or not expressed), and correct the faulty perception pattern.   
Limitations and Future Directions  
Several limitations are noted in the current study.  This research was largely exploratory 
for two reasons.  First, it was only the second stuy to test prosody in BPD.  Second, it utilized 
the CATS, a measure capable of testing single and cross modal perception, which has not been 
used in previous BPD perception research.  The CATS, in and of itself is new, being published in 
2006.  Therefore, one of the limitations of this study was the limited reliability and validity data 
available for the CATS (Schaffer et al., 2006), as well as no reported reliability or validity for 
use with a BPD population.  However, the measure does incorporate images from Ekman and 
Friesen’s facial catalog (1979) which is similar to m st of the FER research discussed here.     
Failure to include brain imaging data was another limitation in the current study.  In 
general, long standing research has suggested that the mygdala is in large part responsible for 
the processing of the emotional content of facial expr ssions (Kling & Brothers, 1992) as well as 
the processing of more complex interpersonal social interactions (Kling, Steklis, & Deutsch, 
1979). More specifically, it has been suggested that a hyper-reactive amygdala could predispose 
BPD individuals to be hyper-vigilant and especially over-reactive to others’ emotional 
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expressions.   Therefore, while it would not have influenced or changed the results of the study, 
it would have been beneficial to be able to assess differences in amagdyla reactivity and how 
much this correlated with perception ability.  FMRI research is costly and requires expertise in 
neuroanatomy, making it the exception rather than te norm in emotion perception research.  The 
information fMRI provides however, cannot be discounted and it is important to continue 
examining the influence of brain abnormalities in BPD.   
Additionally, by design, the present study did not exclude BPD participants who had 
comorbid diagnoses such as anxiety and mood related disorders (those with reported psychotic 
disorders and substance dependence were excluded).  While the presence of co-occurring 
disorders is well representative of the heterogeneity of BPD, the inclusion of co-morbidity may 
have consequently affected the findings. However, BPD samples without Axis I co-morbidity are 
highly atypical, and although the presence of other disorders may have influenced the results, it 
also renders findings more generalizable.  In future research it would continue to be beneficial to 
include co-morbidity, but better control for its influence so that differences between diagnostic 
groups could be determined.   
Similarly, the decision was made to include participants taking psychotropic medication 
and/or who were engaged in psychotherapy.  Including these participants raises the question of 
whether the observed effects were influenced by therapy and/or medication effects on the brain.  
For instance, the observed differences may have actually been more distinct had anyone with 
prior or current treatment been excluded.  Future BPD treatment studies may benefit from 
including perception measures as part of a pre- and post- test battery to determine the effect that 
treatment and/or psychotropic medication has on perception ability.  Similarly, this study did not 
include a clinical comparison group.   While this group did represent a diverse group of BPD 
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participants, and several who had been hospitalized for problems related to the BPD diagnosis, 
they were all ambulatory and fairly high functioning i  the community at the time of their 
participation. Therefore, it is unclear whether these findings are specific to this subject pool, or if 
the findings can be generalizable to BPD as a whole.  A wider spectrum of individuals with BPD 
at different levels of care, severity, and with varying demographic characteristics would aid in 
clarifying the generalizability of these findings.  An ideal study would include a newly diagnosed 
BPD group (i.e. little if any treatment), an outpatien  BPD group, and an inpatient BPD group.    
Lastly, the current study did not control for environmental and temperamental influences.  
As noted several times, it is theorized that BPD stem  from a combination of environmental and 
biological influences, often including a history of an abusive environment and an emotionally 
sensitive disposition.  The current study only gathered diagnostic information, and did not gather 
information regarding how the disorder may have evolved.  Gathering information about 
childhood trauma history, parenting styles, and personality traits/temperament would have 
greatly contributed to the understanding of the current findings and would have offered more 
perspective about how the findings relate to the theories of emotion processing and BPD 
development.  Future research would ideally gather developmental information.  Further to this 
point, administering non-personally relevant perception materials under low stress conditions 
may have limited the ‘real world’ influence that one’s emotionality has on interactions.  It is 
important to extend this research by using dynamic and personally relevant social stimuli in 
multiple modalities and differing social contexts and stress levels to identify whether the effect 






The theories of emotion processing all suggest that emotion perception is a component of 
emotion regulation. Therefore, when there are difficult es in emotion regulation, there are most 
likely difficulties in emotion perception. In people with BPD, emotion regulation is of primary 
concern, and when in treatment, is often targeted as such.  The more that is understood about the 
relationship between emotion perception and components of emotion regulation, the more 
treatments can cater to targeting deficiencies.  The emotion perception differences found 
between groups in the current study further solidify that such differences exist, and will add to 
the scant information regarding the less researched prosody perception.   
This research is the first known study to directly ompare facial and prosodic perception 
as well as emotion to social perception ability. The findings of this study are consistent with 
previous research indicating that facial emotion perception is less accurate in those with BPD 
compared to healthy controls.  More specifically, this study suggests that deficiencies are not 
apparent in basic tasks of perception, but arise whn t e situation is more complex and 
especially, when there is ambiguity between the emotions of anger, sadness, and disgust in 
others.  Results concerning prosody perception suggest that this is not a deficiency for those with 
BPD. This finding is in line with that of the one study that included a comparable prosody 
perception task (Minzenberg et al., 2006).  Because there are only two studies of prosody 
perception in BPD, the current study being one of them, it is suggested that more research be 
conducted in this area before any generalizations regarding prosody can be made.  
Social perception also appears to be deficient in those with BPD.  This finding, along 
with the differences in emotion perception, suggest that misinterpretations may be occurring on 
several different levels including facial perception, body posturing, space boundaries, and use of 
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display rules.  Further research is needed to explore whether there are important personality trait 
dimensions or historical factors that may also be impeding perception ability. However, it 
appears that negative emotional stimuli increase the likelihood of perception difficulties.   
 While there is still much to be learned about the mechanisms by which emotion 
processing and regulation degrade in individuals with BPD, this study has added to this by 
offering several explanations for the differences in perception including: interference from 
traumatic memories, lack of perception or emotion knowledge, heightened sensitivity to 
emotional stimuli, and avoidance of emotional stimul . Likely, perception difficulties stem from 
a combination of factors, and treatment to target mul iple deficiencies (e.g. emotion 
dysregulation, interpersonal difficulties) would be in the best interest for an individual diagnosed 
with BPD.  All of this information allows for conceptualization of how these deficiencies can be 
remedied in treatment and ultimately aid in alleviating symptoms of the disorder.  
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Appendix A: Recruitment Advertisements 
 
Subject line:  PAID Research Study - Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
 
BPD VOLUNTEERS NEEDED:  If you are diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder, 
you may be eligible to participate in a research study examining emotion perception abilities in 
those diagnosed with BPD versus those who do not mee th  criteria for this disorder. 
 
VOLUNTEER REQUIREMENTS: 
1. Age 18-55 
2. Meet diagnostic criteria for BPD 
3. No current drug or alcohol dependence 
 
OVERVIEW of RESEARCH STUDY: 
1. Phone screen to determine eligibility (approx 15min).  Those who do not meet eligibility will 
not be invited for the research study. 
2. One time visit to research lab, located in Midtown Manhattan, to complete assessment 
measures (approx 2 hours) 
 
PAYMENT:  Volunteers will be reimbursed for their time upon their completion of the 
assessment measures.   
 
BENEFITS:  This research study will give participants a chance to contribute to the research on 
how we perceive others emotions and how this affects our own emotional response.  Further, this 
will contribute to the body of research that is aiding in the development of effective treatments 
for those with Borderline Personality Disorder.  All participants will be given resources for 
therapy and/or support groups in the NYC area should they be interested.   
 
IF YOU THINK YOU MAY QUALIFY, PLEASE CALL xxx-xxx-xxxx and leave a message.   
 
THANK YOU 
This research has been approved by:  The City University of New York (CUNY), Institutional 















Subject line:  PAID research study seeking those who have difficulty with their EMOTIONS  
 
VOLUNTEERS NEEDED:  If you relate to most or all of the questions listed below, you may be 
eligible to participate in a research study examining emotion perception abilities in people with 
these characteristics versus those who do not have t es  characteristics:  
 
-Do you often feel anxious about relationships, or fear that others will end relationships with 
you? 
-Do your relationships tend to be rocky and/or intense?  
-Do you find it difficult to manage your emotions throughout the day? 
-Do you often find you experience emotions more intnsely than others? 
-Do you have a hard time finding direction in your life? 
-Have you ever thought about hurting yourself because your emotions were too overwhelming? 
 
VOLUNTEER REQUIREMENTS: 
1. Age 18-55 
2. Meet diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
3. NO current dependence on drugs or alcohol 
 
OVERVIEW of RESEARCH STUDY: 
1. Phone screen to determine eligibility (approx 15min).  Those who do not meet eligibility will 
not be invited for the research study. 
2. One time visit to research lab, located in Midtown Manhattan, to complete assessment 
measures (approx 2 hours) 
 
PAYMENT:  Volunteers will be reimbursed for their time upon their completion of the 
assessment measures.   
 
BENEFITS:  This research study will give participants a chance to contribute to the research on 
how we perceive others emotions and how this affects our own emotional response.  Further, this 
will contribute to the body of research that is aiding in the development of effective treatments 
for those with Borderline Personality Disorder.  All participants will be given resources for 
therapy and/or support groups in the NYC area should they be interested.   
 
IF YOU THINK YOU MAY QUALIFY, PLEASE CALL xxx-xxx-xxxx and leave a message.   
 
THANK YOU 
This research has been approved by:  The City University of New York (CUNY), Institutional 









Subject line:  PAID Research Study Seeking Healthy Volunteers – Emotion Perception 
 
VOLUNTEERS NEEDED:  If you consider yourself to be m ntally stable and generally in 
control of your emotions, you may be eligible to participate in a research study examining 
emotion perception abilities in a clinical sample versus a non-clinical sample.  
 
VOLUNTEER REQUIREMENTS: 
1. Age 18-55 
2. Currently NOT meeting criteria for any diagnosable mental illness (e.g. Depression, Anxiety) 
2. Not prescribed psychiatric medications for any reason 
3. No dependence on drugs or alcohol 
 
OVERVIEW of RESEARCH STUDY: 
1. Phone screen to determine eligibility (approx 10min).  Those who do not meet eligibility will 
not be invited for the research study. 
2. One time visit to research lab, located in Midtown Manhattan, to complete assessment 
measures (approx 2 hours) 
 
PAYMENT:  Volunteers will be reimbursed for their time upon their completion of the 
assessment measures.   
 
BENEFITS:  This research study will give participants a chance to contribute to the research on 
how we perceive others emotions and how this affects our own emotional response.  Further, this 
will contribute to the body of research that is aiding in the development of effective treatments 
for those with Borderline Personality Disorder.  All participants will be given resources for 
therapy and/or support groups in the NYC area should they be interested.   
 
IF YOU THINK YOU MAY QUALIFY, PLEASE CALL xxx-xxx-xxxx and leave a message.   
 
THANK YOU 
This research has been approved by:  The City University of New York (CUNY), Institutional 
















Appendix B: Phone Screen 
 
CODE:__________  Date of Screen___/___/___    Preliminary Group:    HC   or   BPD  
 
Verbal Consent Script:  “This is a research study to determine whether indiv duals with certain 
personality characteristics perceive emotions the same or differently than those who do not have 
these characteristics.  If during a phone screen it seems that you meet the criteria and are willing 
to participate, the study will include coming to the research office for one visit lasting 
approximately two hours.  During that time you will be asked many questions about your mental 
health and your personality.  You will also be asked to complete a computerized task, watch 
several video clips, and complete three brief written questionnaires.  No portion of the study is 
anticipated to be distressing or have a negative impact to participants.  Participation in this study 
is voluntary.  You can discontinue participation at any point during the study.  If you meet the 
eligibility criteria and come to the research office to participate, you will receive $40 
compensation upon completion of the protocol.  You will also be given a list of community 
mental health resources should you be interested.  Does this sound like something you would be 
interested in?”  
 
YES:   “Okay, then at this point I would like to ask you several questions that will help to 
determine whether you are eligible to be a participant in this research study.  This will take 
several minutes and includes questions about your personality, mood, thinking patterns, and 
habits.  You are being assigned a numeric code that will be listed on this questionnaire, and it is 
_______.  From this point forward all of the information you give will be identified by the code 
and neither your name or phone number will be associated with this information.  This will 
ensure your privacy.  Can I have your consent to conduct this interview?”   
Yes               No    
 
NO to either of above:  “Thank you.  If you change your mind, you may re-contact the study.  
We will not save your name or phone number and therefore will not contact you again.”   
 
1. What is your age? _______ 2. What race do consider yourself?___________________ 
 
 
3.  BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER CRITERIA Number of criteria met_____ 
(Minimum of 5 needed for BPD Group, and no more than 2 for HC Group; If YES to any, ask for 
elaboration) 
__ 1.Abandonment (This question refers to all types of relationships.  Do you ever experience 
fear or worry that people will end relationships with you?) ______________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
__ 2.Unstable and intense relationships (Do you feel like in general your relationships have a lot 
of ups and downs?)________________________________________________________ 




__ 4.Impulsivity (Are there ever times you spend a lot more money than you planned, or have 
“road rage” or have one night stands, or find that you often drink too much or use drugs?) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
__ 5.Suicide attempts, threats, gestures, self-injury (Have you ever injured yourself on purpose?) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
__ 6.Affective instability (Do you feel like your emotions and mood change often throughout the 
day? For instance do you get irritated very easily or find that your anxiety levels shift 
quickly?)______________________________________________________________________ 
__ 7.Emptiness (Do you often feel like something is m sing in your life, or that you’re 
emotionally empty inside?)__________________________________________________ 
__ 8.Anger (Do you feel like your anger is stronger than others, or really intense? If so, what do 
you do when you’re really angry?)______________________________________________ 
__ 9.Paranoid ideation/Dissociation (Do you often thi k people have ill will toward you?  Do 
you tend to “space out” when you’re stressed?)___________________________________ 
 
4.  SCID SCREEN ADDITIONAL DIAGNOSIS (To determine Exclusion only) 
___1. Substance/Alcohol Abuse (In the last three months have you had 5 or more drinks on one 
occasion?____ How often do you drink alcohol?______ and typically how much? __________ 
Do you use drugs?______ How often?______ Have you ever abused prescription medication? 
________ Have you ever experienced withdrawal from alcohol or drugs, or been to rehab? ___ 
___2. Psychotic Symptoms (Have you ever been bothered by thoughts that didn’t make any 
sense or feel as though others were communicating with you in a strange way?  Have you ever 
experienced seeing or hearing things that others couldn’t see or 
hear?)____________________________________ 
___3. Have you ever been prescribed medication to address depression, anxiety, or another 
mental health concern?______________________________________________________ 
__ 4.  Have you ever had a traumatic brain injury or been knocked unconscious?_____________ 
 
When Inclusion or Exclusion has been determined: 
INCLUSION:  Thank you for answering all of the questions. It seems at this time that you meet 
eligibility criteria for the study.  Would you like to schedule an appointment to complete your 
participation? (set appointment, give details of location) 
 
EXCLUSION:  Thank you for answering so many questions.  We are looking for people who fit 
very specific criteria and unfortunately you do notqualify for the study.  This information just 
gathered will be saved but your identifying information is not attached to it.  We will not be 
contacting you again but will save your name and phone number in a separate, secured file for 










Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire for BPD Participants 
CODE:____ 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE for BPD GROUP 
 
1.  HISTORY OF SELF-INJURY and/or SUICIDE ATTEMPTS (complete if subject reported 
YES to item 3.5 on Phone Screen) “On the phone screen you indicated that you have injured 
yourself on purpose.  How did you do this?”_________________________ 
“Did you ever injure yourself with the intention ofcommitting suicide? YES      NO 
If YES, “How many times?” ______   “When was the first time you made an attempt?” 
_____________________“Can you please describe what you did?”__________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
“When was the most recent attempt?” ______ “Can you please describe what you 
did?”______________________________________________ ________________“When 
is the last time you had a thought to hurt yourself?” ________________________ 
**If current suicidal ideation is reported, call 911 from office or call campus Security to have 
subject escorted to St. Lukes Roosevelt ER on 59th and 10th Ave. (across the street from John Jay 
campus) **   
 
2.  PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT HISTORY 
“Are you currently in therapy and/or prescribed psychotropic medication?”___________ 
If NO: “Have you ever been in treatment?” ________When?_______________________ 
If YES:  “Were you given a diagnosis? With what?”___ ________________________ 
 























Appendix D: Selected images from the Comprehensive Affect Testing System (CATS) 
 
 
Sample from Subtest 1:  Identity discrimination 
 
 




Sample from Subtest 5: Name affect 
 
 





Sample from Subtest 8: Select Affect 
 
 





Sample from Subtest 12:  Match emotional face to emtional prosody 
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